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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
1.1 Inventing the Economy
Before the 1930s, the economy did not exist. In this dissertation, I explore what it means
to make a claim that the economy did not exist before the 1930s, the evidence for this
claim, and some of the consequences of the crystallization of the economy as an object of
knowledge and policymaking in the 1930s-1940s.
Science studies scholars have a long tradition of studying the formation of new scientific
objects (Pickering 1993, Latour 1999, Knorr Cetina 2001, Hacking 2002, Mol 2002). The
consensus of this research is that objects are enacted (brought into being) through specific
practices (Mol 2002). Scientists, or other experts, construct objects through the practices
that identify those objects, draw their boundaries, establish their properties, and so on.
Work on the social sciences has identified numbers and statistics as particularly capable of
making things “hold together” (Desrosie`res 1991, Porter 1995).
Following this tradition, I identify one set of practices — national income statistics —
that enact the economy. National income statistics here refers to a broad family of aggregate
income and production measures, including national income, gross national product, gross
domestic product, and close relatives (net national product, etc.). Historically, governments
began to produce official national income statistics in approximately the same moment
(1930-1950) that the economy took shape. I argue that this timing is not coincidental, but
rather causal. Specifically, I argue that the routine, official production of national income
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statistics was a cause of the formation of the economy. The economy came into being,
and is sustained by, a particular regime of perceptibility (cf. Murphy 2006, Hecht 2012), a
collection of people, tools, and ideas that provided sustained attention to particular facets of
the economic world. This dissertation is thus a member of the genre of formation stories, a
kind of causal argument about the coming into being of new social kinds. Drawing on my
work with Isaac Reed (Hirschman and Reed 2014), I discuss below how formation stories
provide causal accounts that differ from traditional approaches to causal inference.
In some ways, the economy is a strange sort of object to study via this practice-centered
approach. Many of the objects analyzed by science studies scholars are mundane and
eminently physical like the veins inside a leg. Scholarly analysis is motivated by the need
to unpack the complexities of seemingly simple and obvious things. Atherosclerosis seems
like something you can point to — here’s plaque inside a vein in a pathology lab. But,
as Mol (2002) shows, atherosclerosis is necessarily enacted in different and incompatible
ways in different settings — the definition in the pathology lab is fundamentally unavailable
to patients and primary care doctors, as it requires the removal of the limb in question.
The analytical payoff from these studies comes from rejecting the obvious “there it is!”
character of the object. But the economy is a bit different. Where is it? Everywhere and
nowhere. What is it? Everything and nothing at once.
And yet, we also think of the economy as the most material thing — indeed, “material”
is often code for “economic” in social theory. Similarly, despite the economy’s poten-
tial vagueness, in practice, the economy exists as something to which we can point, refer,
politic, and so on. When it comes to presidential elections, as President Clinton’s strate-
gist, James Carville, famously said, “[It’s] the economy, stupid.” And a large literature
in political science would agree — the economy does determine elections (e.g. Kramer
1971, Achen and Bartels 2004, Healy and Malhotra 2013). More mundanely, the economy
is something we constantly invoke and characterize — “the American economy grew 2%
last year” or “The Japanese economy never recovered from its lost decade.” As Suttles
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(2010) has shown, the economy exists inside a dense landscape of terminology. It can be
a machine or an organism, it can grow or shrink, it can be healthy or weak. It can consist
of manufacturing or be service-based or financialized (Krippner 2005). Thus, in a very
important sense, the economy has become an object according to Star’s (2010: 603) use-
ful definition: “something people... act towards or with” whose “materiality derives from
action, not from a sense of prefabricated stuff or ‘thing’-ness.”
My purpose here is to ask how the economy came to be the sort of object it is —
“how the leopard got its spots.” The critical insight will be that the economy — unlike
“culture,” “politics,” or “society” — has a well-defined size. The concept of an “economic
sphere,” separate from and analogous to the political or cultural spheres, dates back to the
18th century, give or take (Rothschild 2014). In the 1930s, the economic sphere became
something measurable in the aggregate, and in whose aggregate performance everyone was
interested. No similar transformation happened to the political or cultural spheres. The
economy thus has a dual character: on the one hand, an area of life or mode of action
(analogous with politics or culture), on the other, a well-defined, bounded object.
This introduction proceeds as follows. First, I clarify what kind of a dissertation this is
(and thus what the formation of the economy is a “case” of). I offer a detailed discussion
of the concept of formation stories, and how my approach to tackling the formation of
the economy is informed by methodological debates in historical sociology and science
studies. Second, I outline how this dissertation makes a broader contribution to sociological
debates about the performativity of economics, and the relationship between expertise,
quantification, and politics. To do this, I discuss and elaborate the concept of regimes
of perceptibility, first put forward in the science studies literature. Third, I provide brief
summaries of the empirical chapters of the dissertation, focusing on how these chapters
make contributions to discussions to the historiography of macroeconomics, the evolution
of political responsibility for economic outcomes, the economic value of housework, and
the rise of top income inequality as a social problem.
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1.2 Formation Stories in Sociology
This dissertation provides a formation story, a causal account of the coming into being of a
new social kind which can then, in turn, participate in other causal relationships.1 Forma-
tion stories are a venerable and widely-practice form in sociological explanation, but they
have often been misrecognized as interpretive, descriptive, “merely historical”, or other
noncausal derogatories (Hirschman and Reed 2014: 276).2 The genre of formation sto-
ries includes accounts of the emergence of new organizational fields (e.g. Medvetz 2012
on the “crystallization” of the space of think tanks), analyses of the shaping and reshap-
ing of sociotechnical objects (e.g. Eyal 2010 on the history of autism), and even work
on the formation of the individual as an autonomous actor (Meyer and Jepperson 2010).
Formation stories stand in stark contrast to more conventional forcing cause accounts. In
this section, I briefly summarize the three dominant modes of forcing cause accounts, and
then explain how formation stories necessarily violate key assumptions of these forcing
cause approaches while still aiming to provide causal explanations. I conclude by arguing
that my formation story, like many others, is doubly causal: it provides both a causal ac-
count of the emergence of “the economy” as a new social kind, and a causal account of the
consequences of that emergence.
The dominant approaches to causality in sociology can all be characterized by the
metaphor of “forcing.” These approaches emphasize how some aspect of the social world
pushes or pulls on another aspect to move an object of analysis from one state to an-
other. Following Goldthorpe (2001), we can group these approaches into three rough
groups: “variable causality,” “experimental causality,” and “mechanisms.” Variable causal-
ity searches for robust associations between two variables, such as the link between father’s
1This section draws heavily on Hirschman and Reed 2014. I provide in-text citations only to specific
claims and quotes.
2Note, I am not claiming that descriptive work should be derogated. In contrast, I think descriptive work
is highly undervalued in our current disciplinary quest for causal explanation. My point here is that formation
stories are not just descriptive, and that allegations to the contrary both confuse the issue and reinforce the
denigration of both formation stories and true descriptive accounts.
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education and occupation and son’s occupation in the famous Blau and Duncan path model.
Experimental causality relies on the experimenter’s agency in designing an intervention in
the world (or statistically identifying a natural experiment) in order to tease out the rela-
tionship between a treatment and a cause. Mechanistic causality takes diverse forms, but
always involves searching for an account “one level down” from the correlation or outcome
to be explained. Mechanistic accounts include rational choice approaches that focus on mi-
crofoundations (explanations of aggregate outcomes in terms of simple rules of behavior at
an underlying level), and critical realist accounts that treat mechanisms as components of
contingent conjunctures. All of these approaches rely heavily on what Abbott (1988) has
called the “fixed entities” assumption, the idea that the objects whose movements are to be
explained are fixed across the explanatory timeframe. In other words, these accounts rule
out the possibility that new social kinds or outcomes could come into existence. As such,
they are incapable of addressing questions like the one posed in this dissertation: how did
we come to live in a world that contains “economies” as object of knowledge and poli-
cymaking? How did economies come to be the kinds of things that could be growing or
shrinking, industrialized or financialized?
Tackling the question of formation requires making four breaks with forcing cause ap-
proaches. First, we must abandon the fixed entities assumption, and allow for the possibility
that new social kinds may come into existence. We must embrace the historically variable
ontology of the social. Note that this is not a call for complete relativism, but rather a
recognition of the historical character of social construction. Autism exists because of the
social and technical matrix in which it is embedded (Eyal 2010). Similarly, I show how the
economy comes into being at the center of a collection of statistical practices, economic
theories, and policy regimes.
Second, we must treat history as eventful (Sewell 2005). New objects come into being
through both the slow accretion of structural changes and through the chrysalis of transfor-
mative moments. The history of social kinds is one of discontinuous ruptures layered on
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top of slow evolutions. In this dissertation, I point to several key events whose unfolding
shaped the economy. In particular, the responses to the Great Depression and the mobiliza-
tion for World War II catapulted a relatively uninfluential academic preoccupation (national
income statistics) into the policy limelight, and in so doing transformed our understanding
of “the economic” into a particular concrete social kind, “the economy.” I also take pains
to note, however, that this eventful transformation occurred on top of structural changes in
the organization of production, of academic knowledge production, and of the state which
made possible the statistical practices that gave the economy its shape.
Third, drawing on the tradition of actor-network theory and the broader conversation
in science studies on the formation of technical objects discussed above, we must accept
that formation stories proceed through messy assemblages of actors of different scales and
different kinds. Eyal (2010) offers a fantastic example here, showing how autism as a
social problem emerges from the intersection of psychiatric knowledge, state imperatives
to take care of troubled children, the lay expertise of parents, the tangle of billing and
reimbursement practices of the American health care system, and more. In my account,
I focus on the intertwined assemblages underpinning the production and dissemination of
national income statistics and macroeconomic theories.
Finally, inspired by the “dynamic nominalism” of Ian Hacking (2002), we must fore-
ground assemblages involving representation, self-understandings, and culture, broadly
writ. To create categories is both an eminently technical act (Bowker and Star 2000) and
an eminently cultural one (Durkheim and Mauss 1967). The categories we create have
the power to reshape existing social kinds, and to create entirely new ones. Here, I argue
that how economists, politicians, and the general public came to understand aggregate eco-
nomic affairs concretized “the economy” as capturing the sum of all economic activity and
also providing a convenient shorthand for evaluating the success of political programs. As
Yarrow (2010) argues, in the US the economy came to stand in for American exception-
alism (for a similar story in post-war Japan, see O’Bryan 2009). The economy was thus
6
simultaneously (if unsurprisingly) a technical object and a political one, and its representa-
tion as a political object transformed its possibilities as a technical one.
To summarize “[formation stories] refer to explanatory accounts of how social kinds
are shaped, reshaped, or brought into being; in contrast to forcing causes, these stories take
as their points of reference the nonfixedness of social entities, the eventfulness of social
life, the emergence of social entities from processes of assemblage, and the dependence of
such assemblage and nonfixedness on representation.” (Hirschman and Reed 2014: 268)
These formation stories, I argue, are doubly causal. First, they produce causal accounts of
how new social kinds come into being, and come to take particular shapes. These accounts
are messy — social kinds emerge through eventful processes of heterogeneous assemblage
— but they are still causal. Second, formation stories provide causal explanations for the
consequences of the new social kind coming into existence. In my case, I show how the
assemblages that produced and sustain the economy made possible new kinds of preci-
sion in economic governance, while simultaneously obscuring from view potential social
problems.
Given their limitations and messiness, what can we learn from formation stories? Be-
yond their value as explanations of specific historical events (which need not be trivial-
ized), I think formation stories typically offer two sources of value beyond the matter at
hand. First, they are capable of providing boundaries for forcing cause accounts. As I ar-
gue in chapter 4, scholars in political science and political sociology have long linked the
performance of the economy to voting behavior (a classic example of “variable causality”
at work). This analysis, and others like it, tends to treat the economy anachronistically,
assuming that measures like GDP or unemployment meant the same thing at all times and
places. Yet, as my analysis shows, before the economy existed, these measures were largely
unavailable, or only available with a severe temporal lag, and not widely circulated. We
would expect a different relationship to obtain between GDP growth and presidential vote
share after the economy comes into being as a recognized object (measured by national
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income) than we would before it. Second, a particular formation story is not readily gener-
alizable in its details, but it may provide a starting place for future analysis. For example,
Ian Hacking’s (1995, 2007) work on “the looping effect of human kinds” has identified a
general pattern relating diagnostic categories and the behavior of the diagnosed. This work
in turn formed one of the bases for Eyal’s (2010) research on autism. Similarly, work on
the performativity of economics has described particular examples linking new economic
theories to the creation of new markets (MacKenzie 2006). These accounts can and do
form the starting point for future work on the influence of economics, providing a rough
outline for a subgenre of formation story, if not a tightly specified causal mechanism.
In the following section, I outline how the formation story told in this dissertation con-
tributes to two related conversations at the intersection of economic sociology, political
sociology, and science studies.
1.3 Learning from the Formation of the Economy
Sociologists, political scientists, and science studies scholars have been increasingly in-
terested in the consequences of economic knowledge for the functioning of markets and
states. In this section, I discuss how this dissertation contributes to two important strands
of this literature: research under the umbrella of “the performativity of economics” and
work on the intersection of experts, expertise, and politics.
1.3.1 Making Performativity Macro
In 1998, Michel Callon published a pair of influential essays (Callon 1998a, 1998b) that
introduced the concept of the “performativity of economics.” Drawing on his previous
work in the tradition of actor-network theory, Callon argued that sociologists had mis-
understood the relationship between economic knowledge (broadly construed to include
accounting, marketing, etc.) and economic life (buying, selling, producing, consuming).
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Economics, Callon argued, was not (just) an inaccurate representation of an underlying
reality, but rather a toolkit that provided individuals and organizations new kinds of cal-
culative agencies, new ways to act economically. Economic sociologists had argued that
economic action was embedded in social structures (Granovetter 1985); Callon (1998a: 30)
argued in contrast that “economy is embedded not in society but in economics.” Donald
MacKenzie elaborated this perspective in a series of influential papers and books on the
role of financial economics in financial markets, most notably in An Engine, not a Camera
(2006) which documents the role of particular theories, and particular economists, in con-
stituting the Chicago Board of Exchange options market. Economics was thus an engine
that powered economic activity, not a camera that reflected a pre-existing economic world
(more or less accurately).
Thus far, research on performativity has tended to focus on the intersection of particular
economic theories and particular markets, especially financial markets (for some notable
exceptions, see Muniesa 2014). Despite Callon’s call to embed “economy” in economics,
little work in this tradition has focused on the construction of the economy as a whole.
Instead, the performativity literature tends to take for granted the existence of a category
“the economic” and asks how certain objects or ways of acting are brought under the rubric
of the economic. That is, performativity research is interested in how grain is transformed
from a particular product born of nature and human labor into a standardized commodity,
and later an abstract futures market (Cronon 1991)3. Similarly, Holm (2007) looks at how
fish become economic through their transformation into transferable assets. These works
tacitly assume the existence of the economic domain (which is generally equated with “the
economy”), and ask how different objects are brought into that domain.
While incredibly generative, and useful for analyzing many cases of performativity,
these accounts unintentionally ignore the historical construction of the economic itself, and
simultaneously collapse the distinction between the economic and the economy. In chapter
3Cronon’s work predates the performativity literature, but is a key touchstone for it.
9
2, I synthesize the historiography of (macro)economic thought to situate the emergence
of the economic as sphere of social life and the economy as a sociotechnical object of
knowledge. My work thus extends discussions of the performativity of economics to the
macroeconomy as an object, while offering a gentle reminder that acts of economicization
(Caliskan and Callon 2009) only make sense in light of the historical emergence of the
economic as a category.
In chapter 4, I further extend the performativity perspective by reuniting Callon’s work
on performativity with earlier research in the actor-network theory tradition that empha-
sizes how macroactors are constructed from networks of suitably black-boxed smaller ac-
tors. In “Unscrewing the Big Leviathan”, Callon and Latour (1981) argue that the so-called
macro actors of sociology, such as states and large corporations, are not ontologically dif-
ferent from micro-actors. Rather, macro actors set atop networks of control, making it
possible for them to influence larger amounts of the social world. These networks take the
form of black-boxed relationships, where those at the center are capable of issuing orders
outwards without having to take into account all of the details of what happens underneath.
These links are simultaneously social, political, and technological, and it is the technolog-
ical links that most distinguish modern large-scale forms. Put differently, “technology is
society made durable” (Latour 1991). Social and political alliances are unstable; techno-
logical linkages help to stabilize them, and thus make society more durable.4
I bring together this work on macro-actors with Callon’s more recent perspective on
the embeddedness of economy in economics to make sense of modern states. With the
invention of national income statistics, and the stabilization of the economy as a technical
object, states gained a powerful new way of governing as macro-actors. The economy is
made simultaneously “big” (encompassing all economic activity) and “small,” manipula-
ble, understandable, measurable in tables and charts and reports that fit inside an office.
4This is not to say that technological linkages are flawless or incapable of being disrupted. Rather, this per-
spective highlights how technologies form another kind of connection between actors that tends to strengthen
networks. On the possibilities for technological failure, see Akrich 1992.
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Thus, this dissertation continues the work of unscrewing the biggest leviathans, and mak-
ing sense of how seemingly small practices (statistical computations in a single office in a
single Bureau) can join a network of actors to make possible a new mode of governance.
1.3.2 Policy Devices, Styles of Reasoning, & Regimes of Perceptibility
While performativity scholars have debated the effect of economics on markets, a some-
what separate group of scholars in political science and sociology have analyzed the influ-
ence economists on policy. In Hirschman and Berman (2014), we summarize this research
at length, and point towards ways of integrating ideas from science studies (including per-
formativity) into the analysis of the policy effects of economic expertise. In particular,
we argue that economic expertise influences policy through three distinct routes: profes-
sional authority (the broad legitimacy of economists), institutional position (the presence
of economists in the decision-making apparatus of the state), and “cognitive infrastructure”
(how policymakers think about and measure the world they govern).
This last route of influence requires the most explanation, and relates most closely
to the themes explored in this dissertation. Cognitive infrastructure “refers to economic
styles of reasoning prevalent among policymaking elites, as well as the establishment of
economic policy devices that produce knowledge and help make decisions.” (Hirschman
and Berman 2014: 781) Styles of reasoning, a term borrowed from Ian Hacking (1992)
are basic tools of understanding applied to a given domain. For example, the concepts of
incentives, opportunity costs, and maximizing behavior are key components of the modern
economic style of reasoning. One route by which economics (as a field of knowledge
production) influences policy is through the diffusion of economic styles of reasoning. As
economists gained professional authority in the 20th century, they gained positions teaching
in law schools and policy schools, and thus helped to diffuse basic economic concepts to
future policymakers. Similarly, economists in institutional positions of power (such as
the Council of Economic Advisers) spend much of their time expounding basic economic
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principles.
Policy devices, in contrast, refer to specific sociotechnical tools used to see the eco-
nomic world, or to make decisions about economic affairs. Policy devices for seeing in-
clude economic statistics, like the national income statistics which are the focus of this
dissertation. Hirschman and Berman (2014: 797) describe the influence of policy devices
for seeing:
As scholars have long noted, policymakers suffer both from incomplete infor-
mation and from too much of it (March and Simon, 1958; Lindblom, 1959).
Faced with a vast array of choices, they rely on various tricks to narrow their
field of vision enough to make it possible to act (Scott, 1998). The production
of numbers that describe the world—numbers like GDP, the inflation rate, the
unemployment rate—help policymakers to see crisply certain facets of it that,
without the devices that produce them, would be blurry at best.
This dissertation extends the account in Hirschman and Berman (2014) by focusing on
what economic statistics reveal and on those aspects of economic life that remain out of
focus. Here, I draw on the concept of regimes of perceptibility introduced by Michelle
Murphy (2006) and Gabrielle Hecht (2012). Regimes of perceptibility are bundles of peo-
ple, ideas, and tools that provide sustained attention to certain aspects of social life while,
implicitly, rendering other aspects invisible. Hirschman and Berman (2014) discuss policy
devices for seeing in relative isolation; the concept of regimes of perceptibility, elaborated
more fully in chapter 6, helps to connect the dots between particular policy devices and the
actors that employ those devices to surveil the economic world.
In chapter 3, I narrate the construction of a particularly influential regime of perceptibil-
ity around macroeconomics, with national income statistics at its center. This chapter links
the emergence of the “macroeconomic style of reason” to the statistics that make macroe-
conomic outcomes visible. In chapter 4, I show how this macroeconomic regime of percep-
tibility, and the associated stye of reason, helps policymakers “see crisply” macroeconomic
outcomes (especially economic growth), which then become targets of governance, and
political obligations. In chapters 5 and 6, I show how this macroeconomic regime of per-
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ceptibility leaves out unpaid housework and the distribution of income. These aspects of
economic life are not completely invisible — other statistical techniques are capable of ren-
dering them visible — but they are capable of being ignored, not automatically subject to
intense scrutiny. Together, these chapters offer a novel conception of the political power of
economic experts which complements existing accounts in political science and sociology.
1.4 Data and Methods
A compelling formation story must offer a comprehensive account of how the object or
kind in question emerged, and trace the links between the specific details of that emergence
to consequential outcomes. In order to approach this task, I began in typical ANT fashion
by “following the actors” — in this case, national income statistics and national income
statisticians. To follow the actors, I made trips to the archives of the most important na-
tional income statisticians in the early 20th century including, in the US, Wesley Mitchell,
Simon Kuznets, the Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce (at the National Archives)
and in the UK, James Meade, and Richard Stone. I also read influential primary sources
that presented national income estimates, including the 1921 NBER publication, the first
Department of Commerce estimates authored by Simon Kuznets in 1934, as well as many
others. I consulted extensively the “grey literature,” published conference proceedings,
working papers, and edited volumes, especially the NBER Studies in Income and Wealth,
and the journal Review of Income and Wealth. These sources, along with textbooks and
other book-length treatments, provided important insights into the development of national
income statistics as a field, and how practitioners themselves saw the value of their work,
and the challenges they faced.
To understand the place of national income statistics in the broader space of economic
discourse, I expanded my analysis to include a wider sample of economic works. Most
systematically, I analyzed 42 introductory textbooks (constituting approximately 20,000
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pages of text) published between 1890 and 1960 to understand the evolution of debates
over large-scale economic phenomena, and the data mobilized to make sense of those phe-
nomena. I detail this sample and my approach for analyzing it in chapter 2. I complemented
this reading of economic textbooks with an analysis of count data of key macroeconomic
terms in three large N corpora: JStor’s Data for Research, Google Books, and the New
York Times Chronicle. I searched the three main economics journals of the period, Ameri-
can Economic Review, Journal of Political Economy, and Quarterly Journal of Economics
to understand how they mobilized aggregate statistics, and how they discussed aggregate
economic phenomena. Finally, I consulted a smaller collection of archives of prominent
economists who worked with national income data and brought national income analysis
into policymaking, especially Paul Samuelson and John Maynard Keynes.
These works helped to inform my understanding of the emergence of the economy
and the role of national income statistics within the field of economics. To understand
how national income statistics traveled into policymaking, I also analyzed works that in-
tersected more directly with the political arena. In addition to the archival data (which
yielded many fruitful discussions between economists and policymakers), I read through
presidential speeches and party platforms (largely collected in UCSB’s Presidency Project).
I also searched the Congressional Record for debates around national income and the econ-
omy, reading through every early reference to understand the motivations behind the push
for national income statistics in the 1930s. I was unable to travel to the LaFollette fam-
ily collection, but a helpful archivist provided several key documents which informed my
analysis of the 1932 resolution authored by Senator LaFollette calling for official national
income estimates. I also examined the popular reception of macroeconomic aggregates in
the media, focusing on The New York Times and the Washington Post.
My primary data sources are summarized below:
Archival Collections
• Simon Kuznets
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• John Maynard Keynes
• Richard Stone
• Alvin Hansen
• Economist Papers Project
• James Meade
• Wesley Mitchell
• National Archives (Department of Commerce)
• Paul Samuelson
• La Follette Family Papers
Published Primary Sources
• Economics Textbooks Sample (see Chapter 2)
• NBER Studies in Income and Wealth
• Review of Income and Wealth
• American Economic Review
• Journal of Political Economy
• Quarterly Journal of Economics
Large N Discursive Corpora
• JStor Data for Research
• Google Books
• The New York Times Chronicle
Popular Discourse
• The New York Times
• The Washington Post
Political Discourse
• Congressional Record
• Party Platforms
• Presidential Speeches
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1.5 Preview of Coming Attractions
I mobilize these data, along with very helpful secondary sources that narrate at great detail
some of the more consequential events discussed in the dissertation, across five empirical
chapters. I summarize each chapter briefly here, highlighting how it mobilizes my data to
make arguments about performativity, perceptibility, and the formation of the economy.
In chapter 2, I offer a novel interpretation of the historiography of “the economy” in or-
der to resolve a tension between two scholarly camps. The first, centered around Margaret
Schabas and perhaps Michel Foucault, argues that the economy emerged in the 18th cen-
tury with the birth of political economy as a form of discourse. The second, most associated
with Timothy Mitchell, places the birth of the economy in the 1930s, with macroeconomics
and Keynes. I argue that both camps have captured essential discontinuities in the history of
economic thought, but that they have not properly characterized the transformation of the
1930s. I draw on the large N discursive corpora, and the introductory economics textbook
sample, to show how writers in the late 19th century had both a well-developed conception
of “the economic” and a rich vocabulary with which to describe large scale economic phe-
nomena but that they did not yet aggregate these phenomena into a single object called the
economy. Aggregate statistics were occasionally produced as far back as the 17th century,
but they were not incorporated into economic theorizing, and were produced irregularly in
unstandardized fashions. Only with the emergence of state-led efforts to produce routine,
standardized economic statistics do economic texts begin to invoke “the economy” and to
begin to see a role for the government in managing that economy.
Chapter 3 moves to the history of national income statistics. Drawing on the archives
of national income statisticians, as well as published estimates, the published methodolog-
ical literature, and limited data on the political and public reception of national income
statistics, I analyze the conditions that facilitated the emergence of the practice and its
widespread adoption. National income statistics were relatively unimportant as late as the
1920s, and only cemented their place at the center of macroeconomic thought and economic
16
governance in the crucible of World War II. This chapter thus explains how a particular
macroeconomic regime of perceptibility came to dominate postwar economic debates.
Chapter 4 examines the positive consequences of the rise of national income statistics
and the formation of the economy as an object of governance. By positive here I mean
“what was made possible,” without narrowly judging these transformations as wholly ben-
eficial (or harmful). Drawing on major political party platforms and presidential speeches,
and in dialog with extensive secondary discussions of the history of economic policymak-
ing, I show how politicians came to assume responsibility for narrowly defined macroeco-
nomic outcomes, especially the “size” of the economy. Before the 1920s, economic policy
debates focused on the government’s role in creating the proper institutions for economic
prosperity, broadly and fuzzily conceived. By the 1940s, “managing the economy” offered
a new vocabulary for economic claims-making, alongside a new set of policy tools that
seemed capable of reacting to short-term shifts in the economy. This chapter thus explains
how the emergence of the economy, and the macroeconomic regime of perceptibility that
constituted that economy, influenced policy and politics by reshaping the terrain of political
debate.
The next two chapters turn from what was made possible to what was excluded. In
chapter 5, I look at the history of debates over the inclusion of unpaid housework in esti-
mates of national income. Drawing primarily on debates in the published methodological
discourse, supplemented by archival data, I show how national income statisticians continu-
ally confronted the same intractable problems around the inclusion of housework. National
income statistics relied on market data to produce timely and objective measurements —
two major preconditions for their political value. Unpaid housework, by definition, lacked
a clear market price. Yet the principles of national income accounting, in particular the
“principle of invariance,” suggest that housework out to be included in order to avoid mis-
leading estimates of economic well-being as the boundaries of the market change over
time. Economists searched — and continue to search — for appropriate market prox-
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ies, but different estimation techniques yield widely divergent (and very large) valuations.
Thus, economists agree that housework would constitute a large portion of national income
were it to be included, but lacking an unequivocal estimate of its value, they continue to
exclude housework.
Chapter 6 turns from housework to inequality. Recent debates over inequality have
highlighted the growth of top incomes, as the top 1% and .1% of income earners take home
an increasingly large share of the total. Economists began to pay attention to this increase in
the early 2000s, nearly two decades after the massive takeoff began. Why did it take so long
for this simple fact of inequality to become apparent? This chapter shows how the partic-
ular decisions made about the construction of the macroeconomic regime of perceptibility
— and a parallel regime for labor economics and wage income — ended up occluding the
distribution of income from view. Drawing on published primary sources, newspaper arti-
cles, congressional hearings, and economic journal articles, I show how macroeconomists
came to ignore the distribution of income, while labor economists paid attention to the dis-
tribution of earnings using data that were incapable of seeing movements at the very top.
This chapter further elaborates the concept of regimes of perceptibility, and offers a model
for understanding how such regimes can influence policymaking and economic theorizing
through their capacity to shape the construction of “stylized facts.”
Finally, in the conclusion, I speculate about counterfactuals and alternatives. In order
to make sense of the importance of the formation of the economy, and the particular details
of its formation, I pose a series of increasingly implausible or distant counterfactuals. This
exercise highlights how small changes in national income statistics would likely have had
local effects (changing the politics of data collection around housework, reshaping our nar-
ratives of inequality), while counterfactuals involving radically different statistical regimes
imply much sharper deviations and thus highlight the overall importance of the invention
of “the economy” as an sociotechnical object with a well-defined size routinely measured
by national income.
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CHAPTER 2
From Economic Life to Macroeconomy
What did we talk about before we talked about the economy? What difference does it
make? This chapter resolves a debate between two groups of historians of economics
about the emergence of the economy as an object of knowledge. The first camp, identified
with the work of Margaret Schabas, dates the emergence of the economy to approximately
the 18th century. The second, identified with Timothy Mitchell, argues that the economy
did not emerge until the 1930s. I argue that these two groups have largely talked past
each other and thus mischaracterized the history of economic thought. In the 18th-19th
centuries, “economic life” emerged as a recognized domain, separate from but connected
to political life and nature. In the 20th century, “economic life” crystalized into an object
called “the economy.” The economy was both a domain of life parallel to politics or nature
and a reified sociotechnical object with a definite size and investigable dynamics. I support
this argument with an analysis of economic discourse, drawing on both simple nGrams and
in-depth readings of 42 economics textbooks published between 1890 and 1960.
2.1 Introduction
When did the economy emerge as an object of public discourse and scholarly analysis?
And what did we talk about before we talked about the economy? In this chapter, I analyze
the evolution of American economic discourse from 1890 and 1960. I use this analysis to
adjudicate between two competing positions on the emergence of the economy. The first,
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associated most strongly with Margaret Schabas (2005) and certain readings of Michel
Foucault (Dix 2014), places the emergence of the economy in the 18th to early 19th century,
with the birth of political economy as a field of inquiry. The second, expounded most
prominently by Timothy Mitchell (1998, 2002, 2011), argues that the economy did not
emerge until the 1930s with the rise of Keynesian macroeconomics.
I argue that both positions capture important transitions in economic discourse, but nei-
ther correctly characterizes the mid-20th century: the first downplays the period and sees
largely continuity from the early 19th century to the present, while the second exagger-
ates the rupture. Informed by historical sociology on the one hand, and science studies
approaches to the formation of technical objects on the other, I argue that the 18th and
19th centuries saw the formation of “the economic” as a sphere of social life and a kind
of social action distinct from politics on the one hand, and nature on the other. In the 20th
century, the fuzzy conceptual space of “the economic” crystallized into a technical object,
“the economy.” The economy, as distinct from the economic, is characterized by having
a well-defined size and boundaries measured through national income statistics. That the
economy, unlike politics or nature, has a well-defined size made possible new forms of
discourse about its short and long term dynamics, as well as new political obligations. In
chapter 3, I trace in detail the history of national income statistics and how we came to in-
stitutionalize a particular version of that practice as “the size of the economy.” In chapter 4,
I then show how the availability of timely measurements of the economy’s dynamics made
possible new forms of government intervention, while simultaneously obligating govern-
ments to take responsibility for outcomes that would have been previously invisible.
In this chapter, I begin by laying out the positions advanced by previous scholars on
the emergence of the economy. I then further elaborate my interpretation of the forma-
tion of the economy as an object in the mid-20th century and explain how it resolves the
tensions between the two existing approaches. The second half of the chapter presents
empirical support for this argument. I first draw on a three large corpora of discourse—
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Google Ngrams, JStor’s Data for Research, and the New York Times Chronicle—to show
the trends in the usage of key economic terms from 1800 to 2014, with an emphasis on
the transition period of 1890 to 1960. I connect these large-scale trends to a brief analysis
of influential statistical reports, and a more detailed analysis of a sample of introductory
economics textbook published between 1890 and 1960.
These diverse sources of economic discourse offer a more nuanced understanding of
the formation of the economy than previous accounts, which have generally relied on ei-
ther a single news source (e.g. Emmison 1983’s analysis of The Economist), or iconic
texts (Mitchell 1998). This analysis shows that by 1920, unemployment, business cy-
cles, and inflation—but not economic growth—were all topics of widespread discussion
and attempted measurement. In the 1930s-1940s, these topics merged into the study of
macroeconomics, unified by a small set of newly-available official statistical measures.
2.2 The 18th Century Economy?
Historians of economics have long argued that the economy had to be invented. As Du-
mont (1977: 24) put it, “It should be obvious that there is nothing like an economy out
there, unless and until men construct such an object.” This kind of statement takes on two
connected, but distinct, meanings. First, that the economy is itself a human construction—
in the absence of exchange relationships, property rights, and all the rest, there would be no
such thing as an economy. Let’s call this the “trivial realist” perspective—trivial because
it is obviously correct, not because it is unimportant. Second, the claim is taken to mean
that even in the presence of functioning markets, monetary systems, and other hallmarks of
economic exchange, a concept like “the economy” is not necessary. People seemed to have
managed fine without such a concept for centuries. As Finley (1974: 21) noted, the ancient
Greeks and Roman appear to have “lacked the concept of ‘economy,’ and, a fortiori, they
lacked the conceptual elements which together constitute what we call ‘the economy,”’ and
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yet they managed to run cities, states, and empires for hundreds of years (see also Singer
1958, Leshem 2013). Finley continues,
Of course they farmed, traded, manufactured, mined, taxed, coined, deposited
and loaned money, made profits or failed in their enterprises. And they dis-
cussed these activities in their talk and their writing. What they did not do,
however, was to combine these particular activities conceptually into a unit, in
Parsonian terms, a ‘differentiated sub-system of society.’ (Finley 1974: 22)
This quote nicely defines the second kind of claim about the invention of the economy,
the economy as concept. When did writers begin to discuss what we now think of as
economic activity as part of a distinct conceptual unit, a separate societal sub-system?
A large collection of scholars have identified this transition with the birth of political
economy in French and Brittish scholarship in the 18th and early 19th century (Foucault
1966, Tribe 1978, Buck Morss 1995, Hindess 1998, Firth 1998, Schabas 2005, Rothschild
2014, Dix 2014). Some place the foundational moment with the French physiocrats writing
in the mid-18th century (e.g. Rothschild 2014: 1057). The physiocrats are most famous for
their influence on Adam Smith, and for the tableau economique, a theoretical accounting
system that traced the circulation of goods and money between different groups of workers,
entrepreneurs, and landlords that is often seen as a precursor to modern national income
accounts (Studenski 1958, see Milanovic 2015 for a detailed discussion).
Other authors have placed more emphasis on developments in the 19th century. In The
Order of Things, Foucault (1966) argued that the human sciences emerged in a rupture
in the early 19th century, as biology replaced natural history, linguistics replaced general
grammar, and, most important for our discussion, political economy replaced the analysis
of wealth. Foucault (1966) singles out David Ricardo as the key figure in this transforma-
tion, and more recent scholarship has extended this analysis (Hindess 1998, Dix 2014).
These two perspectives differ more in emphasis than substance. For example, Foucault
himself, never one to fetishize consistent chronology, points to the physiocrats (rather than
Ricardo) as the source of a “new conception of the economy” and “maybe even . . . the
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founding act of economic thought and economic analysis” (Foucault 2009: 55).
Taken together, we have a reasonably clear picture: political economy emerges in the
mid-18th century (starting with the physiocrats) and settles into a reasonably stable form in
the early-19th century (culminating perhaps in Ricardo’s [1817] Principles of Economics).
The economy, then, was the object of this new discourse.
Margaret Schabas provides perhaps the most compelling and thorough account of this
transformation. Schabas (2005, 2015) adopts the same chronology as the above authors,
but focuses her analysis on how the emergence of the economy separates economic analysis
from nature:
The discourse of economics in the eighteenth century was thus primarily an
attempt to understand specific features of the commercial and agrarian world,
with the understanding that these phenomena (money, husbandry, manufac-
turing, trade, population growth) were imbedded in a larger system of nature
and not the economy per se. Only gradually, over the course of the nineteenth
century, were the appeals to the natural framing dismantled and replaced by
the concept of a relatively autonomous and self-equilibrating economy with
humans as the proximate cause. (Schabas 2015: 3-4)
For Schabas, the emergence of the economy as an autonomous sphere separates eco-
nomic activity from nature. As Finley (1974:22) notes, ancient economic thinkers conflated
what we would understand as natural and economic causes. “Modern” thinkers—those
writing since the mid-19th century—understand the economy as a domain with its own
dynamics separate from, albeit related to, the dynamics of nature.
In his analysis of Ricardo’s work, Dix (2014) agrees with Schabas on the separation of
the economic from the natural in the writings of 19th century political economist. Dix adds
to this discussion an important analysis of the separation of the economic from the political.
In Ricardo, “The state . . . becomes an actor that artificially intervenes in a domain with its
own natural laws and tendencies. Thereby, the state is no longer an integral part of the
economy but something that stands outside it.” (Dix 2014: 16)1 I return to this theme of the
1Dix’s account of the separation of the economic from the political coincides provocatively with a reading
of Polanyi (1944, 1968), who argues that early 19th century Britain saw the disembedding of economic and
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awkward role of the state as both in and outside of the economy in Chapter 5, in the context
of debates over the measurement of government output in the national income statistics.
Following scholars like Dix, Foucault, and Schabas, then, the story of the emergence
of the economy is relatively clear. From ancient times through the 17th century, “the econ-
omy” as concept did not exist. Between the mid-18th and early 19th century, the economy
came into being as an object of discourse, separated from, but connected to, nature and pol-
itics. This transition can be clearly seen in the canonical works of the new field of political
economy, including the physiocrats and their Tableau Economique, Smith’s The Wealth of
Nations, and Ricardo’s Principles. In the late 19th century, the vocabulary changes a bit as
“economics” replaces “political economy” as the dominant name for the field of inquiry,
but the basic story is one of relative coherence from the early 19th century to present.
Not everyone agrees.
2.3 The 20th Century Economy?
A contrasting strand of scholarship on the emergence of the economy begins with an im-
portant observation: no one seems to have used the phrase “the economy” in anything like
its modern sense until the 1930s. Timothy Mitchell has made this claim most prominently,
in a series of books and articles (Mitchell 1998, 2002, 2005, 2011), and earlier work by
Emmison (1983) supports the basic claim, as do my own analyses of large bodies of popu-
lar and scholarly discourse reported later in this chapter. Mitchell argues that the novelty of
“the economy” as a phrase undermines the consensus position that the economy emerged
in the 18th or 19th century:
The consensus that the economy became a distinct object of intellectual knowl-
edge and government practice in the late eighteenth or the nineteenth century
overlooks a surprising fact. No political economist of that period refers to an
political institutions. That is, Polanyi argues that the economic and political became separated institutionally
for the first time in this moment, while Dix argues that they also became separated in economic thought. For
a detailed discussion, see Hirschman 2011.
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object called ‘the economy.’ In the sense of the term we now take for granted,
referring to the self-contained structure or totality of relations of production,
distribution, and consumption of goods and services within a given geograph-
ical space, the idea of the economy emerged more than a century later, in the
1930s and 1940s. Both in academic writing and in popular expression, the
meaning of the term came into common use only during the years around the
Second World War. (Mitchell 2011: 125)
Mitchell (correctly) notes that the term “economy” has an older meaning, referring to
good management, proper governance, and efficiency (Mitchell 2011: 124). The word
economy has ancient Greek roots, descending from “Oikonomia” which referred to proper
order (“nomos”) of the household (“oikos”, for details see Singer 1958, Leshem 2013).
Political economy, in the sense of Adam Smith or David Ricardo, was understood as the
proper management of the state. For example, Smith (1776, Book IV.I.1) offers this defini-
tion:
Political œconomy, considered as a branch of the science of a statesman or
legislator, proposes two distinct objects: first, to provide a plentiful revenue or
subsistence for the people, or more properly to enable them to provide such
a revenue or subsistence for themselves; and secondly, to supply the state or
commonwealth with a revenue sufficient for the public services. It proposes to
enrich both the people and the sovereign.
For Smith, the object of political economy was the enrichment of both the people and
the state, but political economy itself was a subset of the art of the state. Mitchell argues
that throughout the 19th century and early 20th century, “economy” kept this connotation
of good or efficient governance. This usage persists right through the early days of the
Great Depression—one of F.D.R.‘s first pieces of legislation was the “Economy Act of
1933”, a bill designed to cut government expenditures as part of his less well-remembered
campaign pledge to balance the budget.
Mitchell argues that this terminological transformation represents a fundamental shift
in the both economics as an academic discipline, and in the political management of eco-
nomic affairs: “‘economy’ was not just a new word for an existing sphere or underlying
substance; its arrival marked the emergence of novel forms of sociotechnical practice that
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formed and performed the economy as a new object of professional knowledge and polit-
ical practice.” (Mitchell 2005: 126) In other words, Schabas and Foucault are wrong. It
was in the 20th century, not the 18th or 19th century, when the economy emerged, dis-
placing “population” and other older objects as the central focus of government (Mitchell
1999). Lepler (2012, 2013) similarly argues that early 19th century actors lacked the con-
cepts of capitalism, business cycles, and the economy, and that our persistent tendency to
read those concepts back onto past explanations leads us to systematically misunderstand
contemporary accounts of financial panics.
Mitchell, following the work of Radice (1984), emphasizes the role of John Maynard
Keynes in concretizing the economy, and in establishing the nation as its natural unit of
analysis. The publication of Keynes’s influential General Theory of Employment, Interest
and Employment in 1936 is taken to mark the birth of the economy as object (Mitchell
2011: 134) as well as the the subfield of macroeconomics. Along with Keynes, Mitchell
(2005) highlights the role of the early “econometricians”, especially Ragnar Frisch and
Jan Tinbergen who developed the first macroeconometric models of national economies in
the 1930s. Both Keynes’s macroeconomics, and Frish and Tinbergen’s econometrics were
resolutely national, constructing their object of analysis in terms of the boundaries of the
nation-state. Mitchell argues that this construction only makes sense in the context of the
collapse of European empires in the early 20th century: “Before the 1930s it would have
been difficult to describe something called the “British economy,” . . . because the forms of
trade, investment, currency, power, and knowledge that might be constituted as an econ-
omy were organized on an imperial rather than a national scale.” (Mitchell 2002: 6)2 In
addition to emphasizing how Keynes invented a national economy, Mitchell further argues
that Keynes’s new conceptualization opened up the new possibility of limitless economic
2Historian Adam Tooze (1998: 212-218) argues that the national focus of the field actually goes back
into the 19th century, at least in Germany, and to at least World War I in the United States. Tooze argues
that economic statistics were collected at the level of the nation-state, and these in turn informed the creation
of economic knowledge at the same level of analysis. I discuss debates over the level of analysis for the
economic system more in Chapter 3.
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growth: “The conceptualisation of the economy as a process of monetary circulation de-
fined the main feature of the new object: it could expand without getting physically bigger.”
(Mitchell 2011: 139) I will argue that although Mitchell is correct to emphasize dramatic
shifts in the understanding of economic growth as a result of Keynes’s work and the new
discourse of “the economy”, Mitchell’s analysis places too much weight on monetary cir-
culation as the defining feature of the economy, ignoring the multiplicity of definitions of
the economy that existed in the 1930s-1940s (and continue to exist to present).
Other writers agree with Mitchell on the general timeline, but emphasize slightly differ-
ent actors, especially statisticians. Suzuki (2003) highlights the essential role of national in-
come statistics in laying the statistical groundwork for the emergence of the (macro)economy
in the 1930s, while McVety (2012) makes a similar argument in the context of the rise of
development economics. Breslau (2003) and Shenk (2015) point to slightly earlier devel-
opments, including statistical research on business cycles conducted by Wesley Mitchell in
the 1910s, and continuing under the auspices of the National Bureau of Economic Research
in the 1920s. These authors agree with Mitchell that “the economy” emerged in the 1930s,
and that such transition captures some meaningful change in both economic science and
governance.
We are thus left with two contrasting stories. Schabas, Foucault, and Dix argue that the
economy emerged in the 18th-19th century. Mitchell refutes this contention, and places the
birth of the economy squarely in the 1930s. How are we to reconcile these positions?
2.4 The Economic Sphere and the Economy
To make sense of the apparent tension in the literature, I adopt a perspective informed by
science studies approaches to the formation of objects (Latour 1999, Hacking 2002, Mol
2002) and historical sociology approaches to temporality and the role of culture (Abbott
2001, Sewell, 2005). I argue that both camps have identified important turning points in the
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history of economic thought, and specifically, the formation of new social kinds. In particu-
lar, I claim that the first camp has identified the separation of the economic sphere (broadly
conceived) from the political and the natural, while the second camp traces the crystal-
lization of that diffuse atmosphere into a more precisely defined “sociotechnical object”
(Hirschman and Reed 2014: 271) bounded and made visible through novel measurement
practices.3
The concept of the economic as a sphere of social life may make more sense in explicit
dialog with other such conceptualized spheres. In “Religious Rejections of the World and
Their Directions,” Weber (1946) identifies distinct value spheres, including the economic,
political, esthetic, erotic, and intellectual. Similarly, Boltanski and Thevenot (2006) iden-
tify six “orders of worth,” or logics of justification, corresponding to different regimes of
value. Palonen (2006) offers a particularly useful account of politics as a territorial and an
activity concept—that is, we think of politics simultaneously as a space and as a kind of
action. Reading Schabas (2005) and Dix (2014) alongside these accounts, we can rephrase
their finding as the coming into existence of a distinct economic sphere—a way of divid-
ing up the world in which some activities are economic, some spaces are economic — as
opposed to natural or political. For example, Schabas (2015: 3-4) describes the emergence
of the economy in terms of the attribution of causation: “over the course of the nineteenth
century. . . appeals to the natural framing [were] dismantled and replaced by the concept
of a relatively autonomous and self-equilibrating economy with humans as the proximate
cause.” Nature was supplanted by a new autonomous sphere in which humans were capable
of causing economic events on their own. It becomes possible to explain particular features
3Hirschman and Reed (2014) suggest that formation stories — accounts of the coming into existence
of particular social kinds (objects, forces, and actors) — are an under-appreciated genre of explanation in
contemporary sociology, and present tools for both telling better formation stories and for categorizing the
kinds of object formed. Formation stories start from four basic premises: (1) the set of social entities is not
fixed, the ontology of the social is variable (Abbott 2001), (2) history is eventful and marked by ruptures,
including the coming into being of new social kinds (Sewell 2005), (3) social kinds come into being through
the heterogeneous assemblage of individuals, texts, practices, organizations, and more (Latour 2005), and
(4) new social kinds involving knowledge about people have the capacity to reshape the actions of those
described (Hacking 2002, see Hirschman and Reed 2014: 266–268 for details).
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of the world in terms of their economic properties.
The economic in the 18th-19th century is thus both a collection of spaces (“economic
life”, “the market” conceptualized both as a physical and a metaphorical space, eventually
“business”, “industry”, etc.), and a kind of activity (“rational action”, “economic action”,
etc.), defined in contrast to nature and politics. Political economy, and eventually eco-
nomics starting in the 1890s, is the study of this mode of action and this set of spaces. But
the economic sphere in this period is not yet a sociotechnical object.
The science studies tradition has a long history of trying to understand what it means
for something to be an object (Daston 2000, Hacking 2002). Here, I use the term in the
sense of Star (2010: 603) in her discussion of boundary objects: “something people. . . act
towards or with” whose “materiality derives from action, not from a sense of prefabricated
stuff or ‘thing’-ness.” Sociotechnical objects are understood as both real and historical, as
knowledge practices layer on top of already existing, heterogeneous things, and in so doing
transform that mess into something more obdurate, crystalline, fixed — objective. The ad-
jective sociotechnical reinforces the key role of technical practices in shaping and defining
the boundaries of objects, of “enacting” objects (Mol 2002), while simultaneously remind-
ing us that technical practices are also social practices, that the two are always intermingled
(Latour 2005).
The analogy of public opinion may be useful in understanding how the economic sphere
might have transitioned into a sociotechnical object, the economy. As Osborne and Rose
(1999), and Sarah Igo (2007) have shown, new social scientific research techniques trans-
formed the public’s understanding of itself in the early to mid-20th century. Public opinion
ceased to be a nebulous signifier, but rather was attached to the findings of pollsters and
sociologists who rigorously investigated what the “average American” thought of politics,
social life, and economic affairs. The French elite of the 18th century had learned to ask,
what does the public think of the King? But their answers took the form of a heteroge-
nous collection of circulated books and pamphlets (Hirschman and Reed 2014: 273). The
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American elite of the 20th century could ask, what does the public think of the President?
and receive answers in the form of precise estimates of public approval. We now routinely
rank leaders based on how high their approval stays during the course of the presidency, or
how low it goes. Public opinion is no longer just a piece of a diffuse cultural atmosphere,
it has become a technical object amenable to precise investigation, scholarly research, and
professional manipulation.
I argue that we can understand the formation of the economy in the 1930s in similar
terms. In the 1930s, the economic sphere crystallizes into the economy as a sociotechni-
cal object. A key aspect of this transformation is the creation of national income statistics
which come to be understood as measuring “the size of the economy.” Along with other
macroeconomic indicators developed in this period, including the unemployment rate and
inflation measurements, we come to see and act on the economy as an object. When 19th
century actors wanted to know how well the economic sphere was doing, they had no easy
metrics for success or failure. In contrast, 20th century economists have a battery of mea-
sures available in nearly real-time, which take the “pulse of the economy” (Landefeld et al
2008). This process of transforming a broad cultural atmosphere into a bounded sociotech-
nical object has no direct parallel in politics or biology. There is no ‘size’ of politics or
‘size’ of nature (or culture, for that matter). When political scientists study politics, they
necessarily identify political objects of study — voting, volunteering, campaigning — that
are understood as political in nature. They do not study “politics” as an aggregate whole.
Similarly, economists in the 19th century studied economic objects of various sizes (from
individual behavior to commercial crises, as we will discuss below), but only in the 20th
century did they begin to also study the economy as an object in its own right.
Of all of the writers who have tackled the subject, the work of historian Adam Tooze
(2001) comes closest to the position advanced here. Tooze shows how German economic
discourse, and economic statistics, transformed in the 1920s, often in advance of similar
developments in the US and UK. Tooze (2001:9) similarly argues that the 1920s-1940s
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represent a period of crystallization or reification of the economic brought about by official
government statistics:
Taken together these interrelated statistical innovations constituted a new ma-
trix of economic knowledge, which gave substance to a new conception of the
economy. First of all ‘the economy’ was envisioned as a separate system, dis-
tinct, for instance, from ‘the social’, ‘the cultural’, or ‘the political’. It was
a measurable entity, a ‘thing’. This conception of ‘the economy’ as an au-
tonomous social system was more restricted than that embodied in eighteenth-
century ideas of a commercial society, or Marx’s totalizing conception of the
mode of production. But it was also more concrete than those earlier formula-
tions. Linguistic changes signal this shift to a more reified idea of the economic
world.
I agree in large part with Tooze’s formulation, and in particular the importance of statis-
tics, and the claim that linguistic shifts in how we discuss the economy signal the con-
cretization of the economy-as-object. Tooze, unlike the two bodies of literature described
above, nicely connects 20th century developments with their 18th and 19th century precur-
sors without minimizing the transformations of the 20th century. But Tooze, like Mitchell,
errs in attributing the separation of the economy from the social, cultural, and political to
the 20th century. Tooze also downplays or ignores the potential multiplicity of the econ-
omy — the economy as object does not simply replace older notions of “economic life”,
but coexists with them.
Economics in the 20th century thus becomes somewhat more like demography (with
its well-defined object, population), but at the same time, the economy retains its broad
character of a fuzzy conceptual space and mode of action. The economy comes to mean all
of these things at once. It’s a multiple object (in Mol’s [2002] sense), defined by different
practices in different contexts which give potentially discordant accounts. The economy
becomes a sociotechnical object, but we should resist the temptation to equate objectivity
with coherence, or unanimity (see also Star and Griesmer 1989). Mitchell (2002) and others
are correct to signal an important change in the early 20th century, but overly dramatize
that transformation by downplaying or ignoring the importance of the formation of the
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economic sphere in the 18th-19th century which laid the groundwork for the formation of
the economy in the 20th.
How would we know this argument is right? First, I’m going to show that there were a
host of terms that meant something like the totality of economic stuff in use by the 1920—
well before Keynes, but also a bit before national income statistics take off. Economists
and the public did talk about economic issues, and even macroeconomic ones (especially
monetary issues and inflation, but also unemployment and business cycles and industrial
depressions). They did lump these together as a discrete field of political economy or
economics (as shown in textbook data), but they did not lump them together as the analysis
of a singular object called “the economy.” Additionally, I’ll demonstrate that discussions
of economic growth were largely absent (in accordance with Mitchell’s (2011) claims). In
fact, economic discussions had very few statistics to go on (even less than were available,
because they lacked a framework for putting it all together). And they especially lacked
timely statistics. The availability of timely data about the size and performance of the
economy will be how I characterize the importance of the formation of the economy in the
1930s. Chapter 3 will look at the emergence of official national income statistics and how
they came to be understood as the timely measures of the size of the economy. Chapter 4,
in turn, focuses on the consequence of the emergence of “the economy,” and especially its
timely measurement, for governments and how they are evaluated.
2.5 Studying Economic Discourse
Previous studies of the emergence of the economy have generally relied on hermeneutic or
qualitative analysis of canonical texts. A few exceptions analyze a single data source sys-
tematically — generally a single news publication, including Emmison’s (1983) analysis
of The Economist or Suttles’ (2011) analysis of the front page of the New York Times. This
relatively informal approach to the analysis of economic discourse may have contributed
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to the conflicting narratives both across and within the two camps discussed above. Here,
I endeavor to take a more comprehensive approach by drawing on newly available sources
of discursive data, as well as a more traditional deep reading of a sample of prominent
economics textbooks. I focus my analysis on the period 1890-1960. This period begins
well after the end of the process described by Schabas (the emergence of political econ-
omy and the economic as a conceptual space), but before the transformation described by
Mitchell (the birth of macroeconomics as a subfield and the institutionalization of macroe-
conomic statistics), and ends after that transformation should have completed. Analyzing
this period in depth should enable us to better understand the formation of the economy as
a sociotechnical object.
For the first part of my analysis, I chart the usage of 12 terms related to macroeco-
nomics and the emergence of the economy in three large datasets: Google Ngrams, the
New York Times Chronicle, and JStor’s Data for Research. These three sources sample
different kinds of media: a sample of all books published in English, the entire corpus of
the New York Times, and the entire corpus of academic journal articles archived in JStor.
In general, trends visible in one data source are repeated in the others. These data show that
by 1920, economic discourse included a variety of aggregate objects of analysis including
unemployment, industrial depressions, and business cycles. I supplement these aggregate
discussions with a few exemplars of influential statistical reports that analyzed the relevant
phenomenon in detail.
This analysis relies on simple counts and relative frequencies of nGrams rather than
more sophisticated quantitative or qualitative methods (e.g. topic models, formal coding
procedures). This analytical choice is inspired by Lee and Martin’s (2015) discussion of
the importance of presenting textual data in as transparent a mode as possible. Simple,
transparent methods “condense information to facilitate an intersubjectively valid interpre-
tation” (Lee and Martin 2015: 1). Perhaps the simplest possible method is counts of words
and phrases, i.e. ngrams. These counts condense large amounts of information, but make
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very few interpretive assumptions. In so doing, analysis of nGrams foregrounds the inter-
pretive act of the scholar, and equips critical readers with sufficient information to evaluate
the interpretive claims made, and to offer alternative readings. In contrast to sophisticated
qualitative coding, which “disguises the interpretation and moves it backstage”, a transpar-
ent, count based-method “delays the interpretation, and then presents the reader with the
same data on which to make an interpretation that the researcher herself uses” (Lee and
Martin 2015: 24, see also Biernacki 2012).
In the second part of my analysis, I examine a sample of introductory economics text-
books published between 1890 and 1960. Following the model of Levy and Peart (2011), I
first downloaded bibliographic information on every book in the Library of Congress cat-
alog with the classification HB 171.5, which includes primarily introductory economics
textbooks along with a few related works (problem sets, companion texts, etc.). This initial
pass yielded 696 candidate texts. Circulation data are difficult to acquire for this period,
so in order to select texts that achieved at least some readership, I restricted my sample to
books with multiple editions.4 I also excluded texts from this list that were not introduc-
tory textbooks intended for first year college courses (primarily excluding texts intended
for high schools). This reduced sample included 42 texts.
Comparing this list with texts mentioned in the small literature on pre-World War II
economics textbooks (e.g., Walstad et al 1998, Colander 2010) provides some face validity
to the sample: most of the textbooks cited as influential were captured (Seligman, Ely,
Fairchild, Garver), along with many other less well known texts. I attempted to acquire
the first edition of each textbooks, though in some cases was only able to acquire a later
edition. The final analytic sample includes books from every decade and multiple positions
within the field (institutionalist, marginalist, etc.).5 I will return to this sample in Chapters 3
4Note that in some cases, books changed names between editions. To be conservative, I included any
book whose author published multiple books in the sample even if they were not explicitly labeled as second
editions.
5At least two prominent institutionalist texts (Slichter’s Modern Economic Society and Tugwell, Munro,
and Stryker’s American Economic Life and the Means of its Improvement) seem not to have been categorized
with the bulk of introductory texts, possibly inducing a bias against that perspective. Other institutionalist
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and 4 to substantiate arguments about the historical trajectory of national income statistics,
and the rise of a new understanding of economic governance. Here, I focus on discussions
of “economic life” and “the economy”, along with brief discussions of business cycles and
economic growth as emergent topics in this period.
2.6 Economic Discourse 1890-1960
In this section, I examine trends in the usage of 12 important terms in the period 1890-
1960. These terms were identified through reading both primary and secondary sources on
economic discourse in this period. My emphasis is on establishing how actors talked about
large scale economic aggregates before and after the 1930s. I thus selected terms that
either capture the economic sphere as a whole (“American economy”, “economic life”,
“economic system”, “money economy”), some large dynamic within that sphere (“indus-
trial depression”, “business cycle”, “commercial crisis”, “financial panic”), or some vari-
able that would later become identified as part of the core of macroeconomics (“inflation”,
“cost of living”, “unemployment”, and “economic growth”).
Together, the data presented here establish three important claims. Figure 2.1 presents
trend data on the use of 12 terms in JStor’s database of academic research articles from
1890-1960. First, discussions of the economy as such rise dramatically in the 1930s and
especially 1940s. This confirms previous research by Emmison (1983), Suttles (2011),
and the intuitions of Mitchell (2002) and others. Second, in contrast with the strongest
version of Mitchell’s argument, discussions of other large scale aggregate phenomena seem
well-established by 1920, including unemployment, industrial depressions, business cycles,
and inflation. The discussion of “commercial crisis” dates back even further (as seen in
Figure 2.2, showing Google Ngram data back to 1800). Third, in agreement with Mitchell
(2011), I find that discussions of economic growth only emerge post-World War II. The
texts were included, however (e.g. Edie’s Principles of the New Economics, see Rutherford 2011: 42-43 for
a discussion of institutionalist textbooks).
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dramatic rise in the use of the term itself is suggestive, but requires supplementary analysis
of the textbook data to show just how absent economic growth was from the theoretical
agenda of economists up through the 1940s (for a similar argument about the absence of
economic growth from the literature at this time, see Warsh 2006).
2.6.1 The Economy
Almost no one talked about something called the “American economy” until the late 1930s,
and widespread discussion did not take place until the 1940s. As seen in Figure 2.1, aca-
demic use of the term begins around the mid-1930s. Similarly, Figure 2.2 shows the dra-
matic takeoff in usages in the Google Books sample in the 1930s. I trace the term “Ameri-
can economy” here because “the economy” captures many older usages, e.g. “the economy
of steam engines” referring to their relative mechanical efficiency. Nonetheless, trends in
that phrase follow a similar pattern (if not quite as stark). This timeline accords very nicely
with the story laid out by Timothy Mitchell. And yet, that story downplays the extent of
macroeconomic-like discussions taking place before the 1930s, as I will document more
below.
One very early use of the term occurs in Recent Economic Changes, a 1929 report
published by the National Bureau of Economic Research on behalf of the President’s Con-
ference on Unemployment chaired by Herbert Hoover.6 In the foreword to the report, the
authors frame their task in terms of understanding the economy as a whole:
The committee was directed to make a critical appraisal of the factors of sta-
bility and instability; in other words, to observe and to describe the Ameri-
can economy as a whole, suggesting rather than developing recommendations.
(NBER 1929: v)
The terminology used throughout the report is inconsistent; “American economy” does
not reappear again, although related phrases appear a handful of times.
6For detailed accounts of Hoover’s role in promoting economic statistics as Secretary of Commerce, see
Alchon 1985, Barber 1985.
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Figure 2.1: The relative frequency of 12 phrases, as a percentage of research articles in
JSTor 1890-1960. Note that the vertical axes vary; the intent of the figure is to show
relative, not absolute, trends.
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Figure 2.2: The relative frequency of the phrase “American Economy” in English-language
books, 1800-1960.
By the end of the 1930s, terminological confusion about the economy blossomed.
Nowhere is this heightened level of discourse about the “American economy” clearer than
in a 1939 New Deal report titled The Structure of the American Economy. Published by
the National Resources Committee of the Department of the Interior, The Structure of the
American Economy reports on everything from consumer demand to the geography of agri-
cultural production. Interestingly, the document opens with a definition of the economy,
suggesting the authors knew the term to be of relatively recent vintage:
The American economy is the organized activity through which the 130 million
people in this country obtain their daily living. Farmers raising food and fiber,
miners extracting ore and coal, industrial workers fabricating raw materials
into finished products, whole-sale and retail distributors making goods avail-
able to consumers, and a host of workers performing the other countless tasks
required by modern living, all of these are combined in a huge and highly com-
plex producing organization which constitutes the national economy. (NRC
1939: 1)
Of note, this report opens with a discussion of national income as its first statistical
measure of the economy, in a chart titled “Loss in potential real national income due to
depression unemployment of men and machines, 1930-1937.” (NRC 1939: 2) Here we see
a fully-fledged macroeconomic understanding of the relationship between aggregate output
measured as national income and resource utilization measured by unemployment, similar
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to more recent discussions of “potential GNP” (Okun 1962).
2.6.2 Macro Before Macro
Discussions of large-scale aggregate economic phenomena did not begin in the 1930s, how-
ever. Already by 1920, we see in Figure 2.1 discussion of unemployment, inflation, busi-
ness cycles, and industrial depressions, to name a few. How do we make sense of these
discussions taking place in the decades before “the economy” and the birth of macroeco-
nomics?
The term “money economy” plays an especially interesting role here. In contrast to
McVety’s (2012) claim that the economy shifts from being an adjective to a noun follow-
ing the rise of macroeconomics, we see that already by the 1910s and 1920s, “economy”
served (at least occasionally) as a noun describing an aggregate economic system. For ex-
ample, Wesley Mitchell (1913: 21) frequently referenced the term “money economy” to
contrast with an older “barter economy.” And even earlier, Veblen (1904: 150-151) con-
trasted “money economy” with “credit economy”, with credit economy being an advanced
form of money economy containing a well-developed capital market. Both terms are trans-
lations from German phrases with the root “wirtschaft.”7 Similar examples can be found
from these decades of uses of “world economy”, and even “national economy” (usually
as a translation of the German phrase Nationalokonomie, see Tooze 1998). Reading these
discussions carefully, as I will further document in the textbook analysis below, shows that
“economy” already served as a synonym for the whole economic system or economic life
among some authors a couple decades before the 1930s. What it lacked was a size—in this
period, no author that I can find makes references to the “size of the economy” or “size of
the money economy” or any variation. Economic life was a distinct area of life, economic
action was a distinct form of action, but the economic did not yet have a well-defined or
7Shenk (2015), drawing on Mitchell (1949:546), dates the first German usage of money economy and
credit economy to an essay by Bruno Hildebrand published in 1864, “Naturalwirthschaft, Geldwirthschaft,
und Creditwirthschaft.”
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Figure 2.3: The relative frequency of the phrase “commercial crisis” in English-language
books, 1800-1960.
measured size.
Other aggregate phenomena were measured by 1920, however. In particular, there
was a large body of research on periodic crises and business cycles that dates back to
the 19th century but crescendoed in the early 20th (Morgan 1990). Famously, in 1878,
William Stanley Jevons (a British scholar best known as one of the founders of marginalist
economics) identified commercial crises occurring approximately every 10 to 11 years.
Jevons argued that this periodicity matched the recently identified cycle of sun spots, and
argued that variations in solar output might explain the cycle of ups and downs in overall
commerce. Figure 2.3 shows that discussions of commercial crises were not uncommon in
the mid-19th century.
By the early 20th century, “commercial crisis” were joined by discussions of “industrial
depressions”, “business cycles”, and “financial panics.” In 1886, the newly-formed Bureau
of Labor Statistics in the United States published a 500 page document entitled “Industrial
Depressions” as its first annual report. Industrial depressions were distinguished from, but
considered related to, commercial crises and financial panics, which were understood as
potential causes of a depression:
A panic or a crisis is usually short, sharp, and decisive in its results. A de-
pression is a condition which has duration of time attending it. Panics and
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crises may occur without a resulting industrial depression, as has been the case
many times, and an industrial depression of much severity may occur without
producing a financial or commercial crisis or panic, although financial condi-
tions are always more or less disturbed during the continuance of an industrial
depression. The terms crises, panics, and depressions are used under these
distinctions. (Labor 1886: 15)
So here we can some of the terminology already in use by 1886 for understanding large
scale economic movements. As Lepler (2013) notes, this vocabulary was largely absent
during the Panic of 1837. This report suggests that the industrial depressions of the 1830s
to 1880s were a new phenomenon (Labor 1886: 12-13).8 We see then that between the
1830s (post-Ricardo) and the 1890s (pre-Keynes), a rich vocabulary emerges for describing
and measuring the novel phenomena of industrial depressions.
In 1913, Wesley Mitchell published an influential volume on “business cycles” which
endeavored to unite studies of financial panics and industrial depressions under one system-
atic framework. Mitchell begins his theory building with the concept of “money economy,”
which is defined not simply as “the use of money as a medium of exchange ; but the fact
that economic activity takes the form of making and spending money incomes.” (Mitchell
1913: 21) Several points are worth noting here. First, Mitchell clearly has a well-developed
sense of what constitutes “economic activity”, and assumes the reader does as well. Eco-
nomic activity is not itself a problematic or new category by the early 20th century. On the
other hand, “money economy” is introduced as a relatively new concept, and one likely to
be misunderstood. Mitchell sees money economy as important to understanding the work-
ings of the business cycle because the money economy structures the behavior of business
enterprises, but fails to sufficiently coordinate between businesses: “The money economy
provides for effective coordination of effort within each business enterprise, but not for
effective coordination of effort among independent enterprises.” (Mitchell 1913: 38)
Although the term “money economy” did not enter into as widespread (or sustained)
use as did “business cycle”, it’s important to note how well-developed discussions of the
8Mitchell (1913: 584) places the birth of the business cycle a bit earlier, at the end of the 18th century.
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Figure 2.4: The relative frequency of the phrase “economic growth” in English-language
books, 1800-1960.
aggregate economic system were by 1913.
2.6.3 The Growth of Growth
Third, and finally, Figure 2.1 and Figure 2.4 document the absence of explicit discussions of
economic growth. Without a size by which to measure aggregate economic activity, schol-
ars writing before World War II had no easy way to describe overall increases in prosperity.
Certainly, the topic was not new—Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations discusses differences
in prosperity between various European nations back in 1776. But these discussions were
rarely cast in quantitative terms, and were not related to the overall size of some economic
pie. In the post-war years, we can see the dramatic takeoff of those explicit discussions
of economic growth. Figure 2.4 shows that nicely in the Google Books sample. To fully
understand how scholars understood economic well-being and its measurement in the pe-
riod before comparable national income statistics were available, I turn now to the textbook
sample.
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2.6.4 Textbook Economics, 1890-1960
The above analysis of nGrams painted a broad picture of economic discourse. In the sec-
tion, I fill in that picture with details from introductory economics textbooks. I draw on
these sources to confirm the previous analysis, to add context to particular discussions,
and to point towards moments of transformation. Following my strategy for analyzing the
textbooks, I focus here on discussion of the economic system as a whole and the changing
meaning of national income.
First, in line with the widespread usage of terms like “economic life” in the 1890s-
1930s, we see in the textbook sample a rich vocabulary for describing the economic sphere
as a whole. The terms vary, but the most prominent include economic life, economic sys-
tem, and economic order. For example, Ely (1901: 81) discusses the relationship between
economics and other social sciences by breaking apart their subjects into eight domains:
Man has been busy from the first in several lines of effort. He has talked,
worshiped, fought, studied, etc., and each of these lines of effort has developed
its own faculties and institutions. For convenience we may arrange these in
eight groups, as follows: language, art, education, religion, family life, society
life, political life, economic life. Each of these is the subject of a science of a
science more or less developed.
Ely’s distinctions here are very similar to the classic Weberian discussion of spheres
discussed above. This similarity is, in some ways, not surprising: like many early 20th
century economists, Ely studied economics in Germany. Similarly, Seligman (1905: 6)
contrasted “the economic” with “the ethical, the legal, the political,” all of which were
seen as subsets of the social. And Blackmar (1912: 17) distinguishes “social, individual,
intellectual, moral, religious, political, or economic life.”
These early texts also invoked the term “economy” to characterize the economic system
as a whole. The precise taxonomy varied, depending on the aspects of the economic system
that authors wished to emphasize. For example, Seligman (1905: 67) (similar to Veblen and
Mitchell, discussed above) divided economic history into “three periods of barter, money
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and credit economy.” Later in the same text, Seligman offers a different set of “economies”:
If we regard economic conditions from the standpoint of the relations of pro-
duction to consumption — for these are the fundamental economic facts — we
may divide the world’s history into three great stages, known respectively as
the self-sufficing economy, the trade or commercial economy and the capitalist
or industrial economy. From another point of view these may be called isolated
economy, the local or village economy and the national economy.
Here we see national economy as a synonym for industrial economy, with both terms
being used to describe a system in which relationships of production and consumption were
integrated at a national scale, in contrast to earlier systems. This usage was a bit atypical,
but discussions of barter and money economies were quite common in the pre-World War
I period (see, for example, Johnson 1909: 14, Seager 1910: 7) and persist into the interwar
period (e.g. Brown 1929: 145, Deibler 1929: 260).
In the post-war era, the usage of “the economy” becomes the familiar one, no longer
just characterizing broad economic systems, but also describing a somewhat timeless object
with a size and particular dynamics. Although textbook authors do not remark much upon
the novelty of their usage, several offer definitions of “the economy.” For example, Burns
et al. (1948: 3) write, “The economy of a country is a term referring to the organization of
the countrys resources for the production of commodities and services. Thus, the original
term and its modern derivatives all stress the underlying facts of scarcity and the consequent
need to conserve and manage resources.” Umbreit et al (1952: 16) offer a similar definition:
“By the economy we mean the whole system of economic institutions by means of which
society provides for the production and distribution of economic goods.” And Murad (1953:
3) usefully distinguishes economy as system from economy as efficiency:
We say that we practice economy when we are being thrifty and sparing in
the use of our resources. When we speak of an economy (for instance, the
American economy, the national economy), we mean the orderly arrangement
and management of production, exchange, and consumption in a household,
business establishment, community, or nation.
Beyond offering explicit definitions, these later texts also directly link national income
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and the economy. As noted above, the “barter economy” and “money economy” never
had a size in the the 1890-1930 period, and there was no particular relationship between
national income and the economy. Texts in the 1940s and 1950s began to describe the
economy explicitly in terms of national income. Before the term macroeconomics came
into widespread use, textbook authors outlined a “national income approach,” (Burns et al
1948: xv) a term used sufficiently widely to be incorporated into a survey of introductory
economics professors undertaken by the American Economic Review (reported in Taylor
1950, a book-length survey of undergraduate economics education). The most famous
textbook associated with this approach was Samuelson’s (1948) Economics, but it was not
alone in emphasizing national income (see, e.g. Burns et al 1948, Hicks 1960). Most
importantly for our purposes, these texts began to speak of the size and growth of the
economy measured in terms of national income statistics. For example, Burns et al (1948:
85) equate the national output (a variant of national income, what we’d now call national
product) and the performance of the economy in their discussion of the causes of variation
in economic performance:
Population, geographic and technological factors, the sociological environ-
ment, and especially the attitudes or outlook of the people, the types of in-
centives, and the role of governmental policy — all influence the performance
of the economy. This performance is the national output.
Samuelson (1948: 225) neatly summarized the most important post-war uses of na-
tional income statistics in economics: “By means of statistics of national income, we can
chart the movements of a country from depression to prosperity, its steady long-term rate
of economic growth and development, and finally its material standard of living in com-
parison with other nations.” These post-WWII uses of national income as measures of
the performance of the economy as a whole contrast sharply with discussions of national
income in the preceding decades.
National income measures, and quantitative statistics more broadly, are largely absent
from the earliest textbooks in the sample. This absence is not surprising given the relative
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paucity of statistics produced by the federal government or prominent private actors up
through the end of the 19th century. Even quantitatively-minded economists had to resort
to guesswork and hand-waving if they wanted to quote a measure of national income, as
we can see in Irving Fisher’s (1916: 99) resignation: “Unfortunately, there are no available
statistics for income in the United States. We can only guess as to what the amount of it
may be.”
In the 1920s, we begin to see more detailed discussions of national income statistics
(along with other indicators and measures), but the context of those discussions remains
confined to the problem of distribution. That is, national income statistics were seen as
useful ways to discuss the distribution of income between land, labor, and capital, a prob-
lem of great theoretical and practical concern in 19th and early 20th century economics
(e.g. Lutz and Stanton 1923: 292, Edie 1922: 175-178).9 This emphasis on national in-
come as something to be distributed persists into the 1940s. For example, Froman (1946:
468) cites national income data to chart the dramatic increase in the share of income going
to employees (from 56% in 1910 up to 72% in 1945).
Discussions of national income in the 1920s and 1930s are notably divorced from dis-
cussions of business cycles. To the extent that authors discussed national income—and
many did not—they did so in chapters on distribution. In contrast, business cycle discus-
sions largely followed from discussions of the nature of money and the modern banking
system. Echoing Wesley Mitchell’s (1913) argument that the business cycle emerges with
the “money economy”, authors in the interwar period discussed the importance of bank
credit in determining the ups and downs of the business cycle. To the extent that they of-
fered measurements of the cycle — and not all did — they chose other indicators, such
as the Federal Reserve Board’s Index of Industrial Production (e.g. Deibler 1929, Cronin
1939, Gemmill 1939).
Finally, in line with the discussion above of the absence of the term “economic growth”,
9Some authors also drew on the publications of the National Bureau of Economic Research to discuss the
personal distribution of income (e.g. Edie 1922: 186), a topic I return to at length in chapter 6.
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we see almost no discussion of growth as a quantitative phenomenon up through the imme-
diate post-WWII period. Rather, we see routine discussions of economic progress through
the lens of historical transformations in the economic order. Most often, this takes the form
of the linear development of modes of production in Western Europe (especially England)
and the US, tracing the history from the manorial system in the Middle Ages, through the
rise of guilds and towns, to the modern factory system. We already saw hints of this framing
in the common discussions of the transition from “barter economy” to “money economy”
found in the 1900s-1920s textbooks. The relative absence of economic growth discussions
persists into the 1940s, however. Even after national income approach comes to dominate,
textbooks in the 1940s and 1950s emphasized the stability of national income as a primary
concern, not its growth.
This concern shows through most clearly in debates over economic policymaking. Be-
fore the 1920s, economic policymaking discussions largely consist of unconditional claims
about the value of tariffs, the importance of maintaining the rule of law, or the dangers of
monopoly. That is, good economic policies are seen as good no matter what is happening
in the economic system that particular day. As discussions of the business cycle increase in
the 1920s and 1930s, economic policymaking turns to focus on conditional policymaking:
what should the government do, given the particular moment in the business cycle? That is,
economists come to argue that good policy in a depression might be bad policy in a boom,
and vice versa (e.g. Edie 1922: 431, Brown 1923: 129, Fairchild et al 1926: 501, Deibler
1929: 355). This concern with countercyclical policymaking carries over into the 1940s
and 1950s, with national income (as the best measure of the economy’s performance) re-
placing the business cycle as the object to be stabilized. For example, Mussey and Donnan
(1942: 665) write, “Our central concern is the instability of employment and of real income
which results from unstable production; our ultimate question is How can productive oper-
ations be so stabilized as to give more continuous employment and a more regular national
income?” Similarly, Froman (1946: 751) worries about maintaining a high level of income
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post-WWII: “We are hoping to maintain a national income of some $150,000,000,000 a
year, which is nearly as high as the national income figure for the peak war years and about
double the average of the 1930’s.”
This emphasis on stabilization is not surprising in light of the recent experience of
the Great Depression, and the pervasive worries that military demobilization would bring
about another major downturn, but it contrasts sharply with the interest in growth that
would emerge a bit later (Collins 2000, Yarrow 2010). For our purposes, however, the most
important transition occurs by the 1940s: the government is understood as acting on “the
economy” in aggregate, with national income as the preferred aggregate measure of the
performance of that economy. As Nordin and Salera (1950: 17-18) put it, “the government
is expected to act on the economy as a whole rather than on individual businesses.” I return
to this argument in chapter 4 to analyze the emergence of this new political rationality of
governmental intervention in economic affairs.
2.7 Discussion and Conclusion
What can we learn from this analysis of the history of economic discourse? First, we can
resolve the debate in the history of economics on the origins of the economy. “Economic
life” was recognized as a separate sphere of social life long before “the economy” crystal-
lized into a sociotechnical object. And yet, that crystallization in the 1930s-1940s marks an
important transition in economic measurement, and economic government. Governments
in the 19th century did not act on “the economy as a whole”, nor did they measure the size
of that economy in terms of national income (or anything else).
Nonetheless, recognizing the long continuity of economic thought is important for dis-
pelling some of the more overblown claims about the importance of the 1930s. Perhaps
most important, we can refine Timothy Mitchell’s account. Mitchell (1998: 92) argued
that “To create the economy meant also to create the non-economic.” (Mitchell 1998: 92)
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This is wrong, or more accurately, it’s right but off by a century or two. The non-economic
was defined well-before “the economy” became a technical object, and included variously
nature, politics, culture, art, religion, etc.
Making the economy a technical object did require refining those distinctions for some
practical purposes. It was no longer simply a matter of asserting that the political was sepa-
rate from the economic, but of practically accounting for the economic presence of the state
and somehow creating aggregate measures of economic performance that simultaneously
recognized the importance of the state while separating off the economy as an object. I
turn to these problems in chapter 5, in the discussion of how national income statisticians
reconciled hard to count objects, especially those in the household (housework) and in the
political sphere (government). Of course, the precise demarcation of economy, politics,
nature, and so on required of national income statisticians did not clarify the usage of those
terms in other contexts; the economy remains an object multiple, as analysis of the blurred
boundaries surrounding the state’s economic activities has shown (Maryl and Quinn 2015).
My account also provides a better periodization that clarifies continuities and disjunc-
tures in economic thought. For example, this history highlights the slow build of precursor
concepts to macroeconomics. Business cycles are identified in the 19th century, and busi-
ness cycle analysis increased in prominence and sophistication in the 1910s-1930s. Simi-
larly, analysis of the price level (above all, Irving Fisher’s work) picked up in this period.
Acknowledging these precursors to modern macroeconomics helps to identify precisely
what changed in the 1930s: the economy comes to have a size and that size is knowable,
measurable in a timely fashion.
The relative lack of interest in national income statistics in mainstream economics text-
books from the 1920s and 1930s clarifies our explanatory burden: We must ask not only
how the economy became an object with a size, but why national income in particular (and
measured in one particular way) won out as the measure of that size. In the 1920s, national
income did not hold a privileged place in economic analysis. By the end of World War II,
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it did. What changed in between? How did national income come to be the measure of the
economy? I tackle this question in the following chapter.
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2.9 Appendix: Introductory Textbook Sample
This chapter draws on a sample of 42 introductory economics textbooks published between
1890 and 1960. These textbooks were sampled following a procedure inspired by Levy and
Peart (2011), as described above. The complete list of textbooks is presented here, after a
brief outline of the analysis scheme used to guide my reading.
2.9.1 Analytical Scheme
Mindful of the critiques of qualitative coding laid out by Biernacki (2012, see also Lee and
Martin 2015), my approach to reading the textbook sample was thematic and holistic. The
goal was to capture how broad themes were treated, not to label and count every instance
of particular phenomena. I focused my attention on four broad themes: definitions, data,
government, and topics we would now consider to be macroeconomics. The list of themes
and subthemes is presented here:
1. Definitions.
A. Of the field of study (economics, political economy)
B. Of the object of analysis (wealth of nations, trade, commerce, prosperity, “the
economy”, etc.).
2. Data.
A. What quantitative statistics are presented, if any?
B. What time period are those statistics covering? How frequent are the inter-
vals?
C. Who produced those statistics? (individual scholars, government, private en-
tities, etc.)
D. What is their object of analysis (trade cycles, specific industries, inflation,
etc.)?
3. Role of the government.
A. What kinds of actions are possible?
B. How does the government know when to do what? What data does it look at?
C. What interventions are conditional on some state of the world rather than
always a good idea? Are any of these conditional on timing?
4. Specific macro topics.
A. Business & trade cycles. Fluctuations. Etc.
B. Monetary theory.
C. Growth & long-run prosperity.
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2.9.2 Textbook Sample
Benham, Frederic, and Friedrich Lutz. 1941. Economics: a general textbook. New York:
Pitman Publishing Corporation.
Blackmar, Frank W. 1912. Economics. Revised edition. Topeka, Kan: Crane & Co.
Bladen, Vincent Wheeler. 1946. An introduction to political economy. Revised. Toronto,
Canada: The University of Toronto press.
Blodgett, Ralph Hamilton. 1951. Principles of economics. Third edition. New York:
Rinehart.
Boulding, Kenneth E. 1941. Economic analysis. New York and London: Harper & brother.
Bowman, Mary Jean, and George Leland Bach. 1943. Economic analysis and public
policy. New York: Prentice-Hall, inc.
Briggs, Milton. 1921. A text-book of economics. London: W. B. Clive, University Tutorial
Press Ld.
Brown, Harry Gunnison. 1923. Economic science and the common welfare. Columbia,
Mo: Missouri Book Company.
Bullock, Charles Jesse. 1897. Introduction to the study of economics. Boston, New York
[etc.]: Silver, Burdett and company.
Burns, Arthur Edward, Alfred Clarence Neal, and Donald Stevenson Watson. 1948. Mod-
ern economics. New York: Harcourt, Brace.
Bye, Raymond T. 1941. Principles of economics. Fourth Edition. New York: F. S. Crofts
& Co.
Carver, Thomas Nixon. 1920. Elementary economics. Boston: Ginn and Company.
Chapman, Sydney John. 1911. Outlines of political economy. London, New York [etc.]:
Longmans, Green and co.
Clark, Harold F. 1948. Economics. New York: American Book Co.
Cronin, John F. 1936. Economics and society. Baltimore.
Davenport, Herbert Joseph. 1897. Outlines of elementary economics. New York, London:
The Macmillan Company.
Dearle, N. B. 1939. Economics. London, New York [etc.]: Longmans, Green, and co.
Deibler, Frederick Shipp. 1929. Principles of economics. New York: McGraw-Hill.
Edie, Lionel Danforth. 1922. Principles of the new economics. New York: Thomas Y.
Crowell Company.
Ely, Richard T. 1901. Outlines of economics. Meadville, Pa: Flood and Vincent.
Fairchild, Fred Rogers, Edgar S. Furniss, and Norman Sydney Buck. 1926. Elementary
economics. New Haven, Conn: Macmillan Co.
Fisher, Irving. 1916. Elementary principles of economics. New York: The Macmillan
Company.
Flux, Alfred William. 1904. Economic principles, an introductory study. London: Methuen.
Froman, Lewis Acrelius. 1946. Principles of economics. Revised edition. Chicago: R.D.
Irwin, inc.
Garver, Frederic Benjamin, and Alvin H. Hansen. 1937. Principles of economics. 2nd ed.
Ginn and company.
58
Gemmill, Paul F. 1939. Fundamentals of economics. 3rd ed. New York, London: Harper
& Brothers.
Hicks, John. 1960. The social framework, an introduction to economics. 3rd ed. Oxford:
The Clarendon press.
Johnson, Alvin Saunders. 1909. Introduction to Economics. Boston: D.C. Heath and Co.
Laughlin, J. Laurence. 1915. The elements of political economy. Revised. New York,
Cincinnati [etc.]: American book company.
Lutz, Harley Leist, and Benjamin Fitts Stanton. 1923. An introduction to economics.
Chicago, New York: Row, Peterson and company.
Macvane, S. M. 1891. The working principles of political economy. New York: E. Maynard
& co.
McIsaac, Archibald MacDonald, and J. G. Smith. 1938. Introduction to economic analysis.
Boston: Little, Brown, and Company.
Meyers, Albert Leonard. 1941. Elements of modern economics. Revised ed. New York:
Prentice-Hall.
Mitchell, Broadus. 1932. A preface to economics. New York: H. Holt and company.
Murad, Anatol. 1953. Economics; principles and problems. Ames, Iowa: Littlefield,
Adams.
Mussey, Henry Raymond, and Elizabeth Donnan. 1942. Economic principles and modern
practice. Boston, New York [etc.]: Ginn and company.
Nordin, J. A., and Virgil Salera. 1950. Elementary economics. New York: Prentice-Hall.
Samuelson, Paul A. 1948. Economics. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co.
Seager, Henry R. 1910. Introduction to economics. 3rd ed. New York: H. Holt and
Company.
Seligman, Edwin R. A. 1905. Principles of economics. Longmans, Green, and Co.
Taylor, Fred Manville. 1911. Principles of economics. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan.
Umbreit, Myron H., Elgin F. Hunt, and Charles V. Kinter. 1952. Fundamentals of eco-
nomics. 2nd ed. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co.
59
CHAPTER 3
How the Economy Got its Size
3.1 Introduction
Looking back from our current vantage point, it’s difficult to imagine just how unimportant
national income statistics (NIS) were before the 1930s. We swim in an economic and
political discourse that takes for granted both the existence of “the economy” as an object,
and the existence of comprehensive measures like Gross Domestic Product that measure
the economy’s size. Before the 1930s, however, NIS were almost entirely absent from
our discourse. NIS were not measured by governments, and only infrequently measured by
private actors. Economists did not theorize national income and its movements. Economics
textbooks did not have chapters devoted to national income, nor did they identify NIS as an
important area of research. To the extent that economists of the 1910s and 1920s attempted
to characterize movements of the entire economic system, they turned to a heterogeneous
collection of indicators that they hoped would predict the rise and fall of the business cycle.
By the 1940s, NIS were ubiquitous, and they had come to be understood as measures of
prosperity and power, an essential tool of governance and the ultimate dependent variable
of the new macroeconomic theory. Moreover, NIS had become associated with a new
object, “the economy”, whose size they measured.
In the previous chapter, I showed that “the economy” emerged as an object of discourse
in the 1930s-1940s, augmenting and crystallizing previous notions of “economic life” as
a separate conceptual space from politics and nature. One of the key distinctions between
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the economy and fuzzier notions of economic life is that the economy has a size. You can’t
ask how big economic life (or political life, or nature) is and get a reasonable answer; on
the other hand, the economy’s size is readily knowable and widely discussed. In particular,
national income statistics define the size of the economy and in so doing enact the economy
as the kind of object that has a definite size.
In this chapter, I show how the economy got its size. I attempt to address the following
related questions: Why did we start routinely measuring national income when we did?
Why did national income become the size of the economy and not some other measure?
Why did we fixate on an understanding of the economy as an object with a unitary measure
of size? What alternatives were available?
To answer these questions, I make forays into the history of economics, economic his-
tory, the history of the state, and military history. I focus on the work of national income
statisticians, and their interactions with businesses, politics, governance, and the new field
of macroeconomics. Following national income statisticians helps to explain how it be-
came possible in the 1930s to produce timely measurements of relevant aggregate statis-
tics, which in turn made NIS practically useful for managing war mobilization, politically
useful for appraising the success of the New Deal and other programs, and theoretically
useful for characterizing different states of the economy. In the following chapter, I extend
this analysis by focusing specifically on how the availability of timely NIS transformed the
capacities and responsibilities of the state. Here, I focus on the process by which these
statistics came to be routine productions of the state, and how their initial successes ce-
mented their position as both iconic indicators of economic well-being, and practical tools
of statecraft.
To understand the timing of the emergence of national income statistics, I briefly chart
the growing calculability of the economic system in the late 19th and early 20th century.
Following a similar roadmap to Tooze (2001), I argue that a combination of technological
innovations, changes in the organization of production, and changes in the organization of
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the state made possible the routine production of aggregate economic statistics. Under-
standing why NIS were possible in the 1930s and not in the 1830s is a necessary but insuf-
ficient first step towards understanding how they came to measure the size of the economy.
I document why the ultimate success of NIS was somewhat surprising from the vantage
point of the 1910s-1920s. As noted above, NIS were not yet important parts of economic
theory, political discourse, or business practice. I focus on the United States to document
how the official production of NIS emerged from the political debates of the Great Depres-
sion, but soon became a tool for managing the war economy of the 1940s. NIS proved
useful for managing the economy, which in turn won out as the dominant paradigm for
economic planning.
3.2 The Growing Calculability of Economic Life
The idea of calculating aggregate economic statistics for use by policymakers dates back to
at least the 17th century, and the “political arithmetick” of William Petty. Despite repeated
efforts by individual scholars, aggregate economic statistics made little headway in the
18th and 19th centuries.1 Writing a century after Petty, Adam Smith (1776) famously
dismissed the endeavor: “I have no great faith in political arithmetick.” Between Adam
Smith’s Wealth of Nations and Paul Samuelson’s (1948) Economics, the field of aggregate
economic statistics went from a backwater to an essential practice for economic theory and
policymaking.
The emergence of aggregate economic statistics in the 20th century was not simply a
matter of will. Recent attempts to to reconstruct data series according to modern stan-
dards highlight the impossibility of calculating the economies of the early 19th century.
1Hoppit (1996) offers a critical analysis of the historiography of political arithmetic and, drawing on
Studenski (1958), notes 15 attempts to calculate England’s national income between 1667 and 1812, which
Hoppit argues had at least some influence on policy debates of the time. Hoppit thus points to more of a
gradual increase in interest rather than a sharp break. That said, timely, official, aggregate statistics are absent
until the 20th century.
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Economist Joseph Davis (2004:1178) highlights the difficulty of analyzing this period:
“Quite frankly, constructing a trustworthy U.S. GDP series is simply impossible before the
Civil War owing to the comparative deficiency of annual data on agriculture, merchant and
wholesale trades, and service industries.” Similarly, Porter (1995: 36) writes of Napolean’s
difficulties collecting usable statistical information: “France was not yet capable of being
reduced to statistics.” What changed between the 18th century and early 20th century that
facilitated the calculation of economic aggregates?
Here, I follow the lead of historians Adam Tooze (2001) and Timothy Shenk (2015) in
exploring changes in the calculability of the economic system. By calculability, I mean the
susceptibility of a given arena of social life to quantification by outsiders. In this sense,
changes in calculability result from changes in both the organization of economic life and
in changes of the capacities of economists and statisticians and the bureaucracies in which
they were embedded.
The period in question—roughly “the long 19th century”—saw many more changes
than can reasonably be summarized here. Historian Jurgen Osterhammel (2014) charac-
terizes the period as The Transformation of the World in his massive overview. I focus on
four important transformations that all facilitated the production, collection, and analysis
of economic data by organized groups of experts, and I will largely limit my analysis to the
United States (though similar trends took place in much of Western Europe). The first two
transformations, the rise of the large corporation and the increasing prevalence of wage
labor, occurred in the organization of production. The second two transformations, the
growth of administrative capacity and the collection of income taxes, concerned the role
of the state as well as technological innovation.2 For each, I will discuss the rough timing
of the transformation and how it facilitated the production of timely aggregate economic
statistics.
2For a similar analysis focused on Germany, see Tooze (2001: 17).
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3.2.1 The Rise of the Large Corporation
The calculability of the economic system, from the perspective of government bureaucrats
or private economists, is partly a function of how much data is already generated as a by-
product of the functioning of that system. Put differently, it’s much faster and cheaper
to aggregate data that has already been aggregated. The late 19th century saw the emer-
gence of the “modern corporation” (Berle and Means 1932, Chandler 1977, Lamoreaux et
al 2003), which was large, professionally managed, often owned by distributed sharehold-
ers, and most notably, centrally administered. Large corporations employed accountants to
track the flow of money inside the firm, and between the firm and its suppliers and cus-
tomers. For firms owned by shareholders, these accounts were even made public through
annual reports.
For statisticians, the large corporation was a tremendous boon. If an industry was or-
ganized entirely into large firms, and if those firms could be convinced or coerced into
releasing their data, statisticians would have access to everything needed to produce com-
prehensive aggregates. In the construction of the first official US national income estimates,
internal correspondence shows how much statisticians relied on the records of large firms
to make sense of certain industries, and how much easier it made their jobs when a small
number of firms controlled a large market. For example, an internal letter noted that the
radio industry could be easily measured with the cooperation of a single firm, RCA, as
“They control the entire situation here so that if we get reports from them, we will have
accurate data.”3 Few industries were as concentrated as radio in the 1930s, but to the extent
that production had been increasingly centralized in a small number of accountable units,
the task of creating aggregate statistics was made substantially easier.
3Burnstein, letter to Kuznets, March 9, 1933, National Archives, RG 151, Index 600, Box 2562, Folder:
“Finance and Investment - United States - National Income - 1933 - January - June.”
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3.2.2 Wage Labor
The long 19th century saw dramatic changes in the location and structure of production.
One major trend was urbanization (Osterhammel 2014). In the United States, about 95% of
the population lived in rural areas in 1790; by 1920 that number was less than 50%.4Along
with this transition from rural to urban came the rise of new forms of employment. In the
19th century, most workers were either self-employed or slaves.5 By the early 20th century,
working for wages or salary had become the dominant form of labor. Lebergott (1964), for
example, finds that by 1900, about 55% of the labor force worked as hired labor, and that
number increased rapidly in the following decades.6
The existence of wage labor facilitated the collection of data about economic activity.
To the extent that workers were employed by large firms, statisticians could learn their
numbers and wages directly from the firms. More generally, the more fully production was
commodified, the easier it was to measure. Individuals who were self-employed were more
difficult to track (especially those not covered by the income tax, discussed below). For
example, statisticians in the Commerce Department invested significant time and resources
into producing better estimates of the incomes of professionals (accountants, lawyers, den-
tists, etc.) who tended to be self-employed, but did not always earn enough to be captured
in income tax statistics. Noted economist Milton Friedman gathered data for his disser-
tation working with Simon Kuznets to improve data collection on professionals, and the
Commerce Department worked through professional associations (e.g. the American Bar
Association) to try to survey every professional as to their income.7
4Data from the United States Census, see http://www.census.gov/prod/cen2010/cph-2-
1.pdf, Table 13.
5Arguably, slave labor was the most calculable category, as the extensive records from slave sales and
plantations have made clear. See, among others, Levy (2012) on the relationship between slavery, calculation,
and capitalism in the 19th century.
6Margo (1992: 26) notes that “there are no reliable statistics on self-employment early in the nineteenth
century.” We are reasonably certain that self-employment declined dramatically in the 19th century, but we
cannot know (by modern standards) exactly how much. In a sense, this absence of data further supports the
point that the early 19th century was much less calculable.
7See, for example, National Archives, RG 151, Index 600, Box 2563 Folder: “Finance and Investment -
United States - National Income - 1934 - July - December.”
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Relative to wage laborers, professionals were difficult to aggregate, but at least pro-
fessional associations kept lists of members, and professionals themselves earned money
incomes that could be reported on standardized surveys. In contrast, as I will discuss at
length in chapter 5, national income statisticians struggled throughout the past century to
deal with “nonmarket production,” including everything from the value of produce grown
by farmers for their own consumption to the unpaid labor of housewives. Labor bought
and sold in the market, in contrast, was theoretically easy to value, and practically easy to
measure.
3.2.3 Administrative Capacity
The growth in administrative capacity, and the production of official statistics, began ear-
lier in the 19th century. As Hacking (1990) noted, the period from 1820-1840 saw an
“avalanche of printed numbers.” These early 19th century efforts produced a great mass
of data, but they tended to do so at irregular intervals or with significant lags between data
collection and publication, and with constant shuffling of categories. Tooze (1998: 216)
summarizes:
The giant censuses of occupation carried out in most countries roughly ev-
ery decade provided basic information on the changes to the social structure
wrought by industrialisation and urbanisation. However, they had little value
as guides to current economic conditions. . . Rough estimates of agricultural
production were prepared for most countries on an annual basis; exceptionally
well-organised and publicity-friendly industrial associations might publish an-
nual reports as well. However, the kind of up-to-date statistical information
which we take for granted today was almost entirely non-existent.
Official statistics proliferated throughout the 19th century, but they did not become
useful for thinking about the current state of the economic system until the end of the
century. In part, early 19th century efforts were limited by a lack of resources. For example,
although the US Census has been conducted decennially since 1790, the Census Bureau
was not funded as a permanent organization until 1902 (on the history of the US census, see
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Anderson 1990). Similarly, the Bureau of Labor Statistics opened in 1884 (see Stapleford
2009 for details). More generally, the late 19th and early 20th centuries saw a dramatic
increase in the size and professionalization of state and federal bureaucracies (Skowronek
1982, Tolbert and Zucker 1983). Thus, at the same time the rise of large corporations and
the shift to wage labor made the organization of production easier to calculate, dramatic
changes in the administrative capacities of the state provided new resources with which to
calculate.
These resources included increased funding, organizational changes, and new technolo-
gies. The most iconic technological change in the late 19th century was the emergence of
Hollerith machines for automated processing of punch cards starting with the 1890 Census.
In the 1930s, when economists at the Department of Commerce were tabulating the first
national income estimates, they relied on punch card processing machines borrowed from
the Census Bureau to perform specific calculations with industry-level data.8 The Hollerith
machine may be the best remembered change in administrative data processing capacity
in the late 19th century, however, as Tooze (2001: 25-27) notes, punch card processing
relied on an arguably more important organizational innovation in the division of human
labor. In particular, the Census Bureau and other administrative agencies began to receive
reports of raw data from enumerators, rather than relying on local level offices to aggregate
data. Having centralized the raw data, the Bureau could then process it more efficiently,
and more flexibly.
3.2.4 Mass Income Taxes
In addition to increases in the state’s capacity to collect and process data, the late 19th
and early 20th century also saw the rise of new forms of taxation which in turn generated
data for more accurate, timely economic statistics. In particular, income taxes provided
8Letter from Feiker to Bureau of the Census, February 24, 1933. Nation Archives RG 151 Index 600 Box
2562, Folder “Finance and Investment - United States - National Income - 1933 - January - June.”
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both a motivation for measuring income (to predict tax revenues) and, as a by-product,
the necessary data. Prior to the routine collection of income taxes, state knowledge of
individual and corporate income was spotty at best. As Tooze (2001:21) summarizes, “Tax
records were the fundamental source for most of the early estimates of national income. As
the share of national income going through the state coffers increased, it became easier to
assemble the data from which to compile a national income estimate.”
In the US, the creation of the income tax in 1913 provided the data needed for National
Bureau of Economic Research’s 1921 estimates of national income (which in turn laid the
groundwork for the official Commerce Department estimates). The modern alternative to
tax data—statistically representative household surveys—were not in widespread use until
the 1940s (see chapter 6 for details). In its initial form, the US income tax had a relatively
high threshold and thus covered a very small percentage of households. In the 1930s and
1940s, the tax base expanded until the majority of households were covered (Jones 1988),
which in turn improved the ability of statistics based on tax data to track flows of income.
Together, these changes in the calculability of the economic system and the capacity
of the state to calculate help explain why timely, official aggregate economic statistics
emerged in the late 19th and early 20th century, and not a century or two earlier. Yet
these changes in calculability cannot explain why national income statistics, in particular,
became so dominant.
3.3 Why National Income?
National income statistics were virtually absent from economic theory and economic poli-
cymaking before the 1920s. The period from 1890 to 1920 saw an uptick in large-scale
economic measurement, but very little activity around national income. Instead, theo-
retical and practical efforts around large-scale economic measurement were devoted pri-
marily to cost-of-living indices (Stapleford 2009) and business cycle indicators (Friedman
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2013). These measurement enterprises reflected both the theoretical interests of academic
economists and the practical concerns of business and labor. National income statistics,
in contrast, had no obvious constituency in this moment. Macroeconomics was not yet a
term, or a coherent body of theory. The economics of growth was virtually nonexistent (as
discussed in chapter 2, see also Warsh 2006). NIS were not yet understood as directly rel-
evant to the business cycle. Instead, the impulse for measuring national income came from
efforts to assess class conflict through objective measurement. By the 1930s, economists
and policymakers began to connect national income to the problem of managing the de-
pression as competing visions of economic planning eventually resolved into something
recognizable as macroeconomic management.
3.3.1 Inflation and Business Cycles
The measurement of inflation is an old and difficult problem.9 In the late 19th and early
20th century, economists and bureaucrats began to devote increasing resources to its mea-
surement. Theoretically, inflation was important to debates surrounding the Quantity The-
ory of Money.10 Versions of the quantity theory date back to the 16th century (Landreth
2012), although the most influential version is usually attributed to Irving Fisher (1911).
Generally, quantity theorists argued for “monetary neutrality,” the idea that increasing or
decreasing the supply of money will have no effects on the output of goods and services,
but will instead only affect their price. Critics of the quantity theory argued that monetary
movements frequently have “real” effects. Key to resolving these theoretical debates was
good measurement of both the money supply and the price level. For example, if a doubling
of the money supply (due to debasement, the discovery of new gold mines, etc.) doubled
the price level, then the Quantity Theory would be taken to hold.
9This language is somewhat presentist—“inflation” had varying meanings in the 19th and early 20th cen-
tury and was not very commonly discussed (see chapter 2); less anachronistic terms would be “the purchasing
power of money” and “the cost of living.” For simplicity, I use the term inflation in its modern sense.
10There is an extensive literature on the quantity theory and its history. Interested readers might consult
Laidler 1991, Humphrey 2001, Landreth 2012, and De Boyer Des Roches & Betancourt 2014.
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At the same time as academics were interested in measuring the purchasing power
of money to assess the validity of the Quantity Theory, labor activists and their business
opponents wanted better measurements of the changing cost of living (Stapleford 2009).
Efforts to measure changes in the price level began at the state-level Bureaus of Labor in
the 19th century, and increased over the next few decades, and a final push induced by
World War I resulted in a national Consumer Price Index, produced by the federal Bureau
of Labor Statistics since 1921. These official measurements were invoked by both labor
and business to justify demands for higher (or lower) wages.
Business interest in aggregate economic statistics was not limited to measurements of
inflation, and academic discussions of aggregate dynamics were not limited to the quantity
theory. In particular, there was a healthy tradition of business cycle theory dating back to
the 19th century discovery that inspired a variety of measurement efforts (Morgan 1990),
including the business forecasting movement of the early 20th century.
One of the first attempts to quantitatively assess the business cycle was also one of the
most famous. In 1878, the English economist William Stanley Jevons published “Commer-
cial Crises and Sunspots,” which argued that commercial crises followed a similar timing
to sunspots. Jevons’ sole quantitative data source was the value of merchandise exported
to India by the English East India Company (Jevons 1878: 36), an early example of the im-
portance of large corporations as sources of data. Business cycle theory grew dramatically
in the late 19th and early 20th century and business cycle theorists employed a diverse col-
lection of data sources to analyze the cycle. Wesley Mitchell’s influential (1913) Business
Cycles contained 150 tables on topics ranging from unemployment among union members
to the prices of raw materials to bank clearings. Notably, Mitchell (1913: 21) made exten-
sive use of the concept of “money economy” (defined as a community where “economic
activity takes the form of making and spending money incomes”) to characterize the struc-
tural conditions needed to produce a business cycle. National income, in contrast, was not
mentioned even once. Money economy was a kind of economic life, not an object with a
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size.
Work on measuring business cycles was not limited to academic debates. Businesses in
the United States were intensely interested in short-term forecasts of economic conditions,
and a new industry emerged to provide them. Friedman (2009, 2013) documents the rise
of the business forecasting industry, and how it benefitted from newly available data series,
such as the Federal Reserve’s monthly index of industrial production. Major players in
economic forecasting included Babson’s (first published in 1909), the Harvard Economic
Service (starting in 1911), and the Index Number Institute run by economist Irving Fisher
himself. These forecasting services popularized terms like leading and lagging indicators
to describe how some data series seemed to predict larger movements in the cycle, while
others followed behind. Their approaches varied—the Harvard group produced three series
that aimed to track speculation, business activity, and banking separately, while Babson
produced a single aggregate index—but they all focused on the timing of the ups and downs
of a seemingly inevitable cycle, and not the overall size of the economic system (nor on the
possibility for mitigating the cycle through proactive economic policy). And none of the
forecasts looked at national income.
To summarize, in the 1910s-1920s, national income was not integrated in the major
theoretical debates in economics, nor was it seen as a priority for business and labor. Where,
then, did the impetus for producing better national income estimates come from?
3.3.2 NBER and National Income
Before 1920, estimates of national income were relatively scarce, and produced by lone
estimators working with inconsistent definitions and limited data.11 The most prominent
economist working in the field was probably Willford King. In 1915, King published
The Wealth and Income of the People of the United States. King (1915: 2) motivated his
11For detailed histories of NIS in this period, see Studenski (1958), Carson (1971), Vanoli (2005), and
Mitra-Kahn (2010). Much of the framing of the later half of this section on the origins of the NBER follows
Rutherford (2011) and Shenk (2015).
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research around the classic question of political economy, the question of distribution and
the possibility of the elimination of poverty:
If there has been an increase in the riches of the nation as a whole, has the
increase been distributed to all classes of the population, or have the benefits
been monopolised by a favored few? Are the landlords, the capitalists, the
captains of industry, or the wage- earners receiving the principal share of the
fruits of progress?
King noted the general paucity of studies bearing directly on this question, and how
newly available data from the Census Bureau and other governmental agencies had dra-
matically improved the possibility of providing a satisfactory answer, especially for the
later decades of the 19th century (King 1915: 3-4). King (1915: 138) estimated the na-
tional income for the United States decennially from 1850-1910, and even estimated the
price level to attempt to produce measures of changes in the real value of the national in-
come. King went on to break down the national income by industry, by factor of production
(wages, rent, interest, and profits), and by family income. This set of breakdowns reflected
King’s interest in the distribution of income, and was more or less the template followed
by national income estimates for the next 20 years. King ended his text with a dramatic
call to nativist action—arguing that the relative increase in standard of living documented
in his table would disappear under the weight of “the subtle assaults of the low-standard
alien invaders.” (King 1915: 255)
King’s 1915 book does not seem to have had much influence on its own, but King him-
self continued to work in the field and was recruited by the newly-formed National Bureau
of Economic Research (NBER) to assist in their first ever study, an estimate of national
income and its distribution. NBER was founded by a group of businessmen, labor leaders,
and academics who believed that social problems (and especially the biggest social prob-
lem of all, inequality) could be solved with better, more objective data (Rutherford 2011,
Shenk 2015). NBER was founded in 1919, in part as a response to the elimination of the
Central Bureau of Planning and Statistics, a federal agency which had been organized to
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help mobilize the United States in World War I. Wesley Mitchell was selected as the first
research director. Together, Mitchell, King, Frederick Macaulay, and Oswald Knauth un-
dertook a new estimate of the national income, which was seen as both informing debates
over the distribution of income and providing a framework to organize much-needed sta-
tistical information for military mobilization (Shenk 2015). For Knauth, the measurement
of national income was essential to understanding class conflict. Knauth wanted to know
if the national income were “so large as to make its proper distribution the primary source
of public interest, or... so insufficient that its increase is the question of prime importance.”
(quoted in Alchon 1985: 60).
In 1921, NBER published Income in its Amount and Distribution, 1909-1919. Unlike
King’s (1915) earlier book, NBER was able to produce annual estimates, in part based
on newly available income tax data. The emphasis of the book tracked King’s, with a
bit less nativism. The first page opened with a list of “The Questions to Be Answered,”
which focused on inequality, year-to-year fluctuations, real vs. nominal movements, and
the comparison of the US per capita income to other nations. The report also noted how
scarce comparable estimates were: as of 1921, only Australia had produced an official
estimate of national income (see Studenski 1958 for details).
The 1921 book was well-received by the field, and NBER continued producing esti-
mates of national income through the 1920s. Its estimates were cited in textbooks, espe-
cially those with an institutionalist bent that wanted to report data on the distribution of
wealth and income (e.g. Edie 1922, Fairchild et al. 1926). Other organizations began to
produce national income estimates as well. In 1926, the Federal Trade Commission pub-
lished the first estimate of national income by a governmental agency, which covered the
years 1918-1923, but the research was never continued and the report was largely forgotten
(Carson 1971). National income did not yet have a strong constituency inside the federal
bureaucracy. In 1927, the National Industrial Conference Board, a non-profit research or-
ganization funded by business interests, began to publish a competing estimate of national
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income, using somewhat different definitions than NBER (Carson 1971). National income
estimates were still disconnected from discussions of monetary theory and business cycles,
and from economic planning, but there was growing interest.
In the 1920s, the US government began to take more of a leading role in gathering
and publishing economic data. As Secretary of Commerce, Herbert Hoover pushed a
model where the government supported business by providing information which busi-
nesses could, in turn, use to predict economic movements and moderate the business cycle
(Barber 1985). In 1921, the Department of Commerce began publishing its monthly Sur-
vey of Current Business to provide up-to-date reports to business leaders. In response to the
1920-1921 downturn, Hoover organized the President’s Conference on Unemployment,
which mostly reported the disappointing state of unemployment data, but did eventually
vote that between 3.5 and 5.5 million Americans were unemployed (see Duncan and Shel-
ton 1978 for details). Hoover’s passion for economic statistics, and private-public partner-
ships, made him an easy ally for NBER. In 1929, NBER published a massive volume of
economic statistics on behalf of the Conference on Unemployment, titled Recent Economic
Changes. The report covered everything from consumption to transportation to marketing.
The final empirical chapter of the report, written by Morris Copeland, treated national in-
come directly. Although Copeland reported similar information to prior publications, his
emphasis was squarely on how national income data revealed changes in the economic
system that might promote stability. Copeland (1929: 839) noted in his conclusion:
The two great impersonal forms of economic organization, corporations and
governments, now disburse nearly one-half of our national money income, and
during the war the proportion was even higher. There has been an appreciable
increase in the proportion of total money income which may be called “fixed
incomes”—salaries, interest, and rents—a change making for the increased
stability of business conditions.
The detailed data provided by national income statistics were seen as useful for Hoover’s
distributed vision of planning where large corporations would establish policies that nat-
urally, and voluntarily, tamped down economic fluctuations. This vision of planning was
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tested and eventually abandoned over the following decade, as competing planning ideals
emerged in the Great Depression (Balisciano 1998, see chapter 4 for a longer discussion).
In that process, national income statistics would be repurposed as the central variable for
a new vision of planning associated with John Maynard Keynes and the management of
economic aggregates.
3.4 Making it Official: The 1934 US National Income Statis-
tics
By 1932, everyone knew the nation’s economic system was functioning poorly. But how
bad was it? Available statistics at the time were inadequate to settle even relatively straight-
forward disputes about the number of individuals out of work, or the respective reduction in
incomes of owners, landlords, and workers. Business cycle forecasters famously failed to
predict the crash, as immortalized in Irving Fisher’s infamous statement that “stock prices
have reached what looks like a permanently high plateau” made just a week before the
1929 crash (Friedman 2013: 80). The failures of economic forecasters to predict the crash,
and their continued enthusiasm in the face of a worsening of the economic situation led
most of the major forecasters to close up shop (Friedman 2013: 199-201). The depths of
the Depression and the failures of the available data and tools for understanding business
cycle led academics and the government alike to look for both new data and new theories.
One of the leaders in the push for new governmental statistics was Senator Robert La
Follette, Jr. La Follette, a Republican from Wisconsin, sympathized strongly with orga-
nized labor and supported the New Deal. In an interview given on March 15, 1932, La
Follette laid out the dismal state of economic statistics.12 On unemployment La Follette
noted:
12The following quotes are from “Radio interview between Mr. Charles Ross and Senator Robert M. La
Follette, Jr., over N.B.C., March 15, 1932, 8p.m.”, La Follette Family Papers, Library of Congress, BOX
I:C557.
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It is a sad commentary on our statistical information that in the third winter
of the depression we have absolutely no authoritative official figures on unem-
ployment. The only data we have are those collected by the census in 1930 for
the country as a whole and for certain cities in January 1931.
Better unemployment measurement would prove surprisingly difficult until the federal
government adopted the technique of randomized household surveys, and it was not until
1940 that anything comparable to modern unemployment statistics became available (Card
2011). La Follette went on to call for official measurement of national income statistics
and, in line with existing understandings of their meaning and use, connected this call to
debates over wages and profits:
Likewise, with all the talk we have heard from bankers and others about the
need for cutting wages and with all the actual wage-cutting that has taken place,
we are woefully lacking in any adequate wage statistics. Also, while we are
discussing the wages of labor, it is startling that we have no accurate informa-
tion on the wages which capital is taking in the form of net profits from the
point of view of industry as a whole. Furthermore, do you know that we have
never had any official estimate of the total national income of the United States
and the only authoritative information we have to go on is the estimate of an
unofficial agency in 1929?
Interestingly, La Follette appears to have been unaware of the Federal Trade Com-
mission’s national income estimate published in 1926, which reinforces how marginal the
effort was. In any event, its data would have been almost a decade out of date by 1932, and
as La Follette noted, no estimates, private or official, were available for 1930 or 1931. La
Follette connected the need for national income measurement to debates over the share of
total income going to wages and profits, and how those may have changed in the wake of
the Depression.
La Follette soon translated his public statements on the need for better statistics into
legislative text. In June, La Follette authored and secured the passage of Senate Resolution
220 that called on the Department of Commerce to produce:
estimates of the total national income of the United States for each of the cal-
endar years 1929, 1930, and 1931, including estimates of the portions of the
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national income originating from agriculture, manufacturing, mining, trans-
portation, and other gainful industries and occupations, and estimates of the
distribution of the national income in the form of wages, rents, royalties, div-
idends, profits, and other types of payments. (Quoted in Duncan and Shelton
1978: 77)
The history of the production of these estimates has been well-told (Carson 1971; 1975
offers the most authoritative account, see also Philipsen 2015). Commerce sought the aid
of NBER to help organize the estimates, and Simon Kuznets was tapped to lead the effort.
Kuznets had been a student of Wesley Mitchell, and had just published an agenda-setting
article on theoretical issues relating to national income statistics (Kapuria-Foreman and
Perlman 1995). Kuznets built on and improved the work of the NBER, aided by both
a small full-time professional staff, and the ability to acquire information and assistance
from other governmental agencies (as noted above).
In January, 1934, Commerce published National Income, 1929-1932, to much acclaim.
This report was widely read, selling an unexpected 4,500 copies in less than a year (Carson
1975: 159). The estimates produced became the basis for a continual series of national
income statistics, which Commerce published annually, and then quarterly, in the Survey of
Current Business.
Although Kuznets did not employ the exact language of “size of the economy,” he did
invoke the term “national economy” in its modern sense multiple times in the opening
pages of the report. For example, Kuznets (1934: 1) writes:
If all commodities produced and all personal services rendered during the year
are added at their market value, and from the resulting total we subtract the
value of that part of the nation’s stock of goods which was expended (both
as raw materials and as capital equipment) in producing this total, then the
remainder constitutes the net product of the national economy during the year.
It is referred to as national income produced, and may be defined briefly as
that part of the economy’s end-product which is attributable to the efforts of
the individuals who comprise a nation.
This usage of “national economy” and “the economy” was not yet typical (as noted
in Chapter 2), and Kuznets’ report may have played some role in popularizing the termi-
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nology. Note how “the economy” now has an end-product, a measurable size of output,
denominated in dollars, and derived from market prices. The economy is no longer sim-
ply a placeholder describing a kind of economic system (“money economy” vs. “barter
economy”), but a sociotechnical object whose “end-product” is measured according to a
particular standard. This usage would grow considerably in government reports, academic
publications, and popular usage over the following decade.
Kuznets, like Mitchell and King before him, was forced to make many difficult choices
about what to include in the national income, and how to include it. Commodities bought
and sold on the market presented the least challenge, especially given the increasing ability
of the federal government to collect data on market transactions. Government itself proved
more difficult to include. In addition to somewhat surprising data collection challenges,
Kuznets faced a thorny theoretical challenge: how much was government’s output worth?
For Kuznets, some of government’s activity clearly constituted “intermediate production,”
necessary for final production but not valuable on its own. Counting all of government as fi-
nal production would thus create a double counting problem, as if the final national income
counted separately the value of a car, and the steel used to make the car. Unfortunately,
there was no ready solution to the question of how much of government’s output was inter-
mediate, and Kuznets’ ad hoc solution (subtracting the value of taxes paid by businesses)
satisfied no one. Eventually, Kuznets’ successors at Commerce abandoned this treatment in
favor of counting all of government as final production, a move which frustrated Kuznets
who felt that it sacrificed too much for the sake of convenience (Kuznets 1948, Kuznets
1951, Gilbert et al. 1948).13 Apart from the treatment of government, most of the decisions
made by Kuznets as to how to count and what to count were institutionalized in the official
US standards in the 1940s, and further reinforced in the 1953 United Nations System of
National Accounts. Small changes in the standards continue to present, but the basic logic
13In chapter 5, I return to the question of problematic inclusions and exclusion with an extended discussion
of the treatment of unpaid housework, another area that has vexed national income accountants since at least
the 1920s.
78
of the system has been fixed.14
3.5 Early Uses of National Income Statistics
In addition to being widely read, the official Department of Commerce national income
statistics were picked up by policymakers, politicians, and businesses alike. Although they
were not yet widely understood, and their presence was nowhere near as ubiquitous as it
would later become, national income statistics made their way into discussions of New
Deal programs, business planning, and even campaign speeches.
In 1935, just one year after Commerce published its first estimates, Lauchlin Currie
authored an influential memo titled “Comments on pump priming.”15 Currie was an influ-
ential economic thinker during the New Deal, first at the Treasury Department and later at
the Federal Reserve and the White House itself. Even before John Maynard Keynes’ (1936)
General Theory, Currie advocated the use of fiscal policy (taxes and spending) to fight the
Depression in aggregate. In “Comments on pump priming”, Currie drew on Kuznets (1934)
to calculate how much the production of durable goods had fallen since 1929, and thus how
much money the government would need to spend to restore full employment. Currie’s ap-
proach to macroeconomic management did not immediately win out in the competition
14This opinion is somewhat controversial. For example, there have been some changes in the measurement
of finance (Christophers 2011) and intellectual property (van Ekelen 2015). But compared to the relatively
large changes proposed and executed in the 1920s-1940s, the national accounts have been incredibly stable
(see Waring 1999 for a feminist version of this argument, highlighting the continuity from NBER 1921
to the present UNSNA, also discussed below in Chapter 5). Perhaps the most notable shift has been the
transition from discussions of national income to gross national product (GNP) and later gross domestic
product (GDP). GNP came into use during World War II itself. It differs from national income primarily in
that national income subtracts a measure of depreciation, while GNP does not. During the war, GNP was
seen as the more relevant measure as the central question concerned the output of new war material, and
short-run running down of productive equipment was not a concern. After the war, GNP stuck, although both
measures continue to be produced. Similarly, GDP came to replace GNP in the 1990s (in the US) as the
central aggregate. GDP tracks economic activity that takes place within the boundaries of the country while
GNP tracked economic activity that “belonged” to the nation (e.g. the two measures differ in the treatment of
multinational corporations). That said, GNP and GDP track each other very closely in the US, rarely differing
by more than 1% (although this close equivalence does not hold for smaller countries with more foreign trade
or investment). See Hirschman (2012) for a detailed explanation.
15This memo was reprinted in History of Political Economy as Currie (1978).
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among competing visions of the New Deal, but as I show in the next chapter, by the end of
the 1930s, macroeconomic management was ascendant (see also Lee 1990, Brinkley 1996,
Balisciano 1998), with national income statistics as a critical component of this vision.
The use of national income statistics for planning was not limited to the federal govern-
ment. Federal agencies, local governments, and business all wrote to Commerce asking for
updated statistics and detailed breakdowns. A recurrent theme was an interest in speeding
up the timing of their production. For example, in a November 5th, 1934 telegram, For-
tune magazine wrote to ask for updated national income estimates through the end of 1933;
Robert Martin (a senior analyst) replied that the estimates were not yet ready but would
be soon.16 The following year, Robert Nathan, who took charge of the national income
statistics following Kuznets’ return to academia, corresponded with Herbert Bratter of the
investment firm Loomis, Sayles & Company about the possibility of creating a monthly
index of national income. Nathan reported that Commerce was working on a monthly se-
ries but so far had had little luck, as the data for many important components of national
income did not readily lend themselves to a monthly series.17 Commerce never managed
to produce a monthly index of national income, but the immediate interest in timely data
suggests that end users were interested in up-to-the-minute assessments of the current eco-
nomic situation through the language of national income.
Politicians too saw a use for timely national income statistics. In his 1936 re-election
campaign, Roosevelt invoked increases in the national income as markers of the success
of the New Deal and particularly the idea that deficit spending produced an increase in
income:
The national income of the United States this year will have risen from about
thirty-eight billion dollars in 1932 to well over sixty billions in 1936. In other
words, it seems to me like a fairly simple mathematical question to put to you.
If somebody that you trusted were to come to you and say, Look here, will you
16National Archives, RG 151, Index 600, Box 2563, Folder: “Finance and Investment - United States -
National Income - 1934 - July - December.”
17Letter from Robert Nathan to Herbert Bratter, July 5, 1936. National Archive, RG 151, Index 600, Box
2564, Folder: “1936 July - December.”
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borrow $800 so as to get an increase in your annual income of $2,200?’ would
you do it or not?18
Here, we see how national income has become rhetorically linked to both purchasing
power and the success of government initiatives. Roosevelt invoked similar statistics in at
least eight other speeches in September and October of 1936, all to reinforce the success of
his economic programs.19 An October 1st speech in Pittsburgh, PA went into greater detail,
and offered a quick definition of national income suggesting Roosevelt did not believe that
his audience would be entirely comfortable with the concept:
Our national income had declined over 50 percent—and, what was worse, it
showed no prospect of recuperating by itself. By national income I mean the
total of all income of all the 125,000,000 people in this country—the total of
all the pay envelopes, all the farm sales, all the profits of all the businesses and
all the individuals and corporations in America.20
The entire speech focused on changes in national income, on how Roosevelt took office
in a period when national income was on a declining spiral, and how his deficit spending
managed to arrest that spiral. Seeing the large uptick in national income from 1932 to 1936,
Roosevelt was now certain that the time for deficit spending was over, and that the federal
budget could be balanced as tax incomes automatically increased and temporary spending
measures came to a halt (a strategy that arguably led to a second depression in 1937, which
in turn cemented the place of Keynesian analysis inside the White House, see Brinkley
1996).
By the end of the 1930s, national income had become a significantly more central statis-
tic to our collective understanding of the economic system, which in turn increasingly went
by the name “the economy.” When the National Resources Committee, a New Deal plan-
ning group, published a major 1939 report they titled it The Structure of the American
18Remarks at the State Capitol, Lincoln, NE. October 10th, 1936. Available at http://www.
presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=15161. Also cited in Carson 1975: 160.
19A search for references to “national income” in 1936 in The American Presidency Project yields 11 re-
sults, including 9 campaign speeches. See http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php.
20Address at Forbes Field, Pittsburgh, PA, October 1st, 1936. Available at http://www.
presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=15149.
81
Economy (including a rare definition of this new use of the term “economy”, as discussed
in Chapter 2). The first statistic cited in this report was a measure of national income, in-
cluding an estimate of how much income the country had lost due to the Depression (NRC
1939: 2). National income was seen as the right measure to capture the overall economic
devastation of the 1930s.
The 1930s thus saw significant changes in both the production of national income statis-
tics, and the beginnings of their widespread use. World War II would cement their place
as the most important measure of the size of the economy, and prove the utility of national
income analysis for managing that economy.
3.6 National Income Goes to War
By 1940, national income statistics had begun to work their way into military planning.
Although the US had not formally entered the war, planning for wartime mobilization had
begun in earnest. Throughout 1941 and continuing into 1942, generals, civilian officials,
and economists debated how many men and how much materiel the American economy
was capable of devoting to the war effort. National income statistics became central to
this debate, as three civilian economists—including Simon Kuznets and Robert Nathan—
debated top military planners in an effort to create a “feasible” mobilization plan. Military
historian Jim Lacey (2011: 40) argues that “It is almost impossible to overestimate the
effect of Kuznets’ work on the planning and conduct of America’s wartime mobilization.”21
The most visible site of the influence of national income statistics on US mobilization
came in 1942. In January, 1942, President Roosevelt announced ambitious goals for the
construction of planes, tanks, and ships to be delivered by the end of 1943. Nathan and
21This section relies heavily on Brigante (1950), Edelstein (2001), and Lacey (2011), who all narrate
these events in detail. Brigante offers an immediate retrospective drawn from documents and oral histories,
Edelstein analyzes the debate from the perspective of economic history (how accurate were economists’
predictions?), and Lacey offers a detailed account rooted in military history. All three agree on the details
salient for the account here.
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Kuznets, working for the War Production Board, were convinced that Roosevelt’s goals
could not be met, and that in attempting to produce too much, the US economy would actu-
ally produce less than it could, as the misallocation of resources would exacerbate scarcities
and hold up production. Nathan and Kuznets grounded their analysis in national income
statistics, which provided a single framework to unify discussions of the civilian and mil-
itary labor forces, civilian consumption needs, and different forms of military production
(including production for military allies).
In March, 1942, Kuznets authored a memo arguing that the existing plan was not fea-
sible, and that either civilian consumption would have to fall dramatically or the military
would fall about 20% behind in its production goals. Kuznets’ memo was poorly received
by the military brass, especially General Brehon Somervell, who was in charge of the pro-
curement and distribution of supplies for the Army. Somervell distrusted national income
statistics, and believed Kuznets and Nathan were far too pessimistic.
The bureaucratic debate raged until a heated meeting on October 6, 1942.22 Based on
updated analysis, Kuznets and Nathan were now convinced that the military program was
close to 30% too large to be feasible. They presented their analysis to the War Production
Board, including Robert Patterson (the Under Secretary of War), Isador Lubin (an influ-
ential advisor to FDR), and Leon Henderson (another influential New Dealer, and then
Administrator of the Office of Price Administration).
The turning point of the meeting, according to Brigante (1950: 30) came when Hen-
derson stepped in to support Kuznets and Nathan. Kuznets and Nathan had argued that the
economy could support no more than $90 billion in war production; Somervell had coun-
tered that $90 billion was insufficient for the plans of the Joint Chiefs. Henderson remarked
that “The amount in question, 90 billion dollars, was interesting... because it exceeded by
far the value of our entire national product both for 1933 and 1934. ... Maybe if we can’t
wage a war on 90 billions, we ought to get rid of our present Joint Chiefs, and find some
22Lacey (2011: 173-201) reprints several memos leading up to the meetings, as well as their minutes.
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who can.” (quoted in Lacey 2011: 112) After that, the matter was largely settled: the mili-
tary would have to roll back its plans to what the civilian economists thought was feasible
based on the national income data.
Although the planning committee itself was soon dissolved, the scaled back produc-
tion plans were seen as a tremendous success, enabling the US to efficiently mobilize the
maximum feasible military in the quickest time (Edelstein 2001). The debate also demon-
strated the value of national income statistics for planning government expenditure in a
much more vivid fashion than the halting attempts at macroeconomic planning in the late
1930s. After the war, national income statistics would only increase in their centrality to
federal policymaking.
The United Kingdom experienced an even more dramatic transformation in terms of the
production and use of national income statistics in World War II. As of 1939, the UK had
no official estimates, nor did it have unofficial estimates akin to those routinely produced
by NBER. In 1940, John Maynard Keynes wrote How to Pay for the War, an influential
pamphlet that drew on estimates of UK national income produced by Colin Clark to sketch
a plan for war finance that would avoid the hyperinflation of previous wars by strategically
reducing consumer demand through a mix of taxes and bonds (see Skidelsky 2005 and
Tily 2009 for details). The following year, Keynes convinced the UK government to begin
to produce its own official national income statistics for wartime budgeting, and recruited
Richard Stone and James Meade to compile the first estimates. These estimates, much like
those of Kuznets and Nathan for the US, were seen as highly effective tools for managing
the wartime economy, and proof of Keynes’ economic ideas.
Germany experienced a somewhat different trajectory, adopting national income statis-
tics a bit earlier than the US and UK, but abandoning them before the end of World War
II (Tooze 2001). National income statistics took off under the Weimar regime as part of
the effort to pay reparations. Under the Nazi regime, the German statistical bureau shifted
towards more disaggregated forms of planning (akin to something like input/output ac-
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counts, or Soviet central plans). This trajectory nicely demonstrates the non-inevitability
of national income statistics in this period: many statistical alternatives were available, and
it was a particular alliance of actors and circumstances that led to the success of national
income statistics in the US and UK (and their failure in Germany). Just as the US and UK
and won World War II, national income statistics in the form adopted by the US and UK
would come to dominate in the post-war era.
In 1944, representatives from the US, UK, and Canada met to discuss standardizing the
production of national income statistics (Denison 1947). These meetings laid the ground-
work for the international standards designed by Richard Stone in the late 1940s and 1950s,
and eventually published as the United Nations System of National Accounts. The stan-
dards developed in the 1930s and 1940s to deal with the Great Depression and World War
II would be enshrined as the global standards (Ward 2004, Herrera 2010). National income,
having proved its worth in World War II, would be propelled into global use as the measure
of the size of every nation’s economy.
3.7 Aftermath
Before World War I, national income statistics were a backwater of research, absent from
public debates, and disconnected from economic theory. By the end of World War II,
national income statistics were produced on a quarterly basis by the major English-speaking
governments, were seen as critical policy tools for planning in both war and peace, and were
central to the theoretical debates in the newly-named subfield of macroeconomics. To riff
on Charles Tilly, here war made statistics.
In 1948, Paul Samuelson published the best-selling economics textbook of the era (Sk-
ousen 1997). Samuelson’s Economics departed from pre-war textbooks in several respects,
but one of the most notable was its increased emphasis on aggregate topics.23 Samuelson
23Samuelson’s textbook was not unique in this departure; other late 1940s and 1950s textbooks placed
national income analysis first. See Burns et al. 1948, Nordin and Salera 1950.
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went so far as to write that “National income provides the central unifying theme of the
book” (1948: v) and “It is the first task of modern economic science to describe, to ana-
lyze, to explain, to correlate these fluctuations of national income.” (1948: 5) Macro topics
preceded micro—students were expected to understand Keynesian theories of full employ-
ment, inflation, and the movements of national income before they could make sense of
traditional topics like supply and demand. Samuelson (1948: 225) made clear how na-
tional income statistics made economic movements visible:
By means of statistics of national income, we can chart the movements of a
country from depression to prosperity, its steady long-term rate of economic
growth and development, and finally its material standard of living in compar-
ison with other nations.
National income, then, had replaced the earlier business cycle indicators as the most im-
portant measure of short-term ups and downs while simultaneously providing a metric for
comparing affluence over time and between nations. National income unified the short-run
and long-run, and brought together macroeconomic theories and policymaking. National
income, as the measure of the size of the economy, became an obligatory passage point for
economic debates.24 And in turn, “the economy” became an object with the capacity to
grow or shrink.
The 1940s and 1950s saw a massive increase in both academic research on economic
growth and the explicit politics of growth and development. Academic research on the mea-
surement of growth included early efforts by Clark (1940), whose Conditions of Economic
Progress may have been the first to use national income statistics to show just how large the
gap between poor and rich countries had become, and a long string of research by Kuznets
and collaborators (e.g. Kuznets 1956) that showed just how much the rich countries had
grown in the 19th and 20th centuries. Theoretical work included the famous Solow (1956)
24The explicit use of the phrase the “size of the economy” takes off in the 1950s. Hollinger (1954: 225)
provides a clear example, one that explicitly defends the use of national income statistics as the measure
of size for understanding developing countries: “To get our initial insights into the size of the economy
how much there is there to work with, and the rate of growth of the economy, national income tables are
appropriate...” (Hollinger 1954: 225)
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model, which became the workhorse theoretical model of growth (Warsh 2006, Boianovsky
and Hoover 2014). Politically, economic growth came to dominate domestic politics in rich
countries like the US (Collins 2000, Yarrow 2010) and Japan (O’Bryan 2009), while its
close cousin economic development dominated discussions of rich countries’ obligations
to poor ones (Ferguson 1990, Mitchell 2002). The growing theoretical, practical, and po-
litical use of national income statistics tended to fix the statistics in the form they took in
the immediate post-war period, and to increase their importance.
3.8 Conclusion
Before the 1920s, we did not talk about “the economy” and we did not measure economic
life according to a single metric. In the 1920s-1930s, national income statistics took off as
an empirical enterprise in part fueled by old class concerns, and made feasible by transfor-
mations in the capacities of the state, the organization of business, and information technol-
ogy. By the end of World War II, discussion of “the economy” was pervasive, and national
income was its measure, yoked to new forms of macroeconomic planning. Post-war, na-
tional income was fixed into a system of national accounts, which in turn became a global
standard used in a variety of debates around growth, development, and planning. Academic
research continues along many paths, but “the economy” as object remains indelibly linked
to national income statistics that measure its size, and thus provide its operational defini-
tion. For many purposes, the economy is what national income statistics measure (and vice
versa).
As Porter (1995: 17) has eloquently argued, “Numbers... create new things and trans-
form the meanings of old ones.” Giving economic life a size created “the economy”, a
powerful new thing. Quantifying economic life transformed it into the economy, adding
a bounded object onto an existing domain of social life. As with other forms of quantifi-
cation, this act made economies commensurable with another. Commensuration, in turn,
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inspires comparison: “the truly generative aspect of commensuration is that it creates pre-
cise distinctions at the same time that it unifies... Precise distinctions force comparisons
and stratification. It is impossible not to notice who or what is higher or lower.” (Espeland
and Lom 2015: 34) Adam Smith could point to the apparent affluence of the Netherlands
as a topic of debate; 20th century economists would measure the precise gaps between the
US and Mexico, Germany and France, Africa and the rest of the world, even when this
precision appears unwarranted given the quality of the underlying data (Jerven 2013).
In the next chapter, I focus on another consequence of the proliferation of timely
macroeconomic data: a transformation in the presumed capacities and political economic
responsibilities of the state. Then I will turn to two chapters about what was left out of
national income statistics—paths not taken, alternatives that were abandoned due to the
particular contingencies that led to the institutionalization of a particular version of national
income as the size of the economy. In the conclusion, I return to questions of alternatives
and counterfactuals.
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CHAPTER 4
Managing the Economy in Real Time
4.1 Introduction
In 2007 and 2008, the American financial system was in turmoil. Unexpected declines in
housing prices translated into a widespread panic as previously liquid derivatives suddenly
became toxic.1 The response from the Federal Government was swift and massive. The
Federal Reserve lowered interest rates from 5.25% in 2007 to 0-0.25% by the end of 2008.
The Fed also dramatically increased its purchases of other financial assets to provide liquid-
ity to the market and increased its lending to troubled institutions. In October 2008, after
overcoming brief Congressional resistance, President George W. Bush signed the Troubled
Asset Relief Program into law, which promised to provide another $700 billion in govern-
ment funds to prop up the financial industry. Despite these efforts, the American economy
began to decline. By the time Barack Obama won the presidential election, it was becoming
clear that stemming the panic on Wall St. would be insufficient to prevent a recession.
In meetings with his economic advisors, President-Elect Obama began to draft the
outlines of a proposed economic stimulus bill.2 In order to determine how much money
the federal government should spend, Obama’s economic advisors looked to the available
macroeconomic indicators to see how badly the financial crisis was affecting the rest of the
economy. The first estimate of GDP for the third quarter of 2008 had just been released,
1For details on the panic and alternative accounts of the causes that produced it, see Gorton 2010, Financial
Crisis Inquiry Commission 2011.
2This section draws heavily on the account of journalist Michael Grunwald (2012).
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and it showed a small decline, -.5%.3 Based on this data, economist Christina Romer (soon
to be appointed Chair of the Council of Economic Advisers) argued for a robust stimulus
package, much larger than the one proposed by Obama during his Fall campaign. By Jan-
uary 2009, the President and his advisers settled on $800 billion as the minimum stimulus
needed to right the economy.
On January 9th, 2009, Romer and Jared Bernstein (Vice President-Elect Biden’s top
economic adviser) published a report detailing how they expected the economy to fare
with and without their stimulus proposal, and justifying the size of the program in terms
of the best available estimates of the economy’s decline. Romer and Bernstein (2009: 4)
focused on projections of the unemployment rate (see figure 4.1). Without the stimulus,
unemployment would soar to 8.8%; with it, unemployment could be kept to just 7%. Their
projections translated stimulus spending into jobs: the stimulus would increase GDP 3.7%
over two years, which in turn would create or save 3 million jobs.
In February, the President’s stimulus was passed as the American Recovery and Rein-
vestment Act, which allocated approximately $800 billion dollars in aid to states, tax cuts,
and direct spending on public works, infrastructure, and simple direct cash payments to
individuals. Unfortunately, the data on which Romer’s calculations were based turned out
to be overly optimistic. The -.5% growth for the third quarter of 2008 would be revised
into -4%. And the estimates were even worse for the fourth quarter. As Grunwald (2012:
248-249) reports: “At the time the stimulus passed, the official GDP estimate for the fourth
quarter of 2008 was -3.8 percent. That was disastrous, but a couple weeks later, it would be
revised to an unthinkable -6.2 percent. And it would eventually be rerevised to -8.9 percent.
That’s Great Depression territory.”4
Romer and Bernstein’s unemployment forecasts proved to be as optimistic as the initial
3Note that quarterly GDP data are reported on an annualized basis in the US. For example, if the BEA
reports a 4% growth rate, that means if growth were sustained at that pace for a full year, it would correspond
to an increase in yearly GDP of 4%.
4See Reamer (2014) for a more detailed discussion of what statistics were available to policymakers at
different moments in 2008-2009.
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Figure 4.1: From Romer and Bernstein 2009.
GDP estimates. Even with the stimulus, unemployment hit 10% before the end of 2009. Al-
though recent evaluations suggest that the stimulus and bailout were incredibly successful,
keeping unemployment to 10% instead of 16%, and holding declines in GDP to 4% rather
than 14% (Blinder and Zandi 2015), political commentators routinely judged the stimulus
a failure, and the Democrats fared poorly in the 2010 elections. As political scientists pre-
dicted, voters punished incumbents for the short-run economic situation, independent of
the blame that incumbents “rationally” deserved (Achen and Bartels 2004, Bartels 2013,
Healy and Malhotra 2013).
This chapter investigates the history of government responsibility for the short-term
performance of the economy. As the story of the 2008 bailout and 2009 stimulus demon-
strates, contemporary policymakers have come to understand their role in terms of timely
estimates of economic aggregates. In the language of the Federal Reserve, economic policy
has become “data dependent,” conditional on the best estimates of the current state of eco-
nomic affairs. When and how did the state become responsible for the economy and what
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exactly did it become responsible for? When and how did policy become “data depen-
dent”? In the post-war era, the federal government has taken responsibility for “managing
the economy” (or “macroeconomic management”). The availability of timely measure-
ments of (what came to be understood as) macroeconomic outcomes helped to change how
governments perceived their economic responsibilities without necessarily equipping them
with the capacity to execute those responsibilities. Although economists and politicians
have debated the best means for managing the economy throughout the post-war period,
and the exact targets for good economic performance, the debate has largely rested on the
assumption that the federal government is capable of both seeing the economy in real time
and acting directly on the economy, albeit with limitations.
The playbook that Presidents Bush and Obama followed in responding to the financial
crisis was written over the course of the 20th century. In particular, I focus on the in-
terwoven development of economic theories (macroeconomics, growth theory), economic
policies (monetary policy, fiscal policy), policymaking institutions (the Federal Reserve,
the Council of Economic Advisers), and economic statistics (national income statistics,
unemployment statistics) from about 1890 to about 1964. Covering such a large swath
of time and expanse of domains requires a synthetic, survey approach that necessarily ex-
cludes a detailed analysis of each period. The advantage of taking such a broad view is
that it highlights dramatic transitions from the early to the late 20th century that might be
occluded by focusing on a narrower slice of time. It also allows for the possibility that
policy instruments may be developed before or after the theories justifying and quantifying
their use, and policymaking institutions may be repurposed from one task to another.
This analysis offers new insights into debates over the state’s role in economic life. The
state has long been responsible for “governing economic life” (Miller and Rose 1990) in
various forms. Highlighting the emergence of macroeconomic management showcases the
dramatic transformation in the scale of government’s responsibility for economic perfor-
mance. This policy paradigm made visible small quantitative changes in economic per-
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formance, and obligated the state to account for those changes. Every tiny movement of
inflation, unemployment, and economic growth is made visible to the public and trumpeted
rhetorically by politicians. Romer and Bernstein drew up a massive intervention to respond
to a movement in unemployment that would have been difficult to detect a century ear-
lier. Smaller recessions in the postwar era have occasioned more modest responses, but
nonetheless have obligated states to at least offer explanations and plans cast in precise,
quantitative terms.
The emergence of “managing the economy” as the dominant discourse of government’s
relationship to economic life also offers a novel interpretation of the origins of the political
economic crisis of the 1970s. Krippner (2011) identified a triple crisis for the state: in-
creasing demands for resources in the face of declining growth, state expenditures outstrip-
ping revenues, and declining public confidence. Financialization, in Krippner’s account,
emerged as a partial solution to these crises, a means by which the state offloads some of
its responsibility for managing the economy back onto the market in general, and finance
in particular. Here, Krippner, following Offe (1974), argues that the state’s triple crisis
resulted in part from its expanded role in managing the economy, which redefined eco-
nomic events “as the product of state actions rather than the blind operation of the market.”
(Krippner 2011: 21) This chapter offers a new characterization of the process by which the
state came to manage the economy, and in particular, how managing the economy came to
mean the simultaneous obligation to measure, report, and control inflation, unemployment,
and growth in precise terms.
The remainder of the chapter proceeds as follows. First, I briefly review existing treat-
ments of the state’s responsibility for economic affairs. Second, I describe the sources and
analytical approach used for my analysis. Then I proceed to an analysis of economic policy
from 1890 to 1964, broken into four periods. In each period, I assess changes in the gov-
ernment’s stated responsibilities, the institutions charged with making economic policy, the
economic theories guiding (or at least available to guide) the formation of policy, and the
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production of economic statistics.
4.2 The Role of the State in Economic Life
How has the state’s responsibility for economic life changed over the course of the 20th cen-
tury? My approach in this chapter draws on work by Marxian political theorists, American
economic sociologists, and scholars of governmentality. Specifically, I combine insights
from Offe (1974) and Krippner (2011) on the political responsibility of the state with work
by Miller and Rose (1990) and Scott (1998) on the technological aspects of government. I
focus especially on how these authors make sense of the history of 20th century economic
policymaking.
Writing in an explicitly Marxist tradition, Offe (1974, 1975) argued that the state was
not simply influenced or constrained by the political power of capitalists, but rather that
the state is structurally capitalist. In this account, the state serves to protect the interests of
capitalists against both explicitly anti-capitalist forces (socialist movements) and the short-
sighted self-interest of individual capitalists. Through a combination of selection filters,
the capitalist state prevents radical or destructive items from reaching the policy agenda.
To succeed in this task, the state must maintain a certain level of legitimacy with the public;
it cannot be too closely identified with the capitalists whose interests it serves. Offe argues
that, in the post-WWII era, capitalist states have been pushed by these structural necessities
to take responsibility for economic outcomes while simultaneously attempting to reduce
the size of the state. The consequence is that the state transforms economic outcomes into
state responsibilities, independently of the state’s ability to secure those outcomes. Offe
(1974: 50) highlights full-employment policy as a particularly important example of these
tensions:
A suitable case to illustrate this situation may be found in the proclamation and
practice of “full-employment policy.” At least in the form of a declaration of
the aims of economic policy, a State policy of job-security has since the Second
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World War been part of the stock-in-trade of almost all the parties in every
developed industrial state in the political assurance of corresponding laws and
programmes related to business, educational and structural policies it would
never have been possible to secure the degree of social peace and integration
of the trade-unions which, above all in West Germany, was a prerequisite for
a capitalist restoration. Independently of the failure or (except in the USA)
relative success of this programme its mere adoption alone has an important
effect which modifies reality: the actual fact of unemployment changes its
social definition wherever it appears; it is no longer perceived as a periodic
event in a blindly operating economic cycle but as a “culpable” and therefore
“actionable” failure on the part of political-administrative direction.
Offe sees full-employment policies as both essential to securing the legitimacy of post-
war capitalist states, but also setting up an impossible expectation that the state would
actually manage to achieve jobs for all. Unemployment no longer results from a “blindly
operating economic cycle” but rather from the failures of governments to properly manage
the economy. Whether or not we accept Offe’s arguments about class conflicts as the
source of the state’s newfound responsibility, his analysis of the increasing responsibility
of the state for economic outcomes provides a valuable starting point for understanding
the history of macroeconomic policymaking. Offe identifies how post-WWII states made
many new economic guarantees — full-employment, growth, stability — that they could
neither routinely deliver, nor readily withdraw from without occasioning protest and loss
of legitimacy.
Building on Offe’s analysis, and other treatments of the 1970s crisis, Krippner (2011)
identifies particular strategies through which the American state grappled with its newfound
responsibility for providing full-employment and managing the economy. Krippner (2011:
16-20) characterizes the 1970s crisis as simultaneously a social, fiscal, and legitimation
crisis. The social crisis stemmed from increasing demands for economic resources in the
face of declining growth, which in turn produced inflationary pressures. The fiscal crisis
resulted from asymmetric political forces which pushed for increased expenditures (to solve
the social crisis) and stable or reduced taxes (demanded by capitalists). And the legitimacy
crisis flowed from reduced public confidence in the state, attributable to its failure to deliver
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on its many new promises.
Krippner (2011) identifies financialization as the outcome of policymakers grappling
to solve these crises. The free flow of credit across sectors, and increased foreign capital
inflows combined to relieve credit constraints and, at the same time, the Federal Reserve
managed to fend off the threat of inflation through higher interest rates while simultane-
ously justifying that policy in terms of market forces. Summarizing, Krippner (2011: 22)
argues “these developments allowed policymakers to avoid politically difficult decisions
about how to allocate limited resources between competing social priorities.” The social
and fiscal crises were solved through the increased availability of credit while the legiti-
macy crisis was solved, in part, through a rhetorical inversion that devolved some respon-
sibility for macroeconomic conditions back to the “blindly operating economic cycle” (in
Offe’s words).
These perspectives offer a useful starting point for understanding the transformation
of the state’s responsibility for economic outcomes in the post-war era. They identify an
important end-point, the post-war settlement of the 1960s, and some of its key features,
including the promise of full employment, management of the economic cycle, and di-
rect responsibility of the state. Extending this analysis, I argue that not only had the state
become responsible for broad economic outcomes, but it had become accountable for rel-
atively small deviations from a very optimistic ideal. Fluctuations too small to even see
in the 19th and early 20th century became political crises warranting response in the mid-
20th. “Managing the economy” as a paradigm for the state’s role in economic life implied
a kind of precision, even as it resolved tensions about liberal governance by creating a
new object, the economy, which the state could manage instead of more directly control-
ling production. Put differently: the precise tensions identified by Offe and Krippner were
new to the post-war era, and they emerged from transformations in the technologies states
used to see and act on economic life. These technologies, especially aggregate economic
statistics, allowed capitalist states to take on responsibility for macroeconomic outcomes
100
without taking direct planning responsibilities increasingly associated with socialism or
communism.
My approach to understanding the technologies of governance draws heavily on the
writings of Miller and Rose (1990). Their approach, inspired by Michel Foucault, “draws
attention to the fundamental role that knowledges play in rendering aspects of existence
thinkable and calculable, and amenable to deliberated and planful initiatives: a complex
intellectual labour involving not only the invention of new forms of thought, but also the
invention of novel procedures of documentation, computation and evaluation.” (Miller and
Rose 1990: 3) In order to govern an area of social life, it must first be rendered governable.
As we saw in the previous chapter, the statistical capacities of states dramatically increased
in the first half of the 20th century. By the end of World War II, the United States published
monthly unemployment and inflation statistics, and quarterly estimates of Gross National
Product. At the start of World War I, it produced none of these.
These statistics (re)constituted economic life as “the economy,” crystallizing an im-
mensely complicated domain into a technical object whose performance could be assessed
through a small set of relatively simple statistics. The economy as object is big enough to
include the entirety of production and exchange in a given country, but small enough to be
displayed on a single graph. Following Miller and Rose (1990: 7, cf. Latour 1988), this
sort of simplifying transformation is necessary to make phenomena governable:
The events and phenomena to which government is to be applied must be ren-
dered into information — written reports, drawings, pictures, numbers, charts,
graphs, statistics. This information must be of a particular form — stable, mo-
bile, combinable and comparable. This form enables the pertinent features of
the domain- types of goods, investments, ages of persons, health, criminality,
etc. — to literally be re-presented in the place where decisions are to be made
about them (the manager’s office, the war room, the case conference and so
forth).
In order for the President and the Council of Economic Advisers to “manage the econ-
omy” they must be able to make it small enough to fit inside the Oval Office. Aggregate
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economic statistics developed in the 1920s to 1940s did the trick. Older, competing visions
of the government’s role in economic life (discussed more below) did not disappear en-
tirely, but “managing the economy” came to hold a dominant position in our understanding
of the government’s responsibilities and capacities.
To be slightly more precise, I define “managing the economy” as a kind of political ra-
tionality that takes responsibility for the performance of a particular sociotechnical object
(the economy) measured by specified calculative devices (national income statistics, unem-
ployment rates, etc.).5 Managing the economy is associated with a suite of technologies of
government, including fiscal and monetary policy, which are in turn new names and new
understandings of (primarily) older forms of government actions (e.g. taxing, spending,
buying and selling government debt, printing currency). Managing the economy is not a
singular program, but a terrain of discursive debate in the post-World War II era. From
the ebbs and flows of fiscal and monetary policy (Stein 1969), to debates over appropriate
targets for economic growth (Collins 2000), to the rise and fall of Monetarism (Krippner
2011), economists and policymakers have debated the best way to manage the economy
and the limits of how far the economy could be pushed.
Perhaps no author has been more influential for our understanding of the limits of state
action than James Scott (1998). In Seeing Like a State, Scott (1998: 2) argues that “legibil-
ity” is “a central problem in statecraft.” While Miller and Rose emphasized how processes
of documentation and the creation of new statistics enabled new forms of government, Scott
shows how many aspects of social life remain illegible to central planners despite their best
efforts. Scott’s work focuses on the deadly combination of “high modernist” ideologies
and authoritarian regimes, which combine together to create massive human tragedies.
By contrast, “managing the economy” presents an alternative ideological vision of the
role of the state (authoritarian or otherwise). Riffing on Scott, we might call managing
the economy a form of “low modernist” ideology, one that draws on a particular legibil-
5On political rationalities, see Miller and Rose 1990:8. On calculative devices for policymaking, see
Hirschman and Berman 2014.
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ity project (macroeconomic statistics) to implement a much more modest vision of state
control. The economy is envisioned, and calculated, as an object composed of, yet distinct
from, the plans of individual firms and households. Acting on the economy, at least in
theory, avoids the strong requirements of high modernist projects for complete knowledge
and complete control. Instead, states trying to manage their economies act on aggregate
flows and let individuals work out the details for themselves.
Perhaps no single object embodies this low modernist vision more clearly than MO-
NIAC — the Monetary National Income Analogue Computer — designed by the New
Zealand economist Bill Phillips in 1949 (see Colander 2011). Phillips is most famous for
his eponymous Phillips Curve (Phillips 1958), a mathematical relationship between unem-
ployment and inflation that has been the source of much debate ever since it was first iden-
tified (see Forder 2014). MONIAC, pictured in Figure 4.2, modeled the flow of national
income through the economy as a literal flow of water through the tubes of the machine, and
through manipulation of various apertures allowed an economist, student, or central banker
to compute the effects of various policies. MONIAC was hydraulic Keynesianism in its
most literal form. Managing the economy involves acting on the economic system in a way
that is both timely and invasive (not simply “hands off,” nor entirely “structural” and long
term) without requiring the kind of detailed microeconomic planning schemes that Scott
identifies as failing due to lack of metis, local and tacit knowledge. Of course, avoiding
the pitfalls of high modernist planning does not imply the easy success of macroeconomic
management.
Miller and Rose (1990: 9) argue that democracies rely on “indirect mechanisms of
rule... that have enabled, or have sought to enable government at a distance.” The economy
itself, and the techniques to manipulate it, are examples par excellence of this rule at a
distance. In the following sections, I document how policymakers and experts in the United
States discovered macroeconomic management as a strategy of indirect rule, and how it
came to dominate over competing visions of planning in the 1930s and 1940s.
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Figure 4.2: A photo of MONIAC from Fortune Magazine (1952).
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4.3 Analytical Strategy
In the following four sections, I trace the history of the federal government’s involvement
in managing large scale economic phenomena from about 1890 to 1964. Studying the end
of this period presents relatively few difficulties. By 1946, the major players, theories, mea-
sures, and debates were all established. If you want to understand 1950s thinking about the
state’s role in managing the economy, you can simply look at the debates between the Pres-
ident’s Council of Economic Advisers and the Congressional Joint Economic Committee,
read the policy briefs of the Committee for Economic Development, or study the macroe-
conomics portions of economic textbooks. These stories are well-told, and I rely heavily
on the excellent treatment provided by Collins (2000), Yarrow (2010), Stein (1969), and
Bailey (1950), as well as my own reading of primary sources.
Similarly, the New Deal itself has been extensively researched, including very useful
accounts of the debates within the Roosevelt administration surrounding different methods
of planning (see Balisciano 1998, Brinkley 1996, Lee 1990, Stapleford 2007, and Reagan
1999 for a sample). A smaller but useful literature explores 1920s precursors to the New
Deal, and especially Hoover’s pioneering, but often forgotten, efforts to engage in large-
scale economic planning (Alchon 1985, Barber 1985, Metcalf 1975).
Before the 1920s, however, the trail is much more difficult to follow. In some sense,
this difficulty is reassuring: the larger argument of this dissertation is that the 1920s-1930s
are the beginning of a sizable rupture in how economists and policymakers think and act
on large-scale economic phenomenon. Establishing this rupture requires studying a much
more diffuse policy domain as it begins to coalesce. In order to do so, I rely on a combi-
nation of sources. Two of the most useful are histories of the financial system, including
the debates surrounding the Federal Reserve (Greider 1987, D’Arista 1994) and histories
of the concept of unemployment (Garraty 1979, Sautter 1991). By the 1940s, monetary
policy and unemployment would be linked together in the discourse of macroeconomics;
in the 1900s and 1910s the two discussions transpired largely independently.
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Since the goal of this survey is to contrast the earlier and later periods, I also draw on
two long-running genres to highlight those changes: introductory economics textbooks and
political party platforms. The textbook sample (described in detail in chapter 2) provides
a convenient index of shifting understandings of the role of the state in economic theory.
I use these textbooks to show how the economic policy in the 1890s-1910s was largely
framed in “structural” and “institutional” terms, not “data dependent” ones. By this, I
mean that economists debated how the state should support the institutions and structures
of the economic system, but economist did not identify a role for the state conditional on
the current performance of that system. Economists who advocated the Gold Standard or
low tariffs appealed to criteria of long-term principles, not short-run performance.
Similarly, I read and analyzed the presidential party platforms of the major political
parties from 1892 to 1960.6 At each presidential nominating convention, the major parties
announce a platform containing their promised agenda for the coming term. These plat-
forms identify the major economic policy debates of each election, and proposed solutions
(along with a laundry list of other topics). Through my analysis of these platforms, I show
how the promises made by political parties became increasingly pitched in terms of short-
term, precise, quantitative macroeconomic indicators, in stark contrast to the varieties of
economic claims made in the 1890s and 1900s.
4.4 1890-1910: Tariffs, Trusts, and the Money Question
Economic debates in the 1890s-1900s were dominated by three policy issues: tariffs, trusts,
and the money question. In my brief discussion of these three themes, I highlight how
these debates were characterized as fundamentally structural or institutional.7 Advocates of
6These platforms are conveniently available from UCSB’s American Presidency Project at http:
//www.presidency.ucsb.edu/platforms.php. My analysis included the Democratic and GOP
platforms from each election year 1892-1960, along with the Populist party in 1892 and the Progressive party
in 1912 and 1924.
7My analysis here is not intended to contribute to the historiography of the era and for that reason my
engagement with that historiography is minimal. Rather, I discuss this period to highlight contrasts with
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higher (or lower) tariffs, busting (or allowing) trusts, and gold (or bimetallism) believed that
these policies were unconditionally better than the alternatives. The state was understood
as playing a tremendously influential role in structuring economic life, but there was not yet
a sense that the state’s role could or should involve responding to short-run conditions with
policies justified solely in terms of those short-run conditions. Economic textbooks largely
mirrored these concerns, and although business cycle theories were advanced during this
period, they remained largely unconnected to government policy (Dorfman 1949: 116). To
the extent that political actors or economic theorists invoked current conditions, they did so
to support arguments about the long-run consequences of these policies. And they did so
largely without the aid of timely aggregate statistics.
In the late 19th century, tariff duties loomed large in national politics. In the absence of
an income tax, tariffs served as the primary source of revenue for the central government.
For manufacturers, tariffs also served as a form of protection, insulating them from direct
competition with cheaper British goods. In contrast, some farmers and urban laborers saw
the tariffs as a primary source of the high cost of living. These positions were manifested
in the party platforms of the Republicans and Democrats respectively. As the 1896 GOP
platform put it:
We renew and emphasize our allegiance to the policy of protection, as the
bulwark of American industrial independence, and the foundation of American
development and prosperity. This true American policy taxes foreign products
and encourages home industry. It puts the burden of revenue on foreign goods;
it secures the American market for the American producer. It upholds the
American standard of wages for the American workingman; it puts the factory
by the side of the farm and makes the American farmer less dependent on
foreign demand and price; it diffuses general thrift, and founds the strength of
all on the strength of each.
In contrast, the Democrats argued that tariffs should not be used as a form of industrial
policy (aimed at favoring or promoting particular industries), but should only be used to
later debates. This analysis relies on what should be uncontroversial claims about the major economic policy
debates of the era, drawing primarily on the party platforms to dramatize the forms these claims took. For a
recent survey of the politics of the period, see Prasad 2012.
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generate the minimum revenue necessary to run the government. Their 1896 platform
states:
We hold that tariff duties should be levied for purposes of revenue, such duties
to be so adjusted as to operate equally throughout the country, and not dis-
criminate between class or section, and that taxation should be limited by the
needs of the Government, honestly and economically administered. We de-
nounce as disturbing to business the Republican threat to restore the McKinley
law, which has twice been condemned by the people in National elections and
which, enacted under the false plea of protection to home industry, proved a
prolific breeder of trusts and monopolies, enriched the few at the expense of
the many, restricted trade and deprived the producers of the great American
staples of access to their natural markets.
This debate — reiterated throughout the 1890s and 1900s — echoes discussions among
economists back to at least Adam Smith and David Ricardo on the value of free trade
and the possibility for protective tariffs to promote domestic industry. Note that the tariff
was not discussed in terms of a particular state or condition of the economy, as we now
understand it. Democrats argued for low and non-discriminatory tariffs, Republicans for
high and differential tariffs, both on the basis of the structural effects of such tariffs, not
their short-run or conditional effects. In particular, Democrats connected the tariff debate
to another central policy concern of the period: trusts.
As noted in the previous chapter, the late 19th century witnessed the dramatic growth of
large businesses. This growth spurred intense political concern.8 In 1890, Congress passed
the Sherman Anti-Trust Act in a nearly unanimous vote. The Act did little to end political
concern with big business. Democrats in particular expressed concern about the persistence
of industrial trusts and monopolies throughout the period. The 1900 Democratic platform
asserted: “We pledge the Democratic party to an unceasing warfare in nation, State and
city against private monopoly in every form.” And, as noted above, the Democrats saw
the tariff as intimately linked to the trust question — they accused Republicans of using
the tariff to protect domestic monopolies from foreign competition. The 1900 Platform
8See Sklar (1988) for a history of debates over anti-trust law in this period.
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continues: “Tariff laws should be amended by putting the products of trusts upon the free
list, to prevent monopoly under the plea of protection.” As with the tariff question, the issue
of trusts and monopolies was not a question about the short-run conditions under which
monopolies should be permitted, but rather one of long term structures and institutions.
Perhaps the most iconic economic issue of the period was the money question. Bankers
and farmers faced off over the issue of whether the government should hew to a simple gold
standard, or should allow for the coinage of silver. In general, Democrats supported bimet-
allism and Republicans supported the gold standard. In 1896, the issue rose to its maximum
prominence when the Democrats nominated William Jennings Bryan, who made the free
coinage of silver a central issue of his campaign, and famously declared to defenders of the
gold standard: “you shall not crucify mankind upon a cross of gold.” The 1896 Democratic
platform linked the gold standard to a host of evils:
We declare that the act of 1873 demonetizing silver without the knowledge or
approval of the American people has resulted in the appreciation of gold and
a corresponding fall in the prices of commodities produced by the people; a
heavy increase in the burdens of taxation and of all debts, public and private;
the enrichment of the money-lending class at home and abroad; the prostration
of industry and impoverishment of the people.
Here we see how long run structural issues are brought into dialogue with current con-
ditions. Democrats argued that free silver would improve the nation’s economic system,
and that the return to the gold standard had caused all manner of short-run problems. I
am not arguing that economic debates of this period ignored current economic conditions.
Rather, short-run conditions tended to be mobilized in favor of one or more long-run, struc-
tural solutions. Democrats here blamed rising inequality and indebtedness on a structural
change (demonetizing silver) made more than 20 years earlier.
Similarly, Republicans linked high tariffs and the gold standard to short-run prosperity.
In their 1900 platform, looking back on the first McKinley administration, Republicans
argued that:
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The expectation in which the American people, turning from the Democratic
party, intrusted power four years ago to a Republican Chief Magistrate and a
Republican Congress, has been met and satisfied. When the people then as-
sembled at the polls, after a term of Democratic legislation and administration,
business was dead, industry paralyzed and the National credit disastrously im-
paired. The country’s capital was hidden away and its labor distressed and
unemployed. The Democrats had no other plan with which to improve the
ruinous conditions which they had themselves produced than to coin silver at
the ratio of sixteen to one. The Republican party, denouncing this plan as sure
to produce conditions even worse than those from which relief was sought,
promised to restore prosperity by means of two legislative measures—a pro-
tective tariff and a law making gold the standard of value.
Here, Republicans blame Democrats’ silver coinage for the disastrous economic condi-
tions of the early 1890s, and argue that their own policies of returning to the gold standard
and raising tariffs ensured renewed prosperity. But the point of this argument was not to
claim that protective tariffs and the gold standard were the proper policies only when eco-
nomic conditions were bad. The gold standard and protective tariffs were understood as
always the best policies, and short-run performance merely provided evidence for these
claims.
Economics textbooks from the era follow a similar pattern to the political debates. Dis-
cussions of the role of the state tended to focus on the state’s role in organizing the condi-
tions under which markets could function well: law and order, property rights, enforcing
contracts, building roads and bridges and other public works, and managing the money
supply (e.g. Bullock 1897: 154-157).
Even those economists who saw themselves arguing for an expansive role for the state
framed that role in structural terms. Richard Ely, a leader in the Progressive movement and
economic theorist in the very interventionist German Historical School tradition, wrote in
his influential textbook that “The scope of state action is necessarily great.” (Ely 1901: 254)
His book devoted chapters to the role of the state in enforcing patents and copyrights, fos-
tering industry through land grants and subsidies, protections for workers, anti-monopoly
legislation, and even justifies state-run industry in the case of natural monopolies (Ely 1901:
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296). Nonetheless, his book contains almost no discussion of a role for the government in
responding to short-run crises with short-run solutions. His short discussion of recurrent
economic crises of overproduction makes no mention of specific government responses,
but rather suggests that “Whatever improves industrial society in any respect is a partial
remedy” to the problem (Ely 1901: 243). Short-run crises do not call for special solutions,
and there is no sense that government policy should be responsive to timely data on the
current state of economic affairs.
The Panic of 1907 marked one turning point that increased discussion of short-run gov-
ernment responses. Financial panics were a recurrent problem in the 19th century, but
previous panics were handled primarily by bankers themselves. In particular, JP Morgan
was seen as playing an instrumental role in managing the fallout from the 1893 panic and
in the end Morgan and the Rothschilds bailed out the US Treasury, rather than the reverse.
The 1907 Panic called this system into question, as the aging Morgan was seen as incapable
of continuing to provide order to the market and no one else could fill his shoes (Bruner and
Carr 2007). The political debate increasingly turned to the role of the federal government
in responding to financial crisis, which in turn produced some of the earliest discussions of
conditional policymaking—including in the 1908 party platforms. The Democrats used the
occasion to call for “an emergency currency... issued and controlled by the Federal Govern-
ment, and loaned on adequate security to National and State banks” while the Republicans
lauded “the emergency measures adopted by the Government during the recent financial
disturbance.” The 1907 Panic shifted debates about the government’s role in managing the
financial system and the money supply, beginning a discussion that would end with the
creation of the Federal Reserve.
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4.5 1910-1929: Unemployment, Public Works, and the Fed
Comparing the political discourse of the 1910s and 1920s to the preceding decades high-
lights three related dramatic shifts: changes in the discussion of the money question related
to the founding of the Federal Reserve, the increasing awareness of temporary unemploy-
ment as a problem susceptible to and meriting government response, and more generally an
uptick in discussions of the business cycle drawing on newly available economic statistics.
The 1910s and 1920s saw the first attempts to use two of the most important tools of what
would become understood as macroeconomic management: countercyclical public works
to fight unemployment and open market operations to control interest rates. These tech-
niques were not yet combined into a theory of fiscal and monetary policy (as they would
be in the 1930s and 1940s), but the period does mark a sharp break with the preceding era
in terms of the recognition of a potential for short-run government intervention justified in
terms of temporary conditions.
The history of discussions of unemployment perhaps most fully highlights these shifts.
As Garraty (1979: 4) notes, the term unemployment itself comes into widespread usage in
English only in the 1890s (see also my analysis in chapter 2), although discussions of the
unemployed go back a few decades earlier. Unemployment as a concept emerged in an era
that saw simultaneous heightened levels of worker independent (formally free labor) and
dependence (with an increasing proportion of the population working as wage laborers, and
a decline of self-employment). Connected to discussions of unemployment were issues of
measurement and of the appropriate government responses.
The first efforts to measure the number of unemployed took place in the late 19th cen-
tury, led by Carroll D. Wright (first as chief of the Massachusetts Bureau of Statistics of La-
bor and then as the first US Commissioner of Labor). The 1880 Census was the first to ask
about joblessness, but the data from this question were practically useless for policymak-
ing, as they were never even processed (Sautter 1991: 41-45). Questions on unemployment
were asked in the next three Censuses, but the answers were published years later, and seen
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as unreliable. The 1920 Census did not even bother to ask. These early efforts, and others
undertaken by various state bureaus of labor, were seen as unsatisfactory by all involved,
but did lead to growing awareness of at least the problem of measuring unemployment, if
not consensus on the magnitude or dynamics of unemployment itself (Sautter 1991, Card
2011). Interest in the problem of unemployment grew in the 1920s even without a firm
grasp of its size. Famously, when then-Secretary of Commerce Herbert Hoover called a
Conference on Unemployment in 1921, experts debated the level of unemployment before
voting on a consensus estimate of 3.5-5.5 million.9
In this period, debates around policy responses to unemployment also increased. In the
UK, the 1909 report by progressive economist William Beveridge titled Unemployment: a
Problem of Industry led to the creation of the country’s unemployment insurance system in
1911. Beveridge framed unemployment as a question of the industrial system as a whole
rather than an issue with individual workers: “the inquiry must be one into unemployment
rather than into the unemployed” (Beveridge 1909, cited in Garraty 1979: 137). The Amer-
ican economist Wesley Mitchell adopted a similar perspective in his influential 1913 book
Business Cycles, treating the rise of unemployment as one feature of the larger problem of
business cycles and industrial instability, and one that government should address through
its efforts to mitigate the business cycle.
Debates about the government’s role in responding to unemployment recurred through-
out the period. Although no national measures were adopted in the 1910s, various politi-
cians and activists suggested every major form of governmental response that would later
be attempted: unemployment insurance (like that adopted in the UK), state-run labor ex-
changes to help the unemployed find work, public works to directly employ the unem-
ployed, and better measurement to guide the timing of assistance (Sautter 1991: 119-120).
In the 1920s, these debates only increased. Following the 1920-1921, recession, Herbert
Hoover organized the above-mentioned Conference on Unemployment. In addition to de-
9Report of the President’s Conference on Unemployment, 1921, p. 19.
113
bating measurement issues, the Conference also discussed proposed solutions. One pro-
posal involved planning public works such that government would spend the most money
when unemployment was highest: “In a growing country like the United States the aggre-
gate volume of public works of cities, counties, States, and of the Federal Government is
so great that if a larger proportion were executed in years of depression than in years of
active industry a powerful stabilizing influence would be exerted.”10 The idea had wide
political appeal: the government was not proposing new or unnecessary works, but sim-
ply shifting by a year or two the timing of large projects to coincide with periods of high
unemployment.
In 1928, FG Dickinson of the University of Illinois published a study which attempted
to quantitatively measure “the possible maximum power of public construction to prevent
cyclical unemployment” (Dickinson 1928: iii) from the scanty available data on the magni-
tude of both unemployment and public construction from the 1920s. Dickinson found that
if the government had managed to perfectly allocate public works, it would have been able
to make up for all of the declines of factory wages in bad years. Although this result seemed
encouraging, Dickinson was quick to note that practical difficulties would have made per-
fect countercyclical planning unrealistic: the business forecasters of the 1920s (discussed
in chapter 3) were simply not accurate enough to use as the basis for countercyclical plan-
ning. Dickinson imagined a future in which a clerk at the Bureau of Labor Statistics would
watch an improved index of employment to determine the precise timing of countercyclical
public works in terms of measured aggregates: “His duty would be to watch the index of
employment and immediately inform the numerous public officials throughout the country
whenever the index approached 5 per cent above or below the average of the preceding
years.” (Dickinson 1928: 200)
Although Dickinson’s study, and similar proposals in the 1920s, did not yet involve the
macroeconomic frameworks developed in the 1930s (with debates over multiplier effects,
10Report of the President’s Conference on Unemployment, 1921, p. 96.
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and a broader understanding of fiscal policy than just public works), these discussions
offer a clear example of a proposal that obligated the government to take responsibility for
a precisely measured short-run economic outcome and respond with policies justified in
terms of current aggregate economic conditions.
These new responsibilities appeared in political party platforms and other venues where
politicians made claims about the responsibility of the state. For example, the 1924 Repub-
lican platform describes the situation in 1921, when the Republicans came to power, in
terms of short-run economic performance, and unemployment in particular: “When the
republican administration took control of the government in 1921, there were four and a
half million unemployed; industry and commerce were stagnant; agriculture was prostrate;
business was depressed; securities of the government were selling below their par values.”
Note the 4.5 million unemployed figure—the midpoint of the guess arrived at by debate
at Hoover’s unemployment conference. By 1928, the Democratic platform called for pre-
cisely the sort of countercyclical public works program proposed by Dickinson:
We expend vast sums of money to protect our people against the evils of war,
but no governmental program is anticipated to prevent the awful suffering and
economic losses of unemployment. It threatens the well-being of millions of
our people and endangers the prosperity of the nation. We favor the adoption
by the government, after a study of this subject, of a scientific plan whereby
during periods of unemployment appropriations shall be made available for the
construction of necessary public works and the lessening, as far as consistent
with public interests, of government construction work when labor is generally
and satisfactorily employed in private enterprise.
A year before the 1929 crash and the beginning of the Great Depression, politicians
were already debating the creation of large-scale national programs to respond to unem-
ployment, guided by research (“after a study of the subject”).
At the same time as economists debated how best to measure and respond to unem-
ployment, and politicians began to accept responsibility for it, transformations in the insti-
tutions of monetary policymaking dramatically increased the capacity of the government
to intervene in a timely fashion. In 1913, after years of debate following the Panic of 1907,
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Congress passed the Federal Reserve Act.11 The Federal Reserve system was designed to
be a private-public hybrid, with banks scattered across the nation, accountable to local busi-
ness interests, but also authorized to act on behalf of the nation in order to prevent financial
panics. In the 1910s and 1920s, the bankers of the Federal Reserve began to understand
their capacity to influence short-run economic performance through the buying and selling
of government securities. Conceived as a system for promoting financial stability, the Fed
soon took on a broader role in managing economic conditions.
In the 1910s, individual reserve banks began to buy government debt simply as a source
of revenue in so called “open market operations” (buying and selling government debt on
the open market). Benjamin Strong of the NY bank realized the possibility for the Fed to
influence interest rates more broadly through open market operations as early as the 1910s
(D’Arista 1994: 21). This possibility was put into practice beginning in 1919 when the
Fed first uses open market operations as a policy tool rather than a source of revenue, aided
by the dramatic increase in the size of the market for US debt following the government’s
increased spending during World War I (D’Arista 1994: 80). By 1923-1924, the Fed’s
Open Market Investment Committee, under Benjamin Strong’s leadership, began to take
credit for using open market operations to help shorten the length of the recession by easing
money (D’Arista 1994: 116) The Fed’s role was recognized even in the party platforms, as
when the Democrats denounced the Fed’s policy in 1924 as unduly contractionary:
We denounce the recent cruel and unjust contraction of legitimate and nec-
essary credit and currency, which was directly due to the so-called deflation
policy of the republican party, as declared in its national platform of June,
1920, and in the speech of acceptance of its candidate for the presidency... The
contraction bankrupted hundreds of thousands of farmers and stock growers in
America and resulted in widespread industrial depression and unemployment.
We demand that the federal reserve system be so administered as to give sta-
bility to industry, commerce and finance, as was intended by the democratic
party, which gave the federal reserve system to the nation.
Here we see the Democrats linking the federal reserve and its management of credit and
11For detailed histories of the Federal Reserve, see Greider 1987, D’Arista 1994.
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currency to both financial stability and unemployment. And we see another link between
conditional policymaking and short-run economic conditions, although it is worth remem-
bering that the federal reserve of this period was both more fractured (lacking a central
governing board) and more controlled by local business interests, and thus only partially a
creature of the state.
Open market operations and countercyclical public works were two of the most im-
portant forms of conditional policymaking debated and (to varying degrees) attempted in
this period and show a significant break from early policy debates around tariffs, the gold
standard, and trusts (all three of which remained objects of political debate). Beyond these
particular policies, the 1920s also saw the articulation of some of the first broad visions of
the state’s role in planning the economic system to promote stability (Metcalf 1975, Al-
chon 1985, Barber 1985). Major figures in these “New Era” debates included economists
Wesley Mitchell and Edwin Gay at the newly-founded National Bureau of Economic Re-
search. Working with and sometimes on behalf of Secretary of Commerce Herbert Hoover,
Mitchell and Gay oversaw an ambitious research program throughout the 1920s which
aimed to measure the business cycle and theorize interventions in order to moderate it.
Hoover’s vision of national planning involved businesses taking advantage of this newly
available statistical data to better plan their investment and production decisions and, in
so doing, moderate the ups and downs of the business cycle. The government’s main role
would be to facilitate businesses planning on their own behalf, through the distribution of
up-to-date information in publications like the Survey of Current Business (first published
by the Commerce Department in 1921).
By December, 1929, a month after the great Wall Street Crash, the Survey of Current
Business claimed significant progress in its mission: “While it may be too early to say that
the utilization of business data has entirely eliminated the business cycle, there is agreement
today among business leaders everywhere that the wider use of facts will mitigate in a large
degree many of the disastrous effects of the one-time recurrent business cycle.” (quoted in
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Barber 1985: 82) Somewhat ironically, Herbert Hoover may bear more responsibility than
any other single figure for the growing belief that government could and should manage the
business cycle. Alchon (1985: 169) summarizing the importance of the 1920s planning de-
bates argues that, “New Era techno-corporatism was thus an important chapter in the larger
development and acceptance of the idea that statistical analysis is the appropriate basis for
public policy; that the business cycle can be understood and controlled through such anal-
ysis; that public works and improved business management are legitimate countercyclical
measures.” Competing visions of planing advanced in the wake of the seeming failure of
Hoover’s model would go much further to embrace a strong role for the central government
as the primary force responsible for moderating the business cycle.
4.6 1929-1946: From Pluralist Planning to Macroeconomic
Management
In the 1930s, “planning” was everywhere. Hoover and the NBER had laid the groundwork
for the debate by measuring the business cycle and by offering one vision of how those
measurements might be used (voluntarily) by scientifically-run businesses to mitigate the
cycle. As the Great Depression raged, competing notions of planning were debated, and
the early aspects of the New Deal incorporated features of many of them. These competing
notions relied on different kinds of data, different politics, and different objects of gover-
nance. By the end of the 1930s, macroeconomic management would be ascendant, with
John Maynard Keynes as its foremost theorist, and FDR and his administration avowed
converts. The data needed to execute this macroeconomic vision also came together in this
period, especially national income statistics (as described in detail in the previous chap-
ter). The major tools of government countercyclical action discovered in the 1910s-1920s
would be incorporated together into the theory of macroeconomic management under the
headings of fiscal and monetary policy. In the 1940s, the center of the debate was the ques-
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tion of how the government should use macroeconomic tools to manage the economy, not
whether it should. As the federal government took an increasingly active role in managing
the economy, so too did politicians increasingly articulate a governmental responsibility
for the economy. In 1946, Congress signed the Employment Act, which clearly announced
the federal government’s responsibility for macroeconomic performance.
The intellectual history of economic policy in the Great Depression has been well-
told.12 My short summary here highlights how a specifically “macroeconomic” vision
emerged in this period, how it relied on newly available aggregate statistics, and how it
offered a middle-ground between doing nothing and forms of planning that were seen as
more invasive. Balisciano (1998) usefully identifies four visions of economic planning de-
bated in the 1930s: social management planning, technical-industrial planning, business
economy planning, and what came to be called macroeconomic planning. Each recognized
the responsibility of the government for short-run economic performance, but suggested
different policy responses linked to different political interests and theoretical understand-
ings of the underlying economic problems. Their contradictions help to explain why the
early New Deal programs seemed incoherent.
These four visions provided different diagnoses of the source of economic problems,
and thus different economic prescriptions (Balisciano 1998: 158). Social management
planners believed that the Depression resulted from a lack of coordination and a reckless
pursuit of profit; they proposed planning boards in the style of the World War I Industries
Board to better manage the economic system. Technical-industrial planners identified a
similar problem (lack of rational control of industry, lack of balance) but sought a solution
in the techniques of scientific management, proposing that technical experts (in industry
and government) should be given the authority to run industry in a more rational manner.
Business economy planners offered a vision most similar to the 1920s Hooverian associ-
ationalism; they suggested that business simply lacked the information to prevent cycles
12For a sampling focused on the United States, see Tobin 1966, Stein 1969, Barber 1985, Lee 1990,
Brinkley 1996, Reagan 1999, Stapleford 2007, Alacevich et al 2015.
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of overproduction and crisis, but that with some increased industrial combination (cartels)
and better data (provided by the state), business would be able to plan production on its
own. Finally, the macroeconomic planners identified imbalances between aggregate saving
and spending as the source of crises and depression, and proposed countercyclical spending
to stimulate the economy. All four visions influenced the New Deal, as Balisciano (1998:
166) summarizes through the example of the National Industrial Recovery Act, one of the
most sweeping early New Deal acts:
Business economy planners got the suspension of antitrust laws by allowing
businesses to enter into collusive price contracts. Social management plan-
ners got the promise of centralized industrial control, with government as the
main partner in a collaborative union of economic actors. Technical-industrial
planners got expert technicians in positions of authority; the act established
a planning staff of economists and other professionals who would ostensibly
chart and guide industrial development. Macroeconomic planners got Title II,
the act’s $3.3 billion public works provision.
This pluralist approach to planning collapsed over the next four years. By 1935, when
major portions of the NIRA itself were ruled unconstitutional, “none mourned its pass-
ing” (Balisciano 1998: 167). The failure of the NIRA and related planning efforts struck a
major blow against forms of planning that relied on business cooperation and government
planning through detailed regulation at the industry level. At the same time, the technical
sophistication and appeal of macroeconomic approaches increased, while competing ap-
proaches premised on more fine-grained regulation at the level of industries floundered due
to political resistance and a lack of data (Lee 1990, Stapleford 2011).
In 1934, as detailed in the previous chapter, the Department of Commerce published of-
ficial estimates of national income. These estimates were quickly turned into an annual and
quarterly series, which provided detailed information on aggregate economic performance
used by macroeconomic planners to advocate for specific targets for government spending.
In early 1935, Lauchlin Currie, an economist working at the Treasury Department, wrote
an influential memo titled “Comments on Pump Priming” (reprinted as Currie 1978). The
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memo drew on the newly available official national income data to arrive at quantitative
estimates of the amount of money the government would need to spend make up for the
declines of the Depression. Based on comparisons between 1929 and 1934, Currie argued
that New Deal deficit spending “was too small to have significant effect on the trend of
business in the conditions then prevailing.” (Currie 1978: 527) The deficit would need to
nearly double from its already historically large size to appreciably alter the course of the
Depression. Although Currie did not yet incorporate the concept of a multiplier (the idea
that government spending in a recession increases national income some multiplicative fac-
tor, through secondary employment effects), his memo illustrates nicely the emergence of
a calculative regime that treated fiscal policy as a tool for managing the aggregate economy
in quantitative terms.13 Public works were no longer understood as simply a means of em-
ploying the unemployed, but part of a broader concept of fiscal policy to prime the pump
of the economy.
In the late 1930s, the place of macroeconomic management was cemented by the pub-
lication of Keynes’ General Theory of Employment, Interest, Money and the recession of
1937 (Stein 1969). As the title suggested, Keynes (1936) offered a unified account of the
relationships between national income, employment, and interest rates. The debate over
the true meaning of Keynes’ theory has raged ever since, but his work inspired a generation
of economists to focus on the problem of macroeconomic management (to the exclusion of
older visions of planning) and build a shared language and body of statistics for understand-
ing the economy. Keynes’ theory was seen as making sense of the renewed downturn in
1937-1938, when the Roosevelt administration’s balanced budget led to a sharp recession.
This recession convinced Roosevelt to more fully adopt fiscal policy as a tool for managing
the economy (Stein 1969, Brinkley 1996). This recession was visible to policymakers as it
unfolded, through improved data collection on both employment and national income.
These transformations in the conceptions of economic governance were visible in the
13On the history of the multiplier in economic theory, see Boserup 1969, Dimand 1994. At a minimum,
the idea was floating in the air in the late 1920s, and published in some version by Kahn (1931).
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party platforms of the Depression. For example, the 1936 Democratic platform boldly
asserted government’s responsibility for unemployment:
We believe that unemployment is a national problem, and that it is an in-
escapable obligation of our Government to meet it in a national way.
Due to our stimulation of private business, more than five million people have
been reemployed; and we shall continue to maintain that the first objective of a
program of economic security is maximum employment in private industry at
adequate wages. Where business fails to supply such employment, we believe
that work at prevailing wages should be provided in cooperation with State
and local governments on useful public projects, to the end that the national
wealth may be increased, the skill and energy of the worker may be utilized,
his morale maintained, and the unemployed assured the opportunity to earn the
necessities of life.
Public works to fight unemployment had moved from a marginal debate in the 1910s
to the center of public discourse and policy in the 1930s. Appropriate policy had become
increasingly understood as conditional on the state of the economy, and changes in the
economy were in turn attributable to successful policy. In both 1936 and 1940, Democrats
would argue for the success of their programs in terms of the rebounding of national income
and the reduction of unemployment. For example, the 1940 Democratic platform claimed:
“The full force of our policies, by raising the national income by thirty billion dollars from
the low of 1932, by encouraging vast reemployment, and by elevating the level of consumer
demand, has quickened the flow of buying and selling through every artery of industry and
trade.”
The failure of the Federal Reserve to prevent the crash of 1929 and ensuing financial
chaos led to reforms of the system. A series of laws passed under FDR centralized authority
over the Federal Reserve in the hands of a central Board of Governors largely appointed by
the President, not the bankers themselves. This board oversaw a unified monetary policy
through the Federal Open Market Committee, which took responsibility for buying and
selling government debt and, in so doing, affecting interest rates. Monetary policy was now
coordinated through a single body who took as its task stabilizing the economic system as
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a whole, not just the financial system (Greider 1987: 313).
The government’s role in managing the short-run economy only grew during World
War II. As discussed in the previous chapter, macroeconomic tools, and national income
statistics in particular, played a key role in aiding the allied mobilization through both
management of wartime finances and direct planning of military production. In How To
Pay For the War, Keynes (1940) laid out a vision of wartime macroeconomic management
for the UK which involved a quantified combination of government borrowing, taxing,
and printing currency in order to minimize inflation while maximizing employment and
production. In the US, Simon Kuznets and Robert Nathan shaped the overall plans for arms
production and the size of the American military through calculations based on national
income statistics. These efforts, and other wartime successes, earned economists increased
prominence in public debates, and especially in the administrative branch of the federal
government (Bernstein 2001).
Even before the war was won, economists began to debate demobilization, and how the
US and UK could secure full employment and prevent a post-war depression. For example,
Alvin Hansen, a leading American economist best remembered for his popularization of
Keynes and co-creation of the Hicks-Hansen ISLM model, wrote a report for the National
Resources Planning Board in 1942 titled “After the War — Full Employment.” Hansen,
espousing a relatively conventional position at the time (cf. Samuelson 1944), argued that
major wars are usually followed by major slumps and that the government would need to
plan for the peace well before the war had ended.14 Hansen’s proposal, and others like
it, recognized the potential for the enlarged national government to play a strong role in
stabilizing the economic system through some combination of active intervention (coun-
tercyclical public works, monetary policy) and automatic stabilizers (unemployment insur-
14Somewhat ironically, the predicted post-war depression never came after World War II. This prediction
was arguably the first major failure of the American Keynesians (see Sapir 1949 for an immediate retro-
spective), and echoes the difficulty faced by macroeconomic managers to present. While improvements in
measurement had made present economic conditions much more visible than in the 1920s, forecasting re-
mained and remains very difficult.
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ance, progressive income taxes). Stein (1969) documents in exhaustive detail the debates
in this period as different economists and political actors champion variations on fiscal and
monetary policy. The broad outlines of this discussion feel familiar: should fiscal policy act
primarily through increased expenditures and public works or raising and lowering taxes?
Should monetary policy or fiscal policy be the first resort when a recession looms? Which
political actors should decide the timing and extent of interventions?
In 1944, both political parties included employment policy in their party platforms,
although the subtle differences between the two platforms are revealing. The Democrats
summarized their economic platform simply: “To speed victory, establish and maintain
peace, guarantee full employment and provide prosperity...” The Republicans eschewed
the contentious phrase “full employment,” but still acknowledged government’s role in
supporting the economy:
We shall adopt a program to put men to work in peace industry as promptly as
possible and with special attention to those who have made sacrifice by serving
in the armed forces. We shall take government out of competition with private
industry and terminate rationing, price fixing and all other emergency powers.
We shall promote the fullest stable employment through private enterprise.
The “fullest stable employment” was not a promise of guaranteed jobs, but it did repre-
sent an acceptance of the government’s ultimate role managing the economy. In 1945-1946,
these debates culminated with the eventual passage of the Employment Act of 1946.15 The
act began life as the Full Employment Bill, but as in the discrepancy between the 1944
platforms, “full employment” proved contentious for conservative factions, who put up
staunch resistance to the government adopting such a strong mandate. Full employment
was also difficult to define — early drafts of the bill included attempts at a technical def-
inition written by economists, but these were seen as unsatisfactory and removed. In the
negotiations over the act, the more liberal factions in Congress sacrificed the explicit adop-
tion of full employment as a policy goal (and especially the use of federal investment as
15Bailey (1950) documents the political maneuverings surrounding the proposal, modification, and even-
tual passage of the Act in detail.
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the primary method of maintaining full employment) in order to pass a bill establishing an
economic planning mechanism in both the legislative and executive branch. The Employ-
ment Act created the Council of Economic Advisers, who are tasked with helping to draft
the Economic Report of the President, and Congress’s Joint Committee on the Economic
Report, which was to respond to the report and propose appropriate legislation. The Em-
ployment Act also offered a full-throated embrace of the government’s role as manager of
the economy, even if it did not obligate particular measures:
The Congress hereby declares that it is the continuing policy and responsibility
of the Federal Government to use all practicable means ... to coordinate and
utilize all its plans, functions, and resources for the purpose of creating and
maintaining, in a manner calculated to foster and promote free competitive en-
terprise and the general welfare, conditions under which there will be afforded
useful employment opportunities, including self-employment, for those able,
willing, and seeking to work, and to promote maximum employment, produc-
tion, and purchasing power.
Maximum employment corresponded to a low unemployment rate, maximum produc-
tion to a high GNP, and maximum purchasing power to a low inflation rate. Although the
means and extent of government’s responsibility were still hotly debated, the basic terms
of the debate were set. The Act also marked the extension of governmental responsibility
from responding to exigent, temporary crises (the Great Depression, the need for wartime
mobilization) to an embrace of the government’s role in managing fluctuations in “normal”
times.16 Government’s role in managing the normal peacetime economy would continue to
expand in the following decades, and would subtly transform as growth joined stability as
a primary objective of macroeconomic management.
16I thank Greta Krippner for this characterization.
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4.7 1946-1964: Stability & Growth
Over the following two decades, the debate would continue over the proper means for
government to manage the economy, and the appropriate targets or goals.17 Perhaps the
biggest changes in this period would be the importance of monetary policy (deemphasized
in the 1940s), the rise of tax cuts as the preferred means of executing fiscal policy, and
especially the emergence of economic growth as the most salient aim of economic policy
(or at least, co-equal with low unemployment and inflation). Economic growth held an
especially privileged place in American politics because it brought together Cold Warriors
concerned with a “growth gap” and liberals concerned with ending poverty and raising
standards of living. Growth offered the possibility of everyone getting what they wanted,
and thus politicians in this period began to promise growth (Davis 1988, Collins 2000,
Yarrow 2010). I focus here on the emergence of growth to highlight the unique role played
by national income statistics as measurements of the size of the economy. Most importantly
for my story, not only did politicians begin to emphasize growth, they did so in precise,
quantitative terms. “Economic growthmanship” (as Collins 2000 called it) involved the
promising of higher rates of growth today, based on the superior economic policies of
particular candidates.
In the 1930s and 1940s, economists (and the public) were largely worried about eco-
nomic stability; by the 1950s the discussion would shift to focus more on growth. In the
earlier period, the overriding question had been how to prevent recurrent depressions and
financial panics, and whether or not it was possible to stabilize the economy without enact-
ing some form of socialist or communist government. Some economists, most prominently
Alvin Hansen, went so far as to claim that the economy was entering a period of “secu-
lar stagnation,” characterized by increased unemployment and no increases in output (see
Rosenof 1998 for details). In the 1950s and 1960s, stability seemed surprising easy to
assure and predictions of secular stagnation seemed naive. The post-WWII depression pre-
17See Stein (1969) for the blow-by-blow.
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dicted by Keynesians in the mid-1940s never arrived. In the 1950s, the economy was boom-
ing; yearly real GNP growth exceeded 5% in 1950, 1951, 1955, and 1959, with only two
isolated years of mild recession.18 This growth was not simply discussed by economists
and statisticians. As Yarrow (2010: 64) notes, the short-run rate of growth of the econ-
omy became a point of national pride and intense discussion: “Headlines, congressional
hearings, scholarly and popular reports, and political rhetoric pounded into Americans the
radically new idea that they should be deeply concerned about whether U.S. GNP rose by
3 percent or 5 percent this year.”
This measured growth coincided with the emergence of theories of growth in eco-
nomics. As noted in chapter 2, and discussed in detail in Warsh (2006), economists had
few ways of talking about economic progress in the late 19th and early 20th century, and
even fewer theories that explicitly examined growth (in productivity, output, or standard of
living). In the 1940s and 1950s that changed, most famously with the publication of Robert
Solow’s neoclassical growth model (Solow 1956) and related empirical work (Solow 1957),
which in turn drew on newly available employment and GNP data (see Boianovsky &
Hoover 2014 for details). Solow himself would go on to serve on the Council of Economic
Advisers in 1961-1962 under President Kennedy, in a key period when Kennedy would
begin to push for a large tax cut in order to promote economic growth.
The overt politics of growth is easily visible in the party platforms of the era. For
example, Democrats in 1956 connected economic growth directly to the Cold War:
The Republican Party has not grasped one of the dominant facts of mid-century
— that the growth of productive power of the Communist states presents a chal-
lenge which cannot be evaded. The Democratic Party is confident that, through
the freedom we enjoy, a vast increase in productive power of our Nation and
our Allies will be achieved, and by their combined capacity they will surmount
any challenge.
The fear of the Soviet Union surpassing the US economically was visible everywhere
18Source: BEA Table 1.7.1. “Percent Change From Preceding Period in Real Gross Domestic Product,
Real Gross National Product, and Real Net National Product.”
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Figure 4.3: “America leads Russia, but will the gap narrow?” From Samuelson (1961), also
cited in Levy and Peart (2009).
from political statements like these to economic textbooks themselves. As Levy and Peart
(2009) document, American economics textbooks of the 1960s were fascinated and terri-
fied by Sovet economic growth. In the 1961 edition of his best-selling textbook, Samuelson
famously projected that the Soviet Union would overtake the US economically in between
23 to 36 years (see Figure 4.3). For the next 20 years, Samuelson’s textbook would contin-
ually place the catchup time of the Soviet Union somewhere 20 to 30 years in the future.
The 1956 Democratic platform also illustrated the specificity of growth promises. The
Democrats claimed their economic program would obtain, by 1960, “A 500 billion dol-
lar national economy in real terms.” The Democrats lost and President Eisenhower was
re-elected. In 1960, the Republicans would note in their platform precisely what Eisen-
hower’s second administration accomplished: “Despite the lamentations of the opposition
in viewing the economic scene today, the plain fact is that our 500 billion dollar economy
finds more Americans at work, earning more, spending more, saving more, investing more,
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building more than ever before in history.” The Democrats and Republicans met on the
field of competing claims to provide economic growth, in the shared language of GNP and
the size of the economy. Meanwhile, the Democrats alleged in 1960 that the Republican
record was still insufficient to best the Soviets: “They have slowed down the rate of growth
of the economy to about one-third the rate of the Soviet Union.” The Democrats went
on to promise 5% growth under their administration, along with improved stability, lower
inflation and unemployment.
Even before President Kennedy took office, he was apparently nervous about how his
administration could meet this ambitious target.19 Kennedy consulted top economists like
Paul Samuelson, and eventually formulated an ambitious plan centered around a large tax
cut designed to stimulate investment (rather than increased spending). Kennedy first pro-
posed a stimulative tax cut in 1962, but the final bill was only passed in 1964 under Presi-
dent Johnson. The tax cut was not sold as countercyclical stimulus needed quickly to fight
an already existing recession, but a correction aimed at inching a well-functioning economy
towards higher growth and higher employment. As Davis (1988: 345) documents, both the
CEA and the Treasury Department agreed on the size of the needed tax cut, drawing on
macroeconomic data to arrive at a figure of $7-10 billion. This cut would reduce the “full
employment surplus,” the amount that the Federal Government’s revenue would exceed its
spending if full employment were achieved, a key metric in the 1960s for debates around
the Federal Government’s role in encouraging or discouraging growth.20 In this sense, the
tax cut plan relied on new macroeconomic understandings that linked short-run conditions
(full employment) and long-run concerns (growth).
Davis (1988) documents the debates surrounding the proposal and passage of the tax
cut in exhaustive detail. Part of the reason for the act took more than a year to pass through
19See Stein 1969, Davis 1988, and Collins 2000 for detailed discussions of the Kennedy administration’s
fiscal policy.
20That is, if the Federal Government were running too large a surplus under conditions of full employment,
it was seen as discouraging growth. The initial tax cut proposals aimed to reduce but not entirely eliminate
the full employment surplus. See Costantini (2015) for a history of debates over evaluating the government’s
budget in terms of the business cycle.
129
Congress was that the proposal combined across the board cuts in tax rates with more
politically controversial reforms in the tax cut to close loopholes, cap itemized deductions,
change the standard deduction, and more. Despite relative bipartisan support for across-
the-board tax cuts to stimulate growth, the exact details of tax reform were bitterly fought.
In some sense, then, the debate over the Kennedy tax cut marks a slight return to con-
cerns with long-run structural problems that dominated the 1890s-1910s, but recast with the
quantitative precision of macroeconomic statistics, and focused on the size of fiscal policy
and how it relates to the size and growth of the economy. Managing the economy now
linked both short-run policy aimed at controlling unemployment and inflation and long-run
concerns about economic growth into a unified framework of measurement and interven-
tion. By the 1960s, the conditions were in place for the state to make incompatible, or at
least difficult to achieve, precise economic promises, and thus call into question its own
legitimacy, setting the stage for the triple crisis of the 1970s.
4.7.1 Coda
The idea that a President would be responsible for the overall growth rate of the economy
emerged in the 1950s and 1960s but it persists to this day. In the run-up to the 2016
Republican primary candidate Jeb Bush published an op-ed titled “My Tax Overhaul to
Unleash 4% Growth.”21 Jeb Bush may be a conservative Republican, but he still campaigns
in the discourse of managing the economy, and especially the vernacular of growthmanship
developed more than 50 years ago.
4.8 Discussion and Conclusion
In this chapter, I documented a transformation in the political rationalities of economic
governance in the first two thirds of the 20th century. In the late 19th century, debates over
21Available at http://www.wsj.com/articles/my-tax-overhaul-to-unleash-4-
growth-1441754195.
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the government’s role in economic life took on a structural or institutional character. The
dominant issues of the day concerned how government could best establish the conditions
for prosperity through the maintenance of the proper institutions to support trade and in-
dustry. In the early 20th century, attention turned increasingly to short-run concerns that
demanded policy responses framed not in terms of their long-run superiority but rather in
terms of their capacity to meet a need of the moment. “Managing the economy” in the
1930s and 1940s meant using taxes, spending, and monetary policy to promote employ-
ment and stem inflation. In the 1950s and 1960s, managing the economy expanded to
encompass growth as a particular goal of policy, alongside maintaining economic stability
and preparing to fight recessions as they occurred.
In his presidential address to the American Economics Association, former Chair of
the CEA under Eisenhower Arthur Burns (1960: 1) nicely summarized the transformation
documented above:
The American people have of late been more conscious of the business cycle,
more sensitive to every wrinkle of economic curves, more alert to the possible
need for contracyclical action on the part of government, than ever before in
our history. Minor changes of employment or of productivity or of the price
level, which in an earlier generation would have gone unnoticed, are nowadays
followed closely by laymen as well as experts.22
No longer was the state simply aiming to create a propitious environment for capitalist
growth, but rather was judged according to narrow performance criteria: 4% unemploy-
ment, 5% GNP growth, 2% inflation and so on. While the optimal targets and policy in-
struments were debated throughout the postwar era, the sense that the state was obligated to
meet those short run targets was not. The success or failure of these policies were measured
in timely, official, standardized ways and reported to the public at large. Precise macroe-
conomic outcomes became the responsibility of the state and key elements of campaign
promises. Macroeconomic management had arrived.
This analysis sheds light on the crises of the state that emerged in the 1970s. First, in
22Also quoted in Collins (2000: 43).
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a narrow sense, this chapter identifies the conditions of emergence of the tax and spending
policies that led to the fiscal crisis of the state were in some part derived from the macroe-
conomic theories of the time. Second, in a somewhat broader sense, this chapter showed
how the political responsibilities which governments failed to meet in the 1970s only took
shape in the 1930s and 1940s. At the same time as “the economy” itself crystallized as a
sociotechnical object, so too did the state’s responsibility for managing that economy.
Taking a longer view of the transitions in the state’s role in economic life also suggests
shifts in the notion of laissez-faire. In 1900, arguments against governmental interven-
tion in economic life were arguments against tariff favoritism or industrial policy. By the
1960s, arguments against government intervention took the form of rejections of counter-
cyclical fiscal policy to fight recessions. In some sense, “the economy” and its management
emerged as a third way between the extremes of unfettered capitalism on one hand, and
full-out socialist planning on the other. By acting on the economy, the state could fulfill
its obligations to high economic performance without running afoul of the technical (cf.
Scott 1998) or political difficulties of more invasive forms of intervention. Yet this move
did not long satisfy critics of state intervention. A full exploration of the pushback against
“managing the economy” is outside the scope of this chapter, but at a minimum this argu-
ment suggests that the history of arguments for laissez-faire must be understood against the
backdrop of shifts in the political rationalities of economic government.
This chapter makes relatively minimal claims about the political forces that spurred the
adoption of particular policies or rationalities. Broadly, I showed that new forms of mea-
surement were necessary preconditions for government accepting short-run responsibili-
ties for small movements. In the absence of routine, official, standardized macroeconomic
statistics, it is difficult to see how, say, the politics of growthism could have emerged and
taken the form it did. In making this argument, I bracketed the detailed politics of par-
ticular moments, and thus am incapable of making claims about the relative importance
of social movement actors, party elites, business interests, state officials, and economists
132
themselves. Many of these stories are well-told for particular moments, such as the detailed
histories of the early and late New Deal which document the shifting policy frameworks and
political coalitions that eventually led to the decline of programs like the National Recov-
ery Administration and the embrace of explicitly Keynesian frameworks. A more detailed
examination of other similar turning points might add to our understanding of alternative
formulations of state responsibility for economic outcomes, alternative policy approaches
for achieving economic goals, and why those alternatives did not win out.
As noted in the introduction, political scientists have increasingly linked short-run eco-
nomic performance and electoral outcomes (see Healy and Malhotra 2013 for a recent
review). My historical account suggests that this link may have changed in the first half
of the 20th century. Although research on retrospective economic voting has grown aware
of the possibility that economic voting itself may be contingent on other factors (Ander-
son 2007), thus far researchers have not focused on historical transformations — events, in
Sewell’s (2005) useful terms — so much as mediating factors understood in an experimen-
tal temporality (for a partial exception, see Lin 1999). Future work on the links between
macroeconomic conditions and economic voting should pay extra attention to the distribu-
tion and consumption of information on economic conditions. Put bluntly, we would expect
voters to react differently before and after macroeconomic indicators became widely avail-
able and understood.
One recent finding generally supports this hypothesis. Kayser and Leininger (2015)
find that election forecasts perform better when they rely on the economic data available
at the time of the election, rather than the revised data produced months later. In other
words, “voter perceptions of economic growth are influenced more by media reports about
the economy, which are based on initial economic estimates, than by the actual state of
the economy” (Kayser and Leininger 2015: 1). The same logic underlying this finding
would suggest that voters would respond differently to economic conditions in 1900 (be-
fore the availability of timely macroeconomic aggregates) than in 1960. Future research
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could explicitly account for the information available at different historical moments, per-
haps drawing on a closer reading of the historical record to see which indicators (if any)
politicians themselves pointed to in making political promises and assessing the success or
failure of policies. In so doing, this research could help further identify how politicians and
the public have understood the state’s role in managing economic life over the past century.
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CHAPTER 5
How Much is a Housewife Worth?
This chapter shows how the economy as current enacted is an irreducibly market ob-
ject. I focus on the history of debates over counting unpaid labor, primarily understood
as women’s housework. Tracing the history of partial attempts and near misses demon-
strates that housework could be included without fundamentally disrupting “the economy,”
but it would have to be included on market terms. The practical and epistemic justification
for national income statistics relied on markets as truth-telling devices, but flows of money
and resources are not confined to market transactions, and thus in order to accurately mea-
sure the whole economy, national income statistics are constantly challenged to go beyond
the market.
5.1 Introduction
“This treatment, whereby commercial products are valued at market price, government
services are valued at cost, and unpaid household activities are simply ignored, is not a
matter of principle but of practical convenience. It can be defended, therefore, only on
practical grounds.” — Sir Richard Stone, 1984 Economics Nobel Prize Lecture
The previous three chapters described the formation of the economy as a sociotechni-
cal object, and how the crystallization of the economy transformed how we think about
and act on the economic system. This chapter begins to explore what was left out of the
national income statistics, and in turn, the economy. In chapter 3, I discussed in detail
the difficult work that was required to assemble satisfactory national income statistics and
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make them usable for planning in both war and peace. In accomplishing that task, national
income statisticians faced difficult tradeoffs between theoretical desiderata and practical
constraints. This chapter focuses on one particular form that tension took, one that has
never had a complete resolution: the treatment of unpaid housework.
Feminist economists have long criticized the exclusion of unpaid housework from na-
tional income statistics (Folbre 1991, Waring 1999). In particular, they argue that exclud-
ing unpaid housework distorts the measurement of economic growth and development, and
generally leads to undervaluing women’s work. The feminist economics account suggests
that the men who created and institutionalized national income statistics (and they were
almost entirely men) did not consider women’s work productive, and thus worthy of inclu-
sion, but as yet there exists no definitive historical treatment of this decision (see O’Brien
1998 for a partial exception).
Here, I examine how it was that economists came to exclude housework. Somewhat
surprisingly, I find that economists were intensely conflicted about the exclusion of house-
work, and that conflict persists in various forms to present. In the 1920s-1950s, economists
largely agreed that theoretical principles called for the inclusion of unpaid housework, but
practical concerns made that inclusion difficult. In order to include housework, economists
needed to know both its amount and value, neither of which was easily quantifiable with
available data. After the 1950s, most economists considered the form of the accounts fixed,
but specialists in national income statistics continued to search for better ways to count
and value unpaid housework in order to include it in the accounts, or, at a minimum, add
housework to new “extended accounts” (Eisner 1988). Estimates of the value of housework
were consistently large, but different methods and data produced quite divergent estimates.
Research on unpaid housework continues, furthered in part by newly available time use
data, but has not settled into a stable and agreed upon measurement technique.
Thus, I find that unpaid housework was not simply overlooked, or deemed irrelevant,
by national income accountants. Rather, unpaid housework was initially excluded from na-
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tional income statistics, and by extension from the economy-as-object, in part to guarantee
the mechanical objectivity of the economy, and in part because economists believed that
unpaid housework did not vary sufficiently quickly to help manage the economy in the short
run.1 That is, economists believed unpaid housework should, ideally, be included in order
to produce the “truest” measure of economic performance, but that the costs of producing a
less accurate measure, and possibly distorting long-run or international comparisons, were
not seen as pressing enough to overcome the practical difficulties of settling on a single
estimate. In later periods, institutional inertia placed significant barriers on changing na-
tional and international standards, barriers worsened by the lack of consensus on the best
technique for valuing housework.
5.2 Data & Methods
This data for this chapter are drawn from the larger project on the history of national in-
come statistics. Sources of data include scholarly publications (journal articles, conference
volumes, and books), government documents (especially the Department of Commerce’s
Survey of Consumer Business), newspaper reports, economics textbooks, and archival doc-
uments from six relevant collections.2 I read these documents looking for methodological
discussions, and in particular debates over the inclusion and valuation of nonmarket goods.
I draw heavily on the public presentations of national income estimates — final reports
and methodological treatises — both because they are consistent with archival correspon-
dences, and because they are the context in which national income statisticians were forced
to most clearly justify their work.
1O’Brien (1998) similarly emphasizes economists’ belief that the lack of variability in housework implied
that including it in the accounts would not help resolve short-run economic issues.
2The relevant archives here are the papers of the Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce (the pre-
cursor to the Bureau of Economic Analysis) housed at the US National Archives, along with the papers of
Simon Kuznets (Harvard University), Wesley Mitchell (Columbia University), Richard Stone (University of
Cambridge), John Maynard Keynes (University of Cambridge), and James Meade (London School of Eco-
nomics).
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I divide my analysis into two rough periods: 1920-1947 and 1947-present. In the first
period, national income statistics transitioned from being a relatively low-status pursuit of
individual scholars into a widely-used, high-status product of government bureaucracies in
the US, Canada, and Western Europe. In the second period, national income statistics were
largely standardized, and diffused across the globe. In both periods, statisticians worried
about the perceived objectivity and legitimacy of national income statistics, and in both
periods the exclusion of housework was noted and debated. I focus on the United States
as an influential, albeit non-representative, case to highlight the relationship between the
quest for objectivity and the exclusion of housework.
5.3 The Rise of National Income, 1920-1947
The idea of calculating the total income of a nation for a given year dates back to at least
the 17th century. William Petty produced the first estimates of national income for England
and Ireland in the late 17th century, and his work was followed by intermittent estimates
over the next two hundred years (Studenski 1958).3 This period is characterized by lone
scholars in a handful of countries, often unaffiliated with any government, producing es-
timates based on scarce data. The era of the lone investigator then gave way to a period
of official, routinely produced, institutionalized statistics in the 20th century. While only
eight nations had any estimates whatsoever before 1900, 92 nations had official or unof-
ficial estimates by 1957 (Studenski 1958: 156-157). The rise of official national income
estimates followed the massive expansion of government statistics offices in Europe and
the United States beginning in the 19th century and continuing through the early 20th cen-
3Like most accounts of the history of national income statistics, this one relies heavily on Paul Studenski’s
(1958) The Income of Nations for the pre-20th century era. Additionally, this necessarily brief review omits
many important topics. For example, in the 20th century, the Soviet Union and China developed a competing
accounting framework to the SNA known as the Material Production System. Omitting this story obscures
the role of geopolitical struggles in shaping modern national income statistics. Readers interested in more
detailed histories should consult Studenski (1958), Carson (1971), Vanoli (2005), Bos (2009), Mitra-Kahn
(2010) and Herrera (2010), and see the discussion in chapter 3.
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tury (Desrosieres 1998; Duncan and Shelton 1978). These new offices, along with private
non-profit institutions, replaced the lone scholars of the first period.
World War I sparked more interest in and debate about national income estimates, along
with measures of inflation or cost of living (Stapleford 2009) and other economic aggre-
gates. In the years immediately following the war, a group of high-profile economists
and activists founded the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) with the goal
of improving economic data. NBER brought together politically diverse actors who were
convinced that objective data was the key to solving pressing political and social issues
(Rutherford 2011). Even before the war, influential actors were convinced that an objective
measurement of the distribution of national income between different elements of society
would be critical to resolving class conflicts (Shenk 2015). The NBER embodied that vi-
sion, bringing together academics with experts from business and labor to produce statistics
that political rivals would find mutually acceptable. To achieve that vision, the data NBER
produced would have to be as objective and authoritative as possible.
For its first major research project, NBER tasked noted business cycle theorist Wesley
Mitchell and three collaborators with the production of a comprehensive estimate of the
national income of the United States. Published as Income in the United States: Its Amount
and Distribution, 1909-1919 (NBER 1921), this report emphasized the technical difficul-
ties of calculating national income and the various theoretical and methodological debates
that surrounded such a calculation. Unlike past national income publications, the report
deferred making specific policy recommendations. The methodological decisions made for
this calculation, about what to count and how to count it, have been largely re-made ever
since. Although there have been numerous changes, according to one prominent critic of
national income statistics: “The definition of income used in this report corresponds in
most major ways to what is used today. It included essentially the market economy (where
money must change hands), with the addition of home-produced food and fuel, and an
estimate of the rental value of owner-occupied homes.” (Waring 1999: 41-42)
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In particular, as I will discuss below, the NBER 1921 estimate laid the groundwork
for the official national income estimates produced by the Department of Comment in the
1930s, and continued up to the present. Importantly, NBER 1921 also provided the first
known estimate of the value of unpaid housework, although this estimate was kept separate
from the final total (Hawrylyshyn 1976). How did NBER define national income? Why did
they feel compelled to estimate the value of unpaid housework, but exclude it from their
national income measure?
Following an extended discussion of various alternatives, NBER (1921: 42) defined the
national income as follow:
[T]he National Income is taken to consist of the commodities and services
produced by the people of the country or obtained from abroad for their use,
with the omission of goods for which no price is commonly paid, for example
the services of housewives. Agricultural produce consumed by the families
that produce it, mainly food and firewood, is included, and so also is the rental
value of homes occupied by their owners.
This definition was guided by pragmatic as well as theoretical considerations. In partic-
ular, the authors of the report worried about the quality of the data available: “it is hardest
of all to frame a definition which will include both of these concepts and at the same time
enable one to use the exceedingly miscellaneous data from which an estimate of the aggre-
gate must be made.” (NBER 1921: 4) Thus, the report offered a definition that was meant
to be unambiguously estimable, whether or not that definition was theoretically ideal.
The definition adopted invoked the market to solve one of the central methodolog-
ical problems faced by economists trying to measure national income: the “production
boundary.”4 Social life does not neatly divide into productive and non-productive behavior.
Economists must decide which activities count as productive in order to then estimate the
value of production. Sale in the market provides a clear criterion for inclusion — anything
sold in the market should clearly be included.
4My discussion of the methodological principles of national income draws on a large body of literature,
including the primary sources and historical works cited here, along with various textbooks. For an excellent
primer, see Lequiller and Blades 2006.
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Yet this criterion was insufficient to define a stable, authoritative measure of national
income. The problem, as economists had long known, is that the boundaries of the market
are not fixed over time. Housing offers an important example. Rental income is easy to
include in the national income. Renters pay a fee for the use of housing in a given year, and
this rental income can be added to the total national income. Owners, in contrast, do not
pay a market price for the value of the shelter provided by their homes. What happens when
renters turn into buyers? The amount of housing services produced remains the same, but
the total measured market income goes down. This paradox suggests another principle of
national income estimation: the total estimate should be “invariant” to purely legal changes
in the organization of production. Renters buying their own homes should not change the
total national income because the same housing services are produced.
Already in 1921, the conflict between the principle of invariance and the market crite-
rion for inclusion was clear. Excluding all nonmarket production was simply not an option.
But how far should the production boundary extend? Here, a second market-based criterion
was invoked. If a nonmarket good had a market equivalent whose price was readily known
then the value of the nonmarket good could be easily imputed. So, the value of owner-
occupied housing was estimated based on the rent for similar housing. And the value of
agricultural produce consumed by the farmers who grew it was similarly imputed.
In contrast, unpaid housework, or more precisely “the services of housewives to their
families” (NBER 1921: 57), was not so readily brought into comparison with an existing
market. The problem was not the complete absence of a market for housework. Rather, the
problem was that the market did not provide an unequivocal estimate of either the amount
of unpaid housework performed by housewives nor of the value of that housework: “How
much was their [housewives’] contribution to the National Income worth, on the average?
As much as the average pay of domestic servants? Somewhat more? Perhaps $500 per
annum before the war, and more than that after servants’ wages rose? We do not know.”
(NBER 1921: 59) Over the following decades, economists would routinely confront these
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problems and offer a shifting array of methods of inferring the value of housework from
market price, none of which stabilized into an unequivocal (and thus potentially authorita-
tive and objective) standard.
NBER recognized that the exclusion of housework also presented serious problems
for the comparability of national income estimates across time and space. As housewives
began to purchase on the market goods and services that they used to produce themselves
“the range of goods not commonly paid for in money gradually shrinks. Hence figures
such as we get for the National Income in successive years tend to exaggerate the increase
in economic welfare.” (NBER 1921: 57) Here, NBER recognized the tradeoff between the
theoretical superiority of estimates including housework, and the practical difficulties of
estimating the value of housework in the absence of a market.
In the end, NBER did use the wages of servant as a rough proxy for the services of
housewives and produced an estimate of their value (see figure 5.1). NBER went to great
lengths to highlight the uncertainty of the estimate — the words “assumption” or “assumed”
appear four times, and “conjectural” twice. But, as noted above, this “conjectural estimate”
was excluded from the final total of national income.
NBER continued intermittent work in the field of national income in the 1920s and
early 1930s, as did the National Industrial Conference Board. In 1932, in the wake of
the Depression, Senator La Follette authored a resolution calling on the Department of
Commerce to produce its own estimates of national income. The Bureau of Foreign and
Domestic Commerce (BFDC, the precursor to the Bureau of Economic Analysis) brought
in Simon Kuznets, an NBER affiliate and student of Wesley Mitchell’s, to lead the effort
(see Carson 1971 for a detailed account). Through Kuznets, the methodological decisions
of the NBER were brought into the official measures of national income.
The official estimates were published as National Income, 1929-1932 (Kuznets 1934),
and then updated as a yearly, and eventually quarterly, series in the Commerce Depart-
ment’s Survey of Current Business. Following the lead established by the NBER, Kuznets
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Figure 5.1: From NBER 1921, the first national income estimate of the value of housework.
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(1934: 1) defined national income as “all commodities produced and all personal services
rendered during the year . . . added at their market value” less the cost of the intermediate
goods (raw materials and depreciation) used to make the final goods and services. This def-
inition sufficed for goods and services traditionally sold in the market, but Kuznets still had
to reckon with the problem of nonmarket goods. Again following the logic of the NBER
estimates, Kuznets recognized the theoretical problems of excluding unpaid housework and
the practical problems of including it. Kuznets (1934: 4) further clarified that the services
of housewives are not exactly comparable to those of servants:
the organization of these services render them an integral part of family fife at
large, rather than of the specifically business life of the nation. Such services
are, therefore, quite removed from those which gainfully occupied groups un-
dertake to perform in return for wages, salaries, or profits. It was considered
best to omit this large group of services from national income, especially since
no reliable basis is available for estimating their value.
Kuznets took great care in explaining how the reliance on the objectivity of market
prices shaped the choices of where to draw the production boundary, and how to value
various goods and services. For example, economists and policymakers debated whether
or not various morally questionable goods and services should be counted as productive.
Kuznets (1934: 5) eventually included any legal good bought or sold in the market, arguing
that to do otherwise would be to “impose his own scale of values” on the statistics. As
such, “all lawful activities are to be given that benefit of doubt which the market place is
eager to bestow upon anything that succeeds in fetching a price.” (Kuznets 1934: 5) Here,
the market served as a guard against the economist (or politician) imposing his own values
onto the accounts.
The exclusion of housework from the official estimates was seen as controversial and
notable enough to require discussion and justification. For example, a three page press
release written at the time of the report’s publication listed just two major caveats. First,
that data were available for the continental US only, and second: “Certain items that might
be classified as income under concepts other than those employed by the investigators have
147
been excluded from the totals presented, i.e. . . . the imputed value of services of housewives
and other members of the family. . . ”5The New York Times story reporting on the report
picked up the press release language word-for-word, ending with the same caveat about the
exclusion of housework.6
Similarly, influential economics textbooks in the 1930s-1940s — the first to focus
their attention on macroeconomics and national income statistics — noted the exclusion
of housework and argued that it flowed from practical considerations about data and valua-
tion, not economic principles (Garver and Hansen 1937: 16, Burns et al 1948: 103, Nordin
and Salera 1950: 57). As Paul Samuelson’s famous Economics (1948: 228) put it: “A
wife’s housework services are not included simply because it is hard to find a market-price
yardstick or any other to evaluate them. In all logic, they should be included, and national
income should be increased by one-fifth or more.”
After his work on the 1934 publication, Kuznets returned to academic life and became
an influential theorist of national income and economic growth. Throughout his writings
in the 1930s and 1940s, Kuznets was careful to stress how any national income estimate
required making tradeoffs. This multiplicity of possible national incomes led Kuznets to
argue that a value-free, objective national income measure was not possible. Rather, each
investigator must draw the boundaries of what is included in ways that make sense given
the particular political problem that he hoped to address. For example, Kuznets listed
five possible specifications of what kinds of goods could be included in a national income
estimate, from only those goods produced by private actors and sold on the private market
(ignoring completely governments, let alone housework or owner-occupied housing) all the
way up to a measure that includes goods not appearing in markets such as the services of
housewives to their families, and the services of individuals to themselves (Kuznets 1941:
9).
5“The National Income 1929-1932”, National Archives Record Group 151, Index 600, Box 2563, Folder
“Finance and Investment - United States - National Income - 1934 - January - April.”
6“Our Income Fell 40% in Four Years”, New York Times, January 22, 1934.
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Despite this care, Kuznets continued to justify the emphasis on the role of the market
in determining the production boundary for the official Commerce Department estimates.
Kuznets argued, “It is the market, with its vast mechanism for the disposition of diverse
goods, that reveals the ties binding the separate units in the economic system and segregates
economic goods from other.” (Kuznets 1941: 7) The market both identifies economic
goods, and determines their value. Kuznets (1941: 21-22) further wrote:
The yardstick of economic value is fashioned on the market place. It is in
markets that economic goods are brought together and their relative importance
gauged for purposes of sale and purchase; that the members of the community
vote, in terms of the common currency unit, upon the relative value to them of
various commodities, services, and arrangements. In fact, to identify economic
value with market price is, at least as the first step, the one possible solution of
the problem [of valuation].
Although Kuznets immediately added a caveat to this claim, the basic logic guides the
production of national income statistics. Markets are to the economy what elections are to
politics. In the market, the members of the community vote with their dollars, and in so
doing determine value. Fortunately for economists and statisticians, the outcome of these
economic elections provides the data necessary to compute complex statistics like national
income.
National income statistics were a relatively new and uncertain endeavor in the 1920s
and 1930s. In the 1940s, they would prove their worth in World War II. In the United
States, national income statistics were credited with helping guide military mobilization, as
Kuznets and his colleagues convinced the military to moderate their demands for materiel
to what the economy could feasibly produce in a limited time (see chapter 3 for details).
In the United Kingdom, national income statistics were used to guide wartime fiscal policy
and making it possible to avoid hyperinflation through a carefully planned combination of
higher taxes and bond issues (Keynes 1940, Meade and Stone 1941). This transformation of
the national income into a macroeconomic policy tool continued after the war with the rise
of the politics of economic growth, with GNP as its main outcome of interest (Collins 2000,
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Yarrow 2010). This process fixed the national income in a particular form, as the nitpicking
precision favored by Kuznets lost out to the policy imperatives of the post-war era. In the
next section, I discuss how national income statistics became fixed, as bureaucrats fought
to maintain the status quo for fear of national income becoming politicized and losing its
newfound value as a policy tool.
5.4 The Institutionalization of National Income, 1947-2015
In this section, I document how bureaucrats in the US Department of Commerce fought to
keep GNP from becoming a so-called “welfare measurement” and how this fight led them
to exclude unpaid housework, and other imputations of nonmarket goods.
In 1947, the Department of Commerce published National Income: A New Version.
This document codified the improvements made during the war, established Gross National
Product as the main aggregate reported, and entrenched the “accounting” framework that
gives the national accounts their name. The 1947 standards also brought the US and UK
accounts closer together, and helped to lay the groundwork for the United Nations System
of National Accounts (UNSNA).7
This publication also occasioned a surprisingly critical response from Simon Kuznets
(1948), who had returned to academia from his wartime post and was no longer directly
involved in the production of the data. Kuznets made several criticisms of the 1947 ac-
counts, including that the accounting metaphor itself made the entire enterprise appear
more certain, and objective than it truly was. For Kuznets, it was important to highlight
how and when judgment entered into the framework. The accounting framework, Kuznets
7In the 1940s and 1950s, national income statistics proliferated across the world. At the same time, the
first international standards were created, modeled on the UK and US statistics. British economist Richard
Stone wrote a series of reports that laid out the framework, first on behalf of the League of Nations and then
most influentially the first UNSNA, published in 1953. The UNSNA was revised three times in following
decades (in 1968, 1993, and 2008), but the basic principles and the practical resolution of many of the trickiest
problems remained the same (Bos 1994). Importantly, every version excludes unpaid housework. The exact
procedures used by different nations may vary from the UNSNA, but most attempt to follow the standards
(Herrera 2010).
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argued, distracted attention from the difficult problems of “scope, netness, and valuation”
(Kuznets 1948: 154), to which it offered no helpful answers. Any measure of national
income must make difficult judgments about what is worth measuring, and what counts as
“final” production, and the new national income accounts covered up rather than revealing
or improving those choices. In his view, any measure of national income was necessarily
making judgments about economic welfare.
Kuznets’ argument fell on deaf, and somewhat confused, ears. The new generation of
economists in the Commerce department were less concerned with the theoretical princi-
ples of national income statistics, and more concerned with establishing and maintaining
a reliable policy tool. In particular they worried about subjectivity showing through in the
standards and were surprised that Kuznets criticized them for effectively making the same
decisions he had made in 1934. In their response, Gilbert et al. (1948) argued that Kuznets
proposals would require moving away from the “observable demand of ultimate buyers for
goods and services” (about which knowledge could be relatively certain), and in so doing
would undermine the scientific objectivity of the statistics: “The moralistic flavor [Kuznets]
wishes to inject into national income measurement might be in the tradition of Ruskin —
it is not in the tradition of quantitative economics.” (Gilbert et al. 1948: 189)
This 1948 fight over the role of explicit moral and economic welfare considerations in
the national accounts would be repeated over the following decades. Every time, economists
inside government would successfully fight to maintain the status quo and keep out any
modification that smacked of subjectivity. In turn, this status quo was buttressed by its
reliance on observed market behavior as the hard methodological core, onto which mod-
ifications must be carefully grafted. As Edward Denison, one of Gilbert’s co-authors and
former official statistician, wrote in the Survey Of Current Business in response to growing
calls for welfare measurement argued, “We can obtain a generally acceptable measure only
because market prices provide weights to combine them that are widely accepted as rea-
sonable and objective.” (Denison 1971: 13) Another of Gilbert’s co-authors, George Jaszi,
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went on to serve a long stint as Director of the Bureau of Economic Analysis. At the end
of his career, Jaszi (1986:411) claimed that preventing GNP from becoming a politicized
measure of economic wellbeing was perhaps his greatest accomplishment:
Over the 43 years at BEA, I feel that I made my principal contribution as an
economic accountant. First, I resisted the will-o’-the-wisp of forging national
output into a measure of economic welfare. I was a minority of one in a com-
pany that included such mental giants as Simon Kuznets and John Hicks, and
at one point I had to defy a forceful Secretary of Commerce who had instructed
the BEA to prepare a measure of welfare.
The fight over the exclusion of unpaid housework was central to this debate, although
concerns over the treatment of government and especially the environment also shaped
the debate (Denison 1971, Eisner 1988). In the 1970s and 1980s, influential economists
continued to argue for the inclusion of unpaid housework, and offered innovative new ways
of measuring its value. Each of this methods relied on a different way of reading the
market, a different set of market numbers. Hawrylyshyn (1976: 101) summarized both
the available methods and how they led, unfortunately, to a wide range of estimates: “The
highest values are obtained with methods based upon the opportunity cost of women in
paid employment, lower with methods based upon the cost of a single housekeeper, and
lowest with methods based upon pricing individual services performed.” Three methods,
three ways of analogizing unpaid housework to market labor, three different answers.
Although the BEA resisted efforts to transform GNP into a measure of welfare, research
continued on the value of nonmarket work. For example, Martin Murphy, working at the
BEA, tried to find a consistent estimate for the value of housework. Murphy (1978) argued
that including housework in the accounts would change little because housework was a
relatively stable percentage of measured GNP and that this finding was robust to different
estimate methods. Just four years later, Murphy (1982: 35) overturned his own conclu-
sions, arguing that “aggregate estimates for all persons are highly sensitive to the method
of valuation.” More recently, Steve Landefeld (then-director of the BEA) and co-authors
published estimates of unpaid housework using newly available time use survey data (Lan-
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defeld et al 2009). And yet, despite this continued interest, and radically improved data
sources, the lack of consensus around the value of the estimate, driven by the tenuous con-
nection to the hard facts of market prices, continually militated against the inclusion of
housework.
5.5 Discussion & Conclusion
The practical and epistemic justifications for national income statistics rely on markets
as truth-telling devices, but the actual flows of money and resources are not confined to
market transactions. In order to accurately measure the whole economy, NIS are constantly
challenged to go beyond the market.
In the 1920s-1940s, statisticians were concerned with producing national income esti-
mates that were free from bias and thus capable of objectively informing political debates.
Nonmarket goods like unpaid housework seemed risky to include because they lacked the
(purportedly) objective information provided by market prices. In the 1940s, as national
income statistics gained a surer foothold in the policy apparatus, bureaucrats fought to
preserve the political neutrality of the accounts. Despite protestations from outside aca-
demics that national income always already contained some implicit welfare criterion, the
economists at Commerce argued that modifying the accounts to take into account subjec-
tive welfare criterion would undermine their usefulness and objectivity. At the same time,
estimates of the value of unpaid housework based on different kinds of imputations never
converged on a unique value.
Relying on market prices’ revelatory powers thus helped national income statisticians to
answer the question of valuation and the question of boundaries, of which activities should
count at all. National income statisticians easily included goods regularly bought and sold
by individuals and businesses, and thus about which market price data are available and
credible.
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Conversely, statisticians struggled throughout the 20th century to include non-market
goods. It was not difficult for statisticians concerned with the amount and value of unpaid
housework to find some number, but it was hard to find a unique number. Statisticians
attempted to analogize unpaid housework to the labor of servants or to value housework in
terms of a market opportunity cost, but these methods yielded inconsistent results. Lacking
an unequivocal market estimate of the amount or value of housework, national income
statisticians chose to exclude them entirely.
In terms of unpaid housework, this analysis suggests that statisticians chose to exclude
housework from the national accounts despite theoretical principles, not because of them
(cf. Folbre 1991, Waring 1999). Excluding unpaid housework brought real dangers in terms
of comparability across time and space, and at least the potential to misinterpret trends
in growth and well-being. The persistent stream of research by mainstream economists,
including those working inside the agency tasked with constructing the national accounts
attests to the serious concern with these dangers. Nonetheless, statisticians continually
opted to avoid controversial numbers in order to shore up the authority of the national
accounts.
My analysis here is limited by its focus on dynamics in the United States. As scholars of
quantification have long noted, national culture deeply shapes the acceptance of different
techniques (Porter 1995, Carson 2007, Fourcade 2011). In the case of national income,
however, the connection between the US (and UK) estimates and the relatively influential
UN standards suggests that here the rest of the world largely conformed to the US approach.
Norway offers a brief but revealing counterpoint. In the 1940s, Norway experimented
with including unpaid housework in its official national income estimates but ultimately
removed the estimates to conform to international standards (Aslaksen and Koren 1996).
The global principles of national income statistics are firmly those of Anglo-American
economics, regardless of the national contexts in which they are embedded.
The decisions made by statisticians in the 1920s-1940s produced a set of incredibly suc-
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cessful tools, in the standard sense of widespread adoption and use. At the same time, the
quest for mechanical objectivity led statisticians to exclude unpaid housework despite theo-
retically principled arguments for its inclusion. National income thus exhibits what Sandra
Harding (1995) would call a “weak” objectivity, one that encodes systematic, disciplinary
biases in its quest to eliminate individual ones. Harding (1995: 16) cautions against resting
too easily on the apparent success of weakly-objective measures: “Such information and
explanations may well ‘work’ in the sense of enabling prediction and control. . . . One form
of explanation that ‘works’ may at the same time obscure or draw attention away from other
regularities and their causes that would suggest other possibilities for organizing nature and
social relations.”
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CHAPTER 6
Rediscovering the 1%:
Economic Expertise and Inequality Knowledge
In the 2000s, academics and policymakers began to discuss the growth of top incomes in
the United States, especially the “top 1%.” Newly analyzed data revealed that top income
earners in the 1990s received a larger share of income than at any point since the Great
Depression, and that their incomes had begun a dramatic upward climb in the early 1980s.
This paper investigates why it took two decades for this increase in top incomes to become
politically and academically salient. I argue that experts assembled two “regimes of percep-
tibility” (Murphy 2006) for producing knowledge about income inequality, and that neither
of these regimes was capable of tracking movements in top incomes. Macroeconomists
focused on labor’s share of national income, but did not examine the distribution of in-
come between individuals. Labor economists, on the other hand, drew on newly available
survey data to explain wage disparities in terms of education, age, work experience, race,
and gender. By relying on surveys, these scholars unintentionally eliminated top incomes
from view: surveys top-coded high incomes, and thus were incapable of seeing changes
in the top 1%. Studies of top incomes that relied on income tax data thus fell by the way-
side, creating the conditions under which experts, policymakers, and the public alike could
be surprised by the rise of the 1%. This historical narrative offers insights into the politi-
cal power of economic expertise by clarifying the complex linkages between observations,
stylized facts, causal theories, and policy attention.
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6.1 The Surprising Growth of the Top 1%
In 2003, economists Thomas Piketty and Emmanuel Saez published a surprising finding:
the top 1% of income earners in the United States were now receiving 15% of all income,
almost twice as large a share as they had 30 years earlier. And, perhaps even more surpris-
ingly, top income earners were now receiving the largest share they had received since the
Great Depression. Even before the finding appeared in the prestigious Quarterly Journal
of Economics, it had already been written up in the New York Times Magazine by colum-
nist and noted economist Paul Krugman.1 Although scholars in many fields had noted an
increase in income inequality in the 1980s and 1990s, Piketty and Saez’s research reframed
the debate by offering a new characterization of inequality that did not fit easily into existing
debates about the role of education, globalization, race, or gender. Over the next decade,
the growth of the top 1% thus spurred new research programs in economics, political sci-
ence, and sociology. Beyond the walls of the academy, the growth of the top 1% entered
into mainstream political discourse, and even helped to frame a new political identity as
the Occupy Wall Street movement proudly declared, “We are the 99%!” (Gould-Wartofsky
2014).
My purpose here is not to investigate the history of income inequality in the United
States. Instead, I trace the history of inequality knowledge, in the spirit of O’Connor’s
(2002) poverty knowledge. How was it possible that Piketty and Saez’s finding was so
surprising? The trend of growth in the top 1% of incomes began in the mid-1980s, and
was at least potentially visible in publicly available IRS tax data (see Figure 6.1). Piketty
and Saez did not invent any fancy new statistical techniques, but rather updated an analysis
published by Simon Kuznets half a century earlier (see Figure 6.2). What was it about
the way we produced inequality knowledge that made it possible to miss the growth of the
1%? To answer this question, we must explore the regimes of perceptibility through which
1Krugman, Paul. 2002. “For Richer.” New York Times Magazine. October 20. Krugman, and other
commenters, relied on Piketty and Saez’s NBER working paper, released in 2001.
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experts monitored trends in inequality. Following Murphy (2006) and Hecht (2009), I
define a regime of perceptibility as an assemblage of social and technical things that makes
certain features of the world visible while rendering others invisible.
I argue that the two dominant regimes of perceptibility for making sense of the dis-
tribution of income, associated with labor economics and macroeconomics respectively,
developed and institutionalized tools for seeing inequality that were well-matched to the
particular theoretical problems faced by those fields in the mid-20th century, but which
made top incomes invisible. Labor economists relied on survey-based measures of income
which explicitly top-coded incomes, and thus were incapable of tracking changes in the
extremes of the distribution, while macroeconomists stuck to the national income accounts
to examine the share of income going to labor as a whole, but almost entirely ignored the
personal distribution of income.2 Economists, and other social scientists, interested in in-
come inequality in the 1980s and 1990s lacked easily available, standardized, and timely
data on the whole distribution. Although income distribution data had been seen as a top
statistical priority in the 1940s and 1950s, official measures of the entire distribution re-
ceived little attention and were discontinued in the 1970s — just before they might have
revealed changes in top incomes.
Tracing the history of inequality knowledge, including both theories of inequality and
the data used to assess and inform those theories, contributes new insights to a growing
conversation on the political power of experts and their tools. Scholars in science studies
have recently turned their attention to agnotology (Proctor and Schiebinger 2008, Croissant
2014, Frickel 2014), the social production of ignorance. That is, scholars have sought to
understand how experts intentionally or unintentionally shape political outcomes by not
producing knowledge about particular topics. At the same time, sociologists and political
scientists interested in the political power of economics have increasingly turned their at-
2Top-coding refers to the practice of reporting incomes above a certain threshold, X, as simply “above X”.
The actual dollar value of those high income is either not recorded at all or only recorded in data not released
to the public. The top coding of incomes is usually justified as part of a collection of practices designed to
protect the privacy of respondents with unusual characteristics.
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Figure 6.1: Piketty and Saez’s (2003:12) famous chart showing the growth of top incomes
in the 1980s-1990s.
Figure 6.2: Kuznets’ (1953:33) less famous chart showing the downward trend of top in-
comes in the 1930s-1940s.
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tention to the influence of economists’ technical tools and styles of reasoning in shaping
policy (Hirschman and Berman 2014). Here, I combine these emphases with an older tra-
dition of research on social problem definitions (Hilgartner and Bosk 1988) to show how
the regimes of perceptibility associated with different communities of economic inquiry
collectively influenced policy debates by identifying and disseminating particular “stylized
facts” about inequality, while rendering other forms of inequality invisible.3
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. First, I expand on the above discus-
sions of regimes of perceptibility and the sociology of ignorance. Second, I outline an ana-
lytical strategy for approaching the rise of the 1% in inequality debates, arguing that it can
be usefully understood as an example of the emergence of a new stylized fact. Third, I turn
to the case itself. I explore the intertwined histories of macroeconomics, labor economics,
and the production of official statistics. The case is divided into roughly two periods: the
1920s to the 1970s, when both labor economics and macroeconomics take shape and de-
velop specific regimes of perceptibility for seeing inequality, and the 1980s to present when
we can see the effects of those regimes in rendering largely invisible the growth of top in-
comes. In this later period, I rely on a partial counterexample — a brief moment when
top income inequality became a matter of public concern — to theorize the importance of
regimes of perceptibility for both observing economic life and for sustaining attention on
particular features. In the discussion, I draw on insights from the case to propose a broader
model for understanding economists’ influence on policy debates.
3A stylized fact is a lightly abstracted empirical regularity, such as a trend or correlation. The term has
been used widely in economics since the 1960s, and recently has seen some usage in sociology, but has thus
far not been subjected to much theoretical analysis. I return to the concept in the discussion, but for a more
complete account of stylized facts, including an analysis of the evolution of the term’s usage, see Hirschman
2014.
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6.2 Perceiving Economists’ Influence
How does economic expertise shape policy debates? Here, I draw on theories of social
problem definition and agenda setting to argue that economists are particularly impor-
tant actors in providing facts that can dramatize social problems, and in turn their role
as providers of facts gives economists leverage to shape the framing of social problems.
Inspired by recent developments in the sociology of ignorance or non-knowledge, I then
argue that economists shape policy through absence as well as presence: when economists
don’t study a particular problem, or don’t study it in a particular way, then public discourse
mirrors that absence. This analysis motivates a further discussion of economists’ regimes of
perceptibility: the combinations of people, ideas, and tools that structure what economists
do (and do not) routinely observe.
Sociologists have long been interested in the process by which a particular aspect of
the world becomes recognized as a “social problem” (Blumer 1971, Gusfield 1984). Hil-
gartner and Bosk (1988) provide a useful “ecological” model of social problems which
highlights both the competition between different problems for public attention, and the
struggle between actors to define problems in particular ways.4 The central question for
researchers following this approach is, “Given the vast universe of possibilities, how do
social forces select particular problem definitions?” (Hilgartner and Bosk 1988: 75) Al-
though they do not focus primarily on experts and the production of knowledge, Hilgartner
and Bosk’s approach offers several important insights for understanding how economic ex-
pertise contributes to social problem definition. First, because public attention is assumed
to be scarce, experts may play a role in selecting which problems come to public attention.
Second, because multiple definitions exist for any particular problem, experts may play a
role in shaping exactly how a social problem comes to be defined. Operatives attempting
4This model has many similarities to research on “agenda setting” in political science (Kingdon 1984,
Baumgartner and Jones 2010) and “framing” in social movements (Benford and Snow 2000). For simplicity,
I focus on Hilgartner and Bosk’s work as exemplary of this broader cultural approach to social problems,
rather than emphasizing the differences between these three approaches.
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to promote a particular social problem framing rely on a combination of emotional perfor-
mances and seemingly objective claims about the nature and extent of a problem. Thus,
“‘cold, hard facts’ and an image of technical expertise become powerful resources for con-
structing authoritative presentations” of social problems (Hilgartner and Bosk 1988: 61).
Since experts produce those “cold, hard facts”, exactly which facts they produce — or
fail to produce — influences the construction of social problems. In the past 10 years, his-
torians and sociologists of science and expertise have become increasingly interested in the
“non-production” side of this thesis, arguing that non-knowledge shapes public discourse
just as readily as knowledge itself. Under the broad heading of agnotology (Proctor and
Schiebinger 2008), scholars have studied the causes and consequences of both strategically
and normatively produced ignorance (Frickel 2014). Strategic ignorance refers to the de-
liberate obfuscation of already produced knowledge by powerful interests, such as when
tobacco companies disseminate misleading claims about the health consequences of smok-
ing or when oil companies create the false perception of an ongoing scientific controversy
about climate change (Oreskes and Conway 2010). Normative ignorance refers to a sub-
tler, and perhaps more pervasive, form of ignorance. Normative ignorance is generated by
disciplinary norms, standard operating procedures, standards of evidence, and so on that
dictate which claims are accepted as authoritative, and which claims are either rejected or
never even advanced (Kleinman and Suryanarayanan 2013). A related stream of research
on “undone science” examines cases where social movement activists pressure experts to
produce knowledge relevant to the movement’s goals, but which would require experts to
alter their standard practices or accept alternative kinds of evidence (Frickel et al. 2010).
What determines the kinds of facts that experts produce and fail to produce? Murphy
(2006: 12) introduced the concept of regimes of perceptibility in the context of debates
over a controversial medical diagnosis, “multiple chemical sensitivity”, to describe “how
arrangements of words, things, practices and people drew out and made perceptible specific
qualities, capacities, and possibilities” and in so doing, pushed other possibilities to the
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background. Similarly, Hecht (2009: 899) extends this concept of regimes of perceptibility
to the context of the link between radon and cancer in African uranium mines, arguing
that “In the domain of occupational exposures . . . instruments, labor relations, scientific
disciplines, expert controversy, and lay knowledge combine to create . . . assemblages of
social and technical things that make certain hazards and health effects visible, and others
invisible.” Just as dosimeters and Geiger counters constitute key links in the regime of
perceptibility for radioactive occupational health hazard, I similarly argue that economic
statistics constitute key links in the regime of perceptibility for economic problems.
To make the concept of a regime of perceptibility slightly more tractable, we can an-
alytically separate out three interrelated elements in the assemblage: people, ideas, and
tools. A regime of perceptibility brings together a community of inquiry (in this case, sub-
fields of economics), with particular theories about how their object of study behaves (i.e.
Keynesian economics), and particular institutionalized devices for analyzing those objects
(i.e. economic statistics; for more on the role of economists’ devices in policymaking see
Hirschman and Berman 2014).5 This regime of perceptibility governs what kinds of trends
are readily observed by shaping both the production and interpretation of data.
Thus, given that policymakers and the public always have limited attention, and given
that the economic world does not present itself unproblematically in some ordered and log-
ical fashion, economic theories and data collection practices shape both which aspects of
economic life we view as important, and the precise ways in which we can detect or fail
to detect changes. For example, since the 1940s, macroeconomists have emphasized the
importance of economic growth, with Gross Domestic Product (GDP) serving as a simple
measure of that growth that is easy for policymakers and the public to track. Yet GDP is
also known to leave out or miscount potentially important aspects of growth, including the
role of unpaid labor (especially unpaid housework performed primarily by women), the
5I use the term “community of inquiry” here in place of the narrower “epistemic community” (Haas 1992)
to emphasize that the community is united by its object of study, rather than a particular set of policy positions.
Subfields of economics contain individuals with wildly divergent policy positions, but who may be relatively
unified in terms of the kinds of data they routinely analyze.
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contribution of the environment, and even the value of government services.6 Similarly, as
I will show, macroeconomists and labor economists in the mid-20th century constructed
regimes of perceptibility that emphasized certain forms of inequality, but made others in-
visible, and thus influenced policy attention by failing to identify the growth of top incomes
in the 1980s–1990s.
6.3 Analytical Strategy
Drawing on the language of the preceding section, we are now in a better position to char-
acterize the argument of the chapter and thus to identify the appropriate strategy for es-
tablishing the claims needed to support it. In the early 2000s, economists identified a new
“stylized fact”: the rise of the 1%. Stylized facts are simple empirical regularities in need
of an explanation, such as trends and simple correlations. The trend of the rise of the
1% had fallen outside of the regimes of perceptibility established by macroeconomists and
labor economists, and in particular, was invisible to the particular policy devices for see-
ing linked to those regimes. How did it come to be that the particular tools employed for
analyzing inequality were incapable of seeing the whole distribution?
To answer this question, I trace the histories of labor economics, macroeconomics, and
the production of official economic statistics in the United States over two rough periods
(1920–1970 and 1970–present). I draw on a variety of sources, including published arti-
cles in prominent academic journals as well as the so-called “gray literature” of conference
publications and edited volumes, as well as archival documents and Congressional Hearing
transcripts. Especially important to the history of the economic statistics are the archives
of the Department of Commerce, including discussions of statistical priorities and feed-
back from end users (including business and academic economists). I use these documents
to show how, in the first period, the acceptance of particular economic theories (Keyne-
6I expand on this argument in Chapter 5.
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sian approaches to macroeconomics and human capital theory in labor economics) shaped
the kinds of data that economists collected and analyzed (national income accounts and
household surveys, respectively), and the stylized facts that economists identified. Other
kinds of data were not entirely excluded, but they were sent to the background, less clearly
connected to major theoretical debates, and thus capable of being ignored. In the second
period, I add to these sources an analysis of public debate around income inequality, and in
particular, an important event in 1992 where top incomes briefly became a subject of politi-
cal contention before receding into the background, incapable of being fully comprehended
by any of the dominant regimes of perceptibility.
6.4 Establishing the Regimes
Before the 1920s, the United States produced none of the macroeconomic statistics we
now take for granted. Data — official or privately produced — on employment, inflation,
income distribution, and growth were largely unavailable throughout the 1800s, and only
became available at the state or local level in the 1890s to 1910s (Stapleford 2009, Card
2011). In the 1920s–1940s, the US began to produce consistent series of national data on
inflation (the Consumer Price Index), unemployment (via the Current Population Survey),
and economic growth (in the National Income and Product Accounts).
In 1920, a group of economists founded the National Bureau of Economic Research
(NBER) with the explicit goal of producing timely, objective data about the economic sys-
tem for use by policymakers, businesses, and academics alike. NBER’s first study (NBER
1921) used newly available income tax data to examine both national income and income
distribution. Somewhat ironically in retrospect, this study focused heavily on top income
earners precisely because only top incomes were well-covered by tax data (see Figure 6.3
for an example of their findings).7 In the 1930s, work on national income was transferred
7In the early 1910s, approximately the top 4% of earners made more than $2000/year and thus paid income
tax (NBER 1921: 113). The income tax did not become a “mass tax” until World War II (Jones 1988).
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Figure 6.3: A 1921 estimate of the income received by the top 5% of income earners based
on tax data (NBER 1921: 116).
from NBER to the Department of Commerce, and distributional issues would take a back-
seat to better, more timely measurement of total national income.
National survey-based statistics began in earnest with efforts to measure prices and
expenditures during World War I (the beginnings of the Consumer Expenditure Survey,
used to calculate the Consumer Price Index; see Stapleford 2009), but did not become
widespread until the 1940s. Survey-based measurement of employment and unemploy-
ment, for example, began late in the Great Depression; for most of the 1930s, there were
no nationally representative data on unemployment. In the post-war period, the Bureau of
Labor Statistics’ unemployment survey was transformed into the modern Current Popula-
tion Survey (CPS) which also began to collect income data.
In the same period that official statistical productions took off, the academic field of
economics was itself transformed. Just as there was little of what we now recognize as eco-
nomic data before the 1900s, there was also little “empirical” work in economics, at least in
the sense of analysis of large-scale datasets. Inspired by the German Historical School, the
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American institutionalists began to produce and analyze such data in the 1900s to 1920s.
Wesley Mitchell was both a central figure in the institutional movement and the founder and
first research director of the NBER. Institutionalists would play an important role in inte-
grating private and public data collection efforts, in part through the influence of Herbert
Hoover who advocated such efforts strongly from his position as Secretary of Commerce
and President (Alchon 1985, Barber 1985, Rutherford 2011). The institutionalists’ direct
influence was relatively short-lived, however. The modern divide of macroeconomics and
microeconomics emerged in the 1930s, alongside the terms themselves. Institutional eco-
nomics faded away in the immediate post-war era, replaced by the synthesis of ever-more
mathematical neoclassical microeconomics and Keynesian macroeconomics (Yonay 1998,
Rutherford 2011). While the institutionalists had been heavily involved in the creation of
official statistics, it would be the Keynesians and neoclassicals who would take charge of
finalizing the regimes of perceptibility built around those data.
In the following sections, I explore in greater detail how macroeconomists and labor
economists came to theorize and measure inequality. Although inequality never acquires a
single iconic statistical representation analogous to GDP for growth or the Consumer Price
Index (CPI) for inflation, macro and labor economists did pay attention to inequality, and
build tools for observing it into their regimes of perceptibility. Macroeconomists focused
on the traditional question of factor shares, and drew on the national accounts to track la-
bor and capital’s relative shares of the total economic pie. Personal income distribution was
outside of the scope of most macroeconomic research. Labor economists, in turn, relied on
survey-based measures to track “gaps” between different kinds of workers, with a special
focus on the gaps between college-educated and less-educated workers, along with contin-
ued interest in race and gender gaps. Personal income distribution was thus an important
topic for labor economics, but understood primarily through the lens of the differential pro-
ductivity of different kinds of workers. Although tax data had formed the basis for early
studies of income distribution, by the 1960s, both macroeconomists and labor economists
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had settled on other devices for observing inequality. The Bureau of Economic Analysis
(BEA) did produce tax data–based statistics on income distribution, but these statistics were
ignored — they were not capable of answering the questions economists were interested
in — and eventually the statistics were defunded.8 Thus, by the 1970s, the two dominant
regimes of perceptibility for income inequality were both theoretically incapable of making
sense of such changes and practically incapable of seeing changes in the top of the income
distribution.
6.4.1 Factor Shares in Macroeconomics
Macroeconomics, as such, did not exist before the 1930s. Macroeconomics as we know it
emerged in the 1930s and 1940s at the meeting point of monetary theory and business cycle
theory. These older theoretical concerns were combined with a new interest in economic
growth, and a variety of new economic theories embodied in mathematical models and
measured through new forms of data, most prominently the national income accounts.9
Here, I focus particularly on how macroeconomics came to largely ignore the personal
distribution of income in favor of continued analysis of labor’s share of national income.
The distribution of income between the three great classes was arguably the central
question of classical political economy (Sandmo 2013). Starting with the writings of the
physiocrats in the mid–18th century, political economists divided the economic system into
roughly three groups: landlords (who earned rents), employers (who earned profits), and
laborers (who earned wages). Quesnay’s (1758) famous tableau economique modeled the
flow of goods (or money) from landowners to agricultural workers to artisans and mer-
chants. Although Adam Smith focused less sharply on questions of distribution, David
Ricardo (1817: 2–3, see also McNulty 1980: 64) went so far as to claim that: “But in
different stages of society, the proportions of the whole produce of the earth which will
8For much of this period, the BEA was known as the Office of Business Economics, and before that the
Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce. For simplicity, I refer to it as the BEA throughout.
9For an extended discussion of the history of macroeconomics and what came before, see Chapter 2.
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be allotted to each of these classes, under the names of rent, profit, and wages, will be
essentially different. . . To determine the laws which regulate this distribution, is the prin-
cipal problem in Political Economy.” Twentieth-century macroeconomics was not nearly
so focused on distributional questions as Ricardo or his 19th-century successors, but when
macroeconomists looked at inequality they did so with a Ricardian lens.
Although Ricardo and his followers theorized about the distribution of income between
the classes — what we now call “factor shares” or “the functional distribution of income”
as opposed to the personal distribution of income — they did so without much recourse to
economic statistics. Estimating the distribution of income between the great classes became
a primary motivation for the construction of national income statistics. This motivation is
visible in the first national income statistics published by the Department of Commerce in
1934. The 1934 estimates were produced in response to a 1932 Senate resolution authored
by Senator Robert M. LaFollette Jr. of Wisconsin.10 LaFollette was an outspoken proponent
of the need for better economic measurement in general. In an interview given in March of
1932, LaFollette connected his push for better measurement of national income to debates
about wage cuts in the Great Depression:
Likewise, with all the talk we have heard from bankers and others about the
need for cutting wages and with all the actual wage-cutting that has taken place,
we are woefully lacking in any adequate wage statistics. Also, while we are
discussing the wages of labor, it is startling that we have no accurate informa-
tion on the wages which capital is taking in the form of net profits from the
point of view of industry as a whole. Furthermore, do you know that we have
never had any official estimate of the total national income of the United States
and the only authoritative information we have to go on is the estimate of an
unofficial agency in 1929?11
LaFollette’s language echoes Ricardo; the “wages of labor” and the profits of capital
are at issue, not the wages of individual laborers or the incomes of particular capitalists.
This focus on factor shares was reflected in the presentation of the 1934 report to the Sen-
10Senate Resolution 220, 72nd Congress.
11“Radio interview between Mr. Charles Ross and Senator Robert M. LaFollette, Jr., over N.B.C., March
15, 1932, 8 p.m.” LaFollette Family Collection, Box I:C557, Library of Congress.
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ate, usually characterized as the first official publication of national income statistics in
the United States.12 To estimate the sum total of income payments, Simon Kuznets (who
led the team that produced the 1934 national income estimates) separated incomes first
into “labor incomes” (wages), “property incomes” (rent), and “entrepreneurial incomes”
(profit) before dividing them into finer subcategories (Kuznets 1934: 2). The first chart in
the report similarly reports incomes broken down by type of payment — rents, interest,
dividends, salaries, wages — operationalizing the three primary divisions of income into
slightly more tractable subdivisions (Kuznets 1934: 15). Interestingly, although the 1934
report did not attempt to estimate the personal distribution of income, Kuznets noted the
importance of such estimates for evaluating total national income data as a measure of well-
being: “Economic welfare cannot be adequately measured, unless the personal distribution
of income is known” (Kuznets 1934: 6). Kuznets’ later work, discussed below, made great
strides in estimating that personal distribution, but such efforts were not integrated into the
production or analysis of national income statistics.
Between the 1934 estimates and the end of World War II, national income statistics
took on a decidedly Keynesian character. In part due to the influence of Keynes himself,
who oversaw the production of the first official national income statistics in the UK in
the early 1940s, national income statistics became increasingly interwoven with macroeco-
nomic theory (Tily 2009). Rather than emphasizing factor shares of income, the national
income accounts would increasingly focus on consumption, investment, and government
production, leading to the famous formula Y = C + I + G (+ NX) (gross national product
equals consumption plus investment plus government spending [plus net exports]).
To the extent that post-war macroeconomists, and national income statisticians, did
care about the distribution of income, they continued to focus on the role of factor shares.
For example, as discussed above, macroeconomist Nicholas Kaldor (1961) identified the
stability of labor’s share of national income as one of six “stylized facts” about macroe-
12This framing ignores an admittedly uninfluential and often-forgotten 1926 report by the Federal Trade
Commission, see Carson 1971 for details.
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conomics that later models would attempt to explain. The influential research program
of Cobb-Douglas regressions looked at the relationship, in the aggregate, between labor’s
productivity and labor’s share of income (McNulty 1980: 180, Biddle 2012). Similarly, the
dominant macroeconomic forecasting models of the 1950s and 1960s included an analy-
sis of labor’s share of national income, but did not include measures of the distribution of
personal income (Metcalf 1969).13 In this sense, data and theory were reinforcing: econo-
metricians and macroeconomists theorized factor shares, which were conveniently already
measured in the national accounts, which in turn had been shaped by macroeconomic the-
orists.
The path from the rise of Keynesianism to the exclusion of personal income data from
macroeconomics was not entirely straightforward. One of the central contributions of
Keynes’ (1936) General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money was the concept of
the “marginal propensity to consume.” Keynes argued that many dynamics, including per-
haps most importantly the “multiplier” that related increases in government spending to
increases in total output, depended on how much consumers would change their spending
in response to receiving an additional dollar of income. If the marginal propensity to con-
sume was high, then a bit of extra income created by government spending would multiply
many times. Conversely, if the propensity was low, then extra government spending would
do little to stimulate the economy. From the very beginning, macroeconomists theorized
that the marginal propensity to consume was a function of personal income — individuals
who made a lot of money were more likely to save additional income, while poorer indi-
viduals would likely spend almost all of it. Such theorizing suggested that the personal
distribution of income might be relevant to Keynesian models, and there were some inves-
tigations along those lines (e.g. Stone and Stone 1938; see Fixler and Johnson 2012: 26
for details). These early efforts revealed small differences between models including and
13Metcalf’s own work represents a partial exception; his dissertation attempted to integrate personal dis-
tribution of income into standard forecasting models. As Metcalf (1969: 657) notes, “The Brookings model,
for instance, limits its consideration of the income distribution to a determination of factor shares. Issues
relating directly to how families or income units are distributed by size of income were never raised.”
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excluding the distribution of income, and macroeconomists largely abandoned the study of
the relationship between personal income distribution and the multiplier (Thomas 1992).14
Between 1930 and 1950, macroeconomics emerged as a fully-fledged field, with dis-
tinctive substantive theoretical concerns formalized in particular mathematical models, es-
timated with data drawn from the national accounts. Inequality was not central to macroe-
conomists’ theorizing, and to the extent that macroeconomists did care about inequality,
they measured it in terms of the classical formulation of labor and capital’s respective
shares of national income. The policy device that macroeconomists relied on to see the
world — national income accounts — did not track personal distribution of income, and
by the 1950s there was so little interest from macroeconomists that when the Commerce
Department attempted to incorporate such measurements into the national accounts frame-
work, the measures went unused. In contrast, labor economists did theorize and measure
the personal distribution of income, but the regimes of perceptibility they constructed to
track distribution ultimately limited their capacity to see changes in top incomes.
6.4.2 Gaps in Labor Economics
Like macroeconomics, labor economics emerged as a recognizable subfield in the first half
of the 20th century. As McNulty (1980: 2) notes, in the early 19th century, less than
15% of American income earners were employees; by 1980, 90% of income earners were
employees. The field of labor economics thus grew as the phenomenon of wage labor
itself became dominant. When a recognizable subfield of labor economics did emerge
in the late 19th and early 20th century, it remained outside of the mainstream. Labor
markets were seen as something other than the idealized competitive market, dominated by
regulations and unions (McNulty 1980). Unsurprisingly, institutionalist economists studied
labor markets extensively in the first half of the 20th century, while neoclassical economists
14Fixler and Johnson (2012) present a recent exception that ultimately supports this claim. For prior studies
on the effect of the personal distribution of income on the marginal propensity to consume, they cite only a
handful of papers from the 1950s.
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largely left the field unexamined. In the 1950s, as the institutionalist movement faded away,
a new generation of neoclassical economists turned their attentions to the problems of labor,
and in particular, the determination of personal incomes.
Neoclassical economists turned the question of the individual wages into a central fo-
cus of labor economics. Why did some people earn more money in the labor market than
others? The answer developed in the 1960s was “human capital”, differential productiv-
ity developed through formal education and on-the-job training. Human capital theories
displaced older approaches that either treated the personal distribution of income as re-
sulting from largely random forces, or from inherited ability (Blaug 1976, Teixeira 2007,
Sandmo 2013). In this section, I trace the history of human capital theory and how it came
to study the personal distribution of income through large-scale surveys focused on mea-
suring wages, work experience, and education. This history points to a deep irony: in the
1920s–1950s, studies of personal income distribution focused on top incomes because there
was good tax data about them. In the 1960s–1990s, studies of personal income distribution
ignored top incomes because there was no good survey data about them.
To understand the rise of human capital theory, we must first trace two earlier devel-
opments: early statistical studies of the personal distribution of income and the marginal
productivity theory of distribution. Although the personal distribution of income was not
a central topic to economics in the 19th and early 20th century, a small body of statistical
work on the subject accumulated. In 1897, Vilfredo Pareto (most famous for the concept of
“Pareto optimality”) identified a statistical pattern in the distribution of incomes now known
as the Pareto distribution, a particular functional form that seemed to match the shape of
the income distribution and in particular its heavy right-tail (see discussion in Champer-
nowne 1952). Future works attempted to estimate the parameters for that distribution, and
others, which best fit the observed distribution of income. For example, Champernowne
(1952: 598) fits a modified Pareto distribution to distribution of income data from the US in
1918, while Rutherford (1955) fits a probit distribution to the log of income. To the extent
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that personal incomes seemed to follow particular statistical patterns, economists sought to
explain those patterns with random or “stochastic” models. For example, Champernowne
(1973)15 and Wold and Whittle (1957) both develop stochastic models of income determi-
nation that reproduce the stylized fact that incomes follow a Pareto distribution. Notably,
this whole style of research eschewed analysis of the characteristics of particular individu-
als, but rather focused on producing a model that matched the observed shape of the whole
distribution.
In the same period that statistical research on the distribution of income took off (1890–
1960), the mainstream of economic theory became increasingly dominated by an approach
to understanding wages and productivity known as the “marginal productivity theory of dis-
tribution” (Pullen 2009). In general, “marginalism” refers to an understanding of economic
decision-making in terms of the “margin” — how much is one more unit of a good worth?
How much more could a business produce if it hired one more worker (or paid for one more
hour of work)? And so on. The marginal revolution dates to the 1870s with nearly simul-
taneous publication of works in England (by Jevons), France (by Walras), and Austria (by
Menger) espousing some form of marginalist analysis (Mirowski 1984). Although these
authors differed dramatically in their methodological approaches and substantive conclu-
sions, their insights were eventually unified into a seemingly coherent school of economics
called marginalism (Blaug 1972, Jaffe 1976).
One of the most important substantive conclusions derived from marginalist analysis
was the marginal productivity theory of distribution, developed by the American economist
John Bates Clark. Clark, writing at the end of the 19th century, used calculus to concep-
tualize the marginal product of labor in terms of its partial derivative (Pullen 2009). In the
context of distribution of personal income, marginal productivity suggests that, assuming a
competitive market economy, an individual’s wage will be a function solely of their produc-
15This book was based on Champernowne’s undergraduate research completed in 1936, updated and re-
published as a book much later and thus reflects this older approach to the question of the distribution of
income.
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tivity. This theoretical link between wages and productivity persists into the present, and
forms the backbone of most neoclassical analysis of wages and labor markets. In macroe-
conomics, such approaches were linked to the Cobb-Douglas regressions discussed in the
previous section. In microeconomics, the marginal productivity theory was transformed
in the mid–20th century with the development of human capital theory. Rather than ex-
plaining the statistical distribution of all incomes in terms of some underlying law, human
capital theories would seek to explain differential productivity between groups of workers
based on their education and work experience.
In 1958, Jacob Mincer published an article based on his doctoral dissertation, titled
“Investment in Human Capital.” This article is widely regarded as kickstarting the human
capital turn in labor economics (McNulty 1980, Teixeira 2007). In it, Mincer explicitly
frames his research against the older, statistical models of personal income distribution:
Economists have long theorized about the nature or causes of inequality in per-
sonal incomes. In contrast, the vigorous development of empirical research in
the field of personal income distribution is of recent origin. Moreover, the em-
phasis of contemporary research has been almost completely shifted from the
study of the causes of inequality to the study of the facts and of their conse-
quences for various aspects of economic activity, particularly consumer behav-
ior. (Mincer 1958: 281)
By “study of the facts”, Mincer refers to the empirical estimation of the distribution
of incomes associated with Pareto and Champernowne. Research on the “consequences
for. . . consumer behavior” includes the short-lived line of research in macroeconomics con-
necting the personal distribution of income to the marginal propensity to consume. Mincer
argued that economists needed to focus more attention on the causes of the distribution of
income, and to connect such research to the paradigm of rational choice and marginal pro-
ductivity. In other words, Mincer argued that economics could understand the distribution
of income as a consequence of the choices individuals make about how to invest in their
own productivity, especially by seeking formal education or on-the-job training. In a 1997
retrospective, Mincer also connected the rise of human capital theory to the inability of
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1950s macroeconomics to adequately account for the sources of economic growth (Mincer
1997, quoted in Teixeira 2007: 17).
Soon, Mincer was joined by Theodore Schultz and Gary Becker in leading the charge
for human capital theory. In 1962, they produced a special issue of Journal of Political
Economy, which brought human capital theory squarely into the limelight.16 Blaug (1976:
827) documented the dramatic takeoff of human capital theory studies in the 1960s and
1970s, finding 800 articles on human capital theory published by 1966, and 2000 articles
by 1976. Blaug characterized the dominant form of research in the human capital approach
in terms of its exploration of the “earnings function”:
The [human capital research] program adds up to an almost total explanation
of the determinants of earnings from employment, predicting declining invest-
ment in human-capital with increasing age, and hence lifetime earnings profiles
that are concave from below. No wonder the bulk of empirical work inspired
by the human-capital framework has taken the form of regressing the earnings
of individuals on such variables as native ability, family background, place of
residence, years of schooling, years of work experience, occupational status,
and the like-the so-called “earnings function.” (Blaug 1976: 832)
Several important observations follow for our story. First, human capital theory was
interested in earnings or wages, not in all sources of income. Second, human capital re-
search was interested in explaining variation in individual earnings in terms of a small
set of important covariates, including especially education. Third, the human capital ap-
proach virtually invented the idea of “earnings regressions.” As strange as it may seem in
retrospect, before the 1960s, economists did not run — and were largely not capable of run-
ning — regression models predicting earnings with a set of individual covariates. In part,
economists avoided earnings regressions because the variations in individual earnings were
not seen as an important theoretical topic (as opposed to, say, the aggregate labor share).
But economists were also limited by the relative paucity of data. Fortunately, just as the
16There is a bit of a priority dispute over which of Mincer and Schultz should receive more credit for human
capital theory. Some of Schultz’s work in the 1950s makes similar conceptual moves to Mincer’s dissertation
(e.g. Schultz 1950). That said, commenters agree that the 1962 special issue marked the widespread takeoff
of the approach. I thank Beth Berman for drawing my attention to Schultz’s early work.
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human capital revolution was underway in economic theory, the microdata revolution was
taking place in official statistics.
The rise of the large-scale representative survey is a relatively recent phenomenon (Igo
2007). The first major representative surveys took place during the Great Depression,
such as the famous Gallup Poll predicting Roosevelt’s 1936 electoral victory over Lan-
don. The technique expanded dramatically in the 1940s, including the 1940 launch of
the “Monthly Report of Unemployment”, which became the influential Current Population
Survey in 1948 (Bureau of Labor Statistics 1984: 8). The CPS, along with a handful of
other large-scale, government-funded, representative surveys like the Panel Study on In-
come Dynamics (PSID, launched in 1968), would become the tools of choice for labor
economists interested in understanding not just the overall shape of the income distribu-
tion, but also the covariates that predicted income (age, education, gender, and race). The
availability of individual-level “microdata” contributed to the shift in the field of labor from
studies of the demand for labor (firms) to studies of the supply of labor (individual labor-
ers), and especially to the success of human capital theory and its earnings regressions.
According to Stafford (1986: 388), in the 1970s, “about two-thirds of labor articles in ma-
jor journals were on the broad subjects of labor supply and wage determination”, and by
the early 1980s, about two-thirds of empirical labor economics articles in top journals used
individual-level microdata, and half of those drew on just three surveys (CPS, PSID and
the National Longitudinal Survey) (Stafford 1986: 395).
Surveys fit the research program of human capital theory nicely. Surveys were relatively
less effective than tax data at capturing financial income and profits, but were relatively
good at measuring earnings from labor. And large-scale demographic surveys like the
CPS had the significant advantage of including all the covariates a researcher could want,
especially education variables. As human capital theory increased in influence, its interests
became even better reflected in the data collection practices of government surveys:
Prior to the advent of human capital models of lifetime earnings, most sets
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of microdata did not have much information on work histories of individuals.
Early work on earnings functions was commonly based on years of potential
labor market experience, defined in terms of age and years of formal schooling.
Because the theory emphasized the importance of on-the-job training through
various types of job market experience, new and on-going data collection ef-
forts obtained extensive information on job market experience. Variables such
as years of full time experience, years of part time experience, and years in mil-
itary service became widely available in cross-sectional data. (Stafford 1986:
398)
Conversely, because advances in survey-based microdata were driven by pressure from
labor economists, and labor economists did not particularly care about non-wage income,
improving measurement of such income was not a priority. Similarly, labor economists in-
terested in the returns to a college degree or on-the-job training were satisfied with surveys
that captured the middle 90% of the population well at the expense of known problems with
the reporting of income at both the top and bottom of the distribution. Top incomes were
especially poorly captured due to the problem of top coding. Thus, for researchers relying
on the CPS, incomes at or above the 97% (approximately) were simply unobservable, and
researchers either ignored these incomes or made static imputations about their size (i.e.
assuming that there was no trend in top incomes, as in Katz and Autor 1999: 1471).
By the late 1970s, then, the modern regime of perceptibility for labor economics had
come together. Routinely conducted, large-scale, government-led surveys provided individual-
level microdata which provided good measurements of labor earnings and theoretically im-
portant covariates, but poor coverage of top incomes. These data were analyzed with the
goal of understanding how individuals chose to invest in education and job training over the
life course, and to measure the returns to a college degree, along with other predictors of
individual earnings.17 That surveys were technically incapable of measuring top incomes
was simply not seen as a pressing problem.
17These data were also well-suited to other questions of policy concern, including those asked by sociolo-
gists studying income inequality, such as measuring racial and gender gaps. See discussion below.
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6.4.3 From First Priority to Orphan Estimates
Contemporary discussions of the microdata revolution in empirical economics contrast mi-
crodata to older, aggregate statistics, including the national income accounts. Historically,
the situation is a bit messier. As discussed in this section, during the 1950s to 1970s, gov-
ernment statisticians worked hard to integrate microdata and the national accounts in order
to produce comprehensive statistics on the distribution of income that would be more use-
ful than either on their own. These statistics were considered the number one statistical
priority by economists in government in the 1940s. Yet, when the BEA began to publish
such data in the 1950s, they were barely noticed. When funds to update and maintain the
data could not be secured, the BEA ended the estimates, again, to little fanfare. What
happened? This section traces one possible way that the personal distribution of income
could have been incorporated into prominent policy devices in a way that would have made
changes in top incomes more visible, and connects the previous discussions of theoretical
trends in macroeconomics and labor economics to the failure of this incorporation.
Following World War II, Congress’s newly established Joint Committee on the Eco-
nomic Report (later renamed the Joint Economic Committee, or JEC) laid out a series of
“statistical gaps” that federal statistical agencies were charged with filling. Number one
on this list was information on the personal distribution of income (JEC 1949: 86). In the
1950s, the BEA turned its resources to this task. In 1953, the BEA published estimates
for the distribution of income in the United States from 1944–1950 (see Figure 6.4 for a
graphical presentation of the 1950 estimate).18 By this time, national income data were
published quarterly, and each of these quarterly reports received news coverage, much as
they still do today. In contrast, of the 71 stories that referenced the “Office of Business
Economics” in the New York Times in 1953 and 1954, just one mentioned the income dis-
tribution study. The story, “Family Income Up $850 in Six Years”, emphasized the gains in
18Office of Business Economics. 1953. Size Distributions of Income in the US 1944–1950.
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Figure 6.4: A graphical representation of the distribution of pre-tax income in the United
States in 1950 (BEA 1953: 4).
average income, discussing the distribution of income in just a few sentences at the end.19
The BEA report itself argued for the importance of distribution data in “market analysis”,
with little mention of academic or policy implications.
Later efforts by the BEA to produce data on the distribution of income would meet
with similarly little interest, at least publicly. The BEA produced annual estimates of in-
come distribution from 1955 to 1964, each updating the series to approximately two years
prior (i.e. the 1964 report covered up to the year 1962).20 The BEA sought funds from
Congress to update the series, and better integrate survey data from the Census and Fed-
eral Reserve, but the funds were not forthcoming. Despite being deemed the most accurate
and comprehensive available measurements of the distribution of income by a report to the
JEC (Schultz 1964), and despite personal income distribution having been the number one
statistical priority as recently as 1949, Congress denied a request for $60,000 per year to
19New York Times, 1953, October 12.
20See, e.g., Survey of Current Business, March 1955 and Survey of Current Business, March 1964.
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fund four permanent positions dedicated to the income distribution data. The BEA tried
to link its research to the newly prominent “war on poverty”, but failed to sway skeptical
representatives of the need for the data.21 The BEA would have been hard-pressed to point
to massive interest from outside; for example, the New York Times makes no mention of
the BEA’s 1963 or 1964 publications estimating the distribution of income. The series then
stopped abruptly.
In 1974, the BEA once more restarted its work on income distribution. The publica-
tion included estimates through 1971. Unlike the more recent Piketty and Saez data, the
BEA’s estimates included some sociodemographic variables, as they combined data from
the Current Population Survey alongside tax data and other sources (Radner and Hinrichs
1974). Thus, in some sense, these data could have been useful to labor economists inter-
ested in “gap research”. It is difficult to speculate exactly why labor economists did not
draw on these data, but we can see why their priorities were already better served with the
widely available survey data – the BEA had a few demographic covariates, but not detailed
work histories, and the BEA’s major work was to reconcile survey-based measures of in-
come with the national accounts’ particular definition of income. But labor economists,
interested primarily in earnings and not total income, would have little to gain from these
reconciled measurements. Once again, the BEA’s estimates received little to no public reac-
21Congressional Hearing Transcripts, Budget Hearings for the Department of Commerce, 1965. In a 50
year retrospective on the BEA’s monthly publication, the Survey of Current Business, Lebergott (1971: 117)
made a similar argument connecting the war on poverty to the need for good income distribution data:
In the early sixties the Nation’s concern with poverty began escalating. Publicists offered
explanation after expostulation, Congress passed program after program. And OBE stopped
publishing the only adjusted, and the most reliable, estimates of the U.S. income distribution.
Now these data — indeed, any good data — may have been irrelevant either to public concern
or to policy choice. But the flow of references to what ‘official’ income distribution figures
show continues unabated. Hence it would seem desirable once again to have income estimates
that allow for known limitations of the field survey and IRS data. (The adjustment procedure
tended to reduce the proportion of families that were reported as, but were not actually, low
income.) One hopes that the tiny amount of expenditure and the mild extent of interagency
cooperation required to reinstitute the series on a solid basis will be forthcoming during the
next fifty years.
In spite of Lebergott’s optimism, such expenditure has not been forthcoming.
183
tion (e.g. no mention in the Times). The 1974 estimates were not repeated in the following
year, and the BEA has not published estimates of the distribution of income since.
By the end of the 1970s, the Federal Government had flirted with producing income
distribution estimates compatible with the National Income and Product Accounts. These
efforts met with little interest from scholars and the public, and were discontinued. What
remained were survey-based measures derived from the Census’s Current Population Sur-
vey, and similar surveys conducted by the Bureau of Labor Statistics and the Federal Re-
serve to measure prices and consumption. These surveys captured the bulk of income —
although with some recognized problems of underreporting at the top and bottom22 — and
they were ideally suited to the research agendas of those interested in sociodemographic
forms of inequality rather than characterizing the distribution as a whole. These statistics
did not, however, accurately measure all forms of income (such as capital gains), and they
suffered from the problem of top-coding, thus making them largely incapable of tracking
movements at the top of the income distribution. In terms of data, economic growth and
income inequality were unlinked — no dataset tracked both in comparable ways. This dis-
connect in the data used to study inequality and growth came just as a thirty-year span of
decreasing inequality would itself come to an end.
6.5 The Stylized Facts of Inequality
Having traced the construction of two disjoint regimes of perceptibility for inequality, we
are now better positioned to understand how economists knew what they knew about in-
equality in the 1980s–1990s, and how they were capable of missing new trends in top
incomes.
In the 1980s and 1990s, labor economists both noticed and attempted to explain in-
22The BEA argued before Congress that the Census surveys only captured about 90% of all income, due to
problems of underreporting, top-coding, and some categories that were simply not measured. Congressional
Hearing Transcripts, Budget Hearings for the Department of Commerce, 1965.
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creases in inequality in the United States. The dominant characterization of this increase
focused on the growing gap between the wages of college-educated and non-college edu-
cated workers. One influential, and reasonably representative example is Bound and John-
son (1992). Bound and Johnson document the stagnation of average wages in the 1980s,
as well as dramatic shifts in the relative wages of individuals. Examining CPS data, Bound
and Johnson measure changes in the relative wages of individuals based on years of work
experience, education, and sex. In the end, they conclude that “skill-biased technological
change” has driven major increases in the wage gap between college and non-college ed-
ucated workers. The emphasis here, as in much of the literature, is specifically on wage
inequality, which is understood as an indicator of productivity (following from the marginal
productivity theory of distribution and human capital theory).
Later work in the 1990s would debate the relative influence of international trade and
globalization as alternatives to technological change as explanations for the observed gaps,
as well as the persistence of race and gender gaps (see Card and DiNardo 2002 for one sum-
mary of the literature).23 While labor economists in the 1990s recognized the increasing
right skew in the income distribution, they did not link it specifically to the growth of in-
comes at the very top, nor did they marshal data capable of explaining — or even seeing —
movement at the very top. For labor economists (and sociologists) interested in inequality,
the growth of top incomes was almost invisible.
The focus of inequality researchers on “gaps” is mirrored in popular coverage of in-
equality during the 1980s–1990s. McCall (2013: 53–95) analyzes news coverage of in-
equality during this period and finds it to be very fragmented. Explicit discussions of
economic inequality or the overall distribution of income are largely absent. Instead, like
labor economists, public discourse focused in earnings disparities and education:
[The] earliest debates about income inequality seeped into the media as re-
23Similarly, work by sociologists interested in inequality would focus on persistent wage gaps. Leicht
(2008) summarizes sociological research on inequality in the 1990s as “dominated by studies of racial and
gender gaps”, in contrast with economists’ focus on education, technology, and trade. See Morris and Western
(1999) for an excellent example that, like much work by economists, relies primarily on the CPS.
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searchers began to notice the increase in the 1980s. Because earnings are the
main component of income, and earnings disparities appeared to be rising in
the 1980s, researchers focused at the outset more on the widening disparity
in hourly earnings between high-skilled and low-skilled workers in the labor
market than on disparities in incomes between rich and poor families. (McCall
2013: 59, emphasis in the original)
McCall did not find an increase in discussions of inequality in the popular press as
inequality itself increased throughout the 1980s–2000s. Rather, the nature of the discussion
shifted. McCall (2013: 59) finds that inequality debates shift from a focus on earnings and
the labor market to a focus on incomes and tax policy: “Remarkably, the role of tax policies
in affecting top incomes did not emerge as a focal part of the academic story until the early
2000s, when new ‘facts’ about income inequality became available.” In other words, at
least in this case, popular discussion followed from the trends in academic research. In
the 1980s–1990s, labor economists identified earnings disparities as the novel stylized fact
of interest, and public discourse focused on issues like the minimum wage, trade, and
education. In the 2000s, as we will see, the identification of the stylized fact of increasing
top income inequality would alter the landscape of public debate about inequality.
Macroeconomists, for their part, mostly ignored the personal distribution of income
in favor of continued debate about the stability of labor’s share of national income. One
partial exception was the continued debate over the Kuznets’ curve in development eco-
nomics. In his 1954 presidential address to the American Economics Association, Simon
Kuznets (1955) theorized an upside-down U-shaped relationship between economic growth
and income inequality. As countries developed, inequality would first increase (as work-
ers moved from the rural to urban sectors) and then decrease (as various forces pushed up
wages). Kuznets relied on sketchy data from the late 19th and early 20th century in the US
and UK, which roughly followed this pattern. In the 1970s, consensus held that Kuznets’
curve was real, although better longitudinal data produced in the 1980s and 1990s troubled
this consensus. The early acceptance of Kuznets’ hypothesis ironically led researchers to
argue that increasing inequality in development would resolve itself as development pro-
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ceeded, and thus incentivized researchers to not focus much on inequality (see Moran 2005
for a detailed history). Most of the debate about the curve itself concerned inequality in
developing countries (not the US), and ultimately relied on survey-based measurements of
inequality, which were still incapable of seeing top inequality.
Those macroeconomists who were more squarely focused on the United States largely
ignored inequality in favor of discussions of the big three macroeconomic variables: growth,
inflation, and unemployment. Dominant macroeconomics textbooks, for example, included
lengthy discussion of labor and capital’s share of income, but no discussion of income in-
equality. Mankiw’s (2003, 5th edition) intermediate textbook is an influential exemplar:
the entire book contains just one reference to economic inequality, and it is in the context
of unemployment (Mankiw 2003: 173). Labor’s share, on the other hand, is discussed and
even modeled prominently in the contexts of the Cobb-Douglas production function (2003:
72–73) and growth accounting models (Mankiw 2003: 229–231). Labor’s share was also a
continued object of research, from debates about how best to measure it (Krueger 1999) to
empirical observations of its decline starting in the 1980s (Gordon 1988).
Thus, the stylized facts of inequality in the 1980s and 1990s included an impressive and
important list of findings: the widening gulf between highly educated and less educated
workers, the persistence of race and gender gaps, and the overall decline in labor’s share of
national income. But, in general, the two largest groups of economists potentially interested
in income inequality were incapable of seeing, and theoretically disinclined to look for,
changes in top incomes.
6.5.1 Krugman and the 1992 Presidential Election
Although most sociologists and economists conceptualized and analyzed inequality in ways
that left the growth of top incomes of the 1% invisible, there were a few notable exceptions.
Economists specifically interested in taxation followed more closely the IRS’s Statistics of
Income, and the various tax models used by the Federal Government to produce revenue es-
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timates. Drawing on these data, Feenberg and Poterba (1993) noted the growth of incomes
of the top 0.25%. This paper appears to have attracted some notice from fellow tax schol-
ars, and from Piketty and Saez who cite the paper as a precursor, but had little resonance
in the broader economics literature. Feenberg and Poterba would repeat their argument
that inequality scholars failed to pay sufficient attention to the very top incomes through
the 1990s, and explicitly noted the problem of top-coded survey data as an impediment to
studies of this income group (Feenberg and Poterba 2000).
More surprising than this academic outlier is Paul Krugman’s highly public, and highly
political, 1992 calculation of the income gains of the top 1%. In the early 1990s, Paul Krug-
man was a noted international trade theorist in the process of transitioning to his current
status as one of economics’ leading public intellectuals. His first major book for popular
audiences, The Age of Diminished Expectations, was published in 1990 and included a very
short chapter on income distribution, noting the growing wage gap between more and less
educated workers, and a brief analysis of the divergence between the incomes of the top
10% (Krugman 1990: 19–25). In an interview, Krugman (1998) later noted that his editors
objected to this chapter’s inclusion: “For complicated reasons, that book was initially a
Washington Post project. And my editors at the Post tried to pressure me into taking the
income distribution chapter out, saying that nobody cared about that issue.”
Two years later, Krugman published a more surprising finding. Based on a Congres-
sional Budget Office (CBO) publication with information derived from tax data, Krugman
argued that between 1977 and 1989, 60% of the income gained by the country went to
the top 1% of income earners. This finding was popularized in the New York Times, criti-
cized by the Wall St. Journal and the Bush Treasury Department, and eventually featured in
stump speeches by then presidential candidate Bill Clinton. The CBO eventually responded
to the critiques with a study of its own, supporting Krugman’s overall finding, with a caveat
that the number dropped a bit when adjusted for the size of families (a common practice at
the CBO, though not common in many other income datasets). One Times summary of the
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debate is particularly revealing:
One reason that the issue remained relatively invisible for so long – in spite
of broad agreement among academic economists that income and wealth have
grown more unequal – is that statistics on distribution are among the mushiest
and murkiest in economics. There are literally dozens of ways to slice and
dice the data, not to mention hundreds of different data series. Confronted by
Republican legislators after Governor Clinton started peppering his speeches
with the statistic on the top 1 percent, the budget office was called upon to
assess the Krugman calculation. Several weeks later, it issued a report that
gave a number of alternate measures of the gains by the top 1 percent. Every
measure showed that the top 1 percent of families reaped an outsized share of
the gains. By one calculation 70 percent of the rise in average after-tax family
income went to the top 1 percent, rather than the 60 percent figure that Mr.
Krugman had initially estimated and that Governor Clinton has been using.24
[Emphasis added.]
Krugman’s 1992 calculation represents a significant challenge to the initial premise of
this paper — that the growth of the top 1% was a surprising finding in the early 2000s.
Clearly, there was some political awareness in 1992 that the incomes of the top 1% had
grown dramatically, and thus the Piketty and Saez findings could not be a complete surprise.
Yet, despite the political salience of Krugman’s calculation during the 1992 election, the
stylized fact that the top 1% had captured most of the income gains of the 1980s and
grown to an historically unprecedented level did not take hold. Without a recognized place
among academics, or even a tight connection to a particular statistical agency or dataset, it
became just one more economic fact bandied about in a presidential election. One piece
of evidence for this claim is Krugman’s own later academic work. In 1995, Krugman
published a foray into the debates about the role of trade in increasing inequality.25 This
paper makes no mention of the growth of the top 1%, instead sticking to the mainstream
academic debate about the increasing education wage gap. Similarly, a broader sample
of articles from JStor’s database suggests a large increase in discussions of the top 1%
in academic publications about income inequality in the 2000s as compared to the late
24“Richest Getting Richer Now Top Political Issue.” New York Times. 1992. May 11.
25“Growing World Trade: Causes and Consequences.” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 1:327–377.
Krugman’s primary conclusion is that increased world trade is not responsible for growing income inequality.
189
19
76
19
79
19
82
19
85
19
88
19
91
19
94
19
97
20
00
20
03
20
06
20
09
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
4.5
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
of
A
rt
ic
le
s
M
en
tio
ni
ng
To
p
1%
,1
97
3-
20
12
Figure 6.5: Three-year moving average of the percentage of all research articles in JStor’s
Data For Researchers database that mention “income inequality” or “income distribution”
and also “top 1%”, “top one percent” or “top 1 percent” from 1973–2012. The data are
noisy — not every reference to the “top 1%” will refer to the growth of top incomes — but
suggestive of a slight, temporary increase in 1992 followed by a large increase post-2000.
1990s (see Figure 6.5). Finally, Krugman’s calculation also focused on a very narrow time-
window — 1977–1989, corresponding to the period covered by the CBO data. It would
be Piketty and Saez who would go back to the IRS data at the source of the CBO model
and construct a series that put contemporary top incomes into a much longer historical
perspective.
6.5.2 Rediscovering the 1%
In 2001, Piketty and Saez (in this section abbreviated as P&S) published a working paper
containing estimates of the share of income accruing to the top 5% and 1% of income earn-
ers in the United States from 1913 to 1998. Their working paper relied heavily on tax data,
combined with national income accounts data to determine some of the relevant denomina-
tors (e.g. total wage income). Their estimates differed from Feenberg and Poterba (1993,
2000) in two interesting respects. First, P&S estimate a consistent series back to 1913, sev-
eral decades earlier than Feenberg and Poterba. Second, in order to extend their series back
190
further, P&S use a slightly more complicated method to generate their denominators, in
order to take into account the much smaller percentage of income that was reported on tax
returns in earlier periods. All told, P&S produce a dataset capable of making the provoca-
tive claim that the share of income accruing to the top 1% had returned to levels not seen
since the Great Depression. Additionally, Piketty and Saez note that the top 1% increas-
ingly derived their incomes from wages and salary, and not simply from capital gains, thus
rejecting a sharp division between their work on overall income inequality and the work of
labor economists focused solely on wage income.
It is hard to say why Piketty and Saez’s research had such a large academic and political
impact.26 That their data series extended back to the Great Depression may have played a
large role in capturing attention. Additionally, the early 2000s saw researchers interested
in more conventional wage inequality (the labor economists above) casting about for new
explanations. Katz and Autor’s (1999) review of the literature on changes in inequality
in the United States noted some evidence that the top incomes had grown dramatically
(even as all of their own quantitative evidence, relying on the CPS, analyzed only incomes
up to the 97th percentile). Specifically, Katz and Autor (1999: 1468) cited growing evi-
dence on the tremendous growth of CEO and athlete pay (e.g. Hall and Liebman 1998).
It is possible that Piketty and Saez’s work caught on academically because it helped make
sense of increasing evidence from the labor economics literature that something interesting
was happening at the top of the income distribution which had not previously been fully
measured, and which did not easily fit within the framework of human capital theory.
Piketty and Saez also benefitted from early and positive attention from the media.27
Specifically, Paul Krugman, by then a renowned columnist at the New York Times, wrote up
26As of August, 2014, the main paper (published in working paper form in 2001, in the Quarterly Journal
of Economics in 2003, and updated since) has 1825 citations on Google Scholar.
27One critic, Alan Reynolds (2007: 2), claimed: “After 35 years of writing on economic issues, I do not
recall any other private and unofficial estimates that were as widely and uncritically repeated as the Piketty-
Saez estimates on income shares of the top 1 percent. . . . Searching Google for “Emmanuel Saez” in early
October turned up 51,700 entries, including 871 that also involved the New York Times. Similar searches
yielded 814 joint references to Saez and the Washington Post, 568 for the Wall Street Journal, 375 for the
Financial Times, and 319 for USA Today.”
191
an extensive magazine piece drawing heavily on their research. In “For Richer”, Krugman
(2002) argued that the US had entered a “new Gilded Age.” Krugman rehearsed 15 years
of CPS-based studies that showed increases in income in the top 5%, starting in the late
1970s.28 But Krugman then went on to claim that studies that relied on categories as big as
the top 10% or 5% missed the big change in the new Gilded Age:
Most of the gains in the share of the top 10 percent of taxpayers over the past
30 years were actually gains to the top 1 percent, rather than the next 9 percent.
In 1998 the top 1 percent started at $230,000. In turn, 60 percent of the gains of
that top 1 percent went to the top 0.1 percent, those with incomes of more than
$790,000. And almost half of those gains went to a mere 13,000 taxpayers, the
top 0.01 percent, who had an income of at least $3.6 million and an average
income of $17 million. (Krugman 2002)
Krugman continued on to say that the three main arguments (globalization, skill-biased
technological change, and the so-called “superstar” hypothesis) economists had generated
to try to understand growing income inequality in the 1980s–1990s seemed inadequate in
the face of the Piketty and Saez data:
Globalization can explain part of the relative decline in blue-collar wages, but
it can’t explain the 2,500 percent rise in C.E.O. incomes. Technology may ex-
plain why the salary premium associated with a college education has risen, but
it’s hard to match up with the huge increase in inequality among the college-
educated, with little progress for many but gigantic gains at the top. The super-
star theory works for Jay Leno, but not for the thousands of people who have
become awesomely rich without going on TV. (Krugman 2002)
Instead, economists would need to bring in social and political factors, like social
norms, to make sense in the massive increases in executive pay that helped to drive the
incomes of the 1%. Other economists, sociologists, and political scientists would build off
of P&S’s findings to make claims for the importance of politics (Hacker and Pierson 2010),
financialization (Kaplan and Rauh 2007), the rise of agency theory, the death of unions, and
more. And Piketty (2014) himself would write a bestselling work connecting the growth
28Perhaps surprisingly, Krugman makes no mention of his own earlier 1992 calculations on the growth of
the top 1%, showing just how tangential they had been to the larger conversation on inequality in this period.
192
of top incomes to newly-discovered “fundamental laws of capitalism” relating the returns
on capital, the rate of economic growth, and concentration of income at the very top. The
stylized fact of the growth of the top 1% had entered into academic debates in force and
gave force to new and different theories.
Not all economists bought into the P&S findings uncritically. Conservative think tanks
continued their war on all findings of increased income inequality, much as they contested
Krugman’s 1992 calculation. Reynolds (2007) published an influential critique in the Cato
Institute’s journal Policy Analysis. Reynolds claimed that P&S dramatically overstated the
rise of the top 1% by misusing tax data, and that their estimates were very inconsistent with
the story told by survey data.29 P&S show a change in recorded, taxable income accruing
to the top 1%, but Reynolds argues that this observation is consistent with a shift in how
the 1% earned their money rather than the total amount the top 1% earned: Top-earners
responded to changes in the tax law (specifically, lowering the top marginal tax rates), by
shifting income from corporate tax filings to individual tax filings. By relying solely on
pre-tax income, P&S failed to capture the government benefits paid out to some of the
bottom 90%, and thus underestimated the bottom at the same time as they overestimated
the top. Reynolds summarized his findings:
[S]tudies based on tax return data provide highly misleading comparisons of
changes to the U.S. income distribution because of dramatic changes in tax
rules and tax reporting in recent decades. Aside from stock option windfalls
during the late–1990s stock-market boom, there is little evidence of a signifi-
cant or sustained increase in the inequality of U.S. incomes, wages, consump-
tion, or wealth over the past 20 years. Reynolds (2007: 1)
P&S responded to Reynolds point-by-point (Piketty and Saez 2006), noting that the
discrepancies between their findings and survey-based measures are completely logical,
and in fact, the main novelty of their study:
The reason for the discrepancy is that the Census Bureau estimates are based
29“If the Piketty and Saez estimates actually demonstrated a continuous and credible upward trend toward
greater inequality since the late-1980s, all other estimates of income distribution would have to be wrong —
including those of the Census Bureau, the CBO, and the Federal Reserve Board.” (Reynolds 2007: 18)
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on survey data which are not suitable to study high incomes because of small
sample size and top coding of very high incomes. In contrast, tax return data
provide a very accurate picture of reported incomes at the top. Our key con-
tribution was precisely to use those tax data to construct better inequality esti-
mates.
My point here is not to claim that P&S are right and Reynolds is wrong, or vice versa.
Rather, I simply want to document just how much was still up in the air in the mid-2000s
(and indeed, even now) in terms of the measurement of inequality. Although extensive de-
bates still exist about the measurement of unemployment, inflation, and economic growth,
the existence of widely accepted, bureaucratically produced, official, and timely measures
institutionalized in policy devices forestalls many of the sorts of challenges present in
both the 1990s “Krugman calculation” debate and in the critical reception of P&S.30 Ba-
sic definitional issues — what kinds of income should be studied (wage, capital gains,
non-monetary remuneration, before tax or after tax and transfer, etc.), the units of analysis
(families, households, individuals, “tax units”), and the relevant metrics for comparison
(top 1% or .1% income shares, 90/50 or 90/10 ratios, Gini coefficients) — are all still live
controversies in the study of income inequality. Inequality is not unknown, nor unknow-
able. But even now, it remains knowable at some remove, an ill-defined structural fact
about the US political economy to be debated and pondered, not an immediately relevant
indicator of overall economic well-being or policy success.
6.6 Discussion
6.6.1 Modeling Economic Influence
What can the rediscovery of the 1% teach us about the political power of economic experts?
Here, I draw on the case to produce a simplified model of policy-relevant economic knowl-
30Note that the U.S. government still does not produce income distribution data similar to the Piketty and
Saez data. For example, a recent controversial Congressional Research Service report (Hungerford 2012) on
the relationship between top tax rates and economic growth relied on P&S’s data as the best existing data on
top incomes.
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edge claims focusing on the interactions of narrow observational claims, stylized facts, and
full-blown causal or explanatory theories. I make two key interventions. First, I argue
that all three kinds of economic knowledge claims may independently enter into the policy
process and public debates. As in the case of the 1%, this model recognizes the capacity
for stylized fact claims to enter into policymaking even in the absence of elaborated causal
theories.31 Second, I argue that dominant causal theories from previous eras shape contem-
porary economic regimes of perceptibility, which in turn limit the range of data that may
be observed, and shapes the interpretation of those data.
The model here relies on complicating the distinction between observation statements
and causal theories through further analysis of the concept of stylized facts. A long tra-
dition in the history and philosophy of science has complicated the clean divide between
observations and theories, perhaps most famously in Kuhn’s (1969) argument that data are
“theory-laden”. More recently, and concretely, Edwards (2010) has shown how modern cli-
mate data could not exist in the absence of theoretical models. Inspired by this research, I
argue that economic knowledge claims can usefully be divided into three broad ideal types:
1. Narrow observational statements that are clearly bounded in time and place and
linked to specific data. Example: “Real gross domestic product – the output of goods
and services produced by labor and property located in the United States – increased
at an annual rate of 4.2 percent in the second quarter of 2014.”32
2. The identification of simple empirical regularities in need of explanation, including
trends, rates of incidence, and bivariate associations. In economics, such regularities
are often explicitly named as stylized facts, following the usage pioneered by Kaldor
(1961) who identified a collection of macroeconomic trends and argued that further
research in macroeconomics should attempt to explain those broad trends, rather
than focus on noisy data. Perhaps the most famous of these “Kaldor facts” is the
claim that labor’s share of national income remains roughly constant over time (a
claim to which we will return in the discussion of macroeconomists’ approaches to
inequality). Similarly, the claim that top incomes increased dramatically constitutes
a stylized fact (a trend abstracted from noisy data).
31Conversely, this model also recognizes the possibility that theories might become influential even in the
absence of compelling support from observational data.
32http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/gdp/gdpnewsrelease.htm, ac-
cessed August 30, 2014.
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3. Causal theories or explanatory models. While stylized facts abstract noisy data into
clean trends, causal theories try to explain why the trends characterized by stylized
facts exist. Stylized facts, in this sense, are the explananda for causal theories,
and serve as analogs to “phenomena” in the natural sciences (cf. Hacking 1983).
That is, while physicists might come up with theories to explain a newly observed
phenomenon (a predictable reaction of the physical world to a particular interven-
tion), economists come up with theories to explain relatively stable trends and rates
identified as stylized facts. Families of causal theories constitute the broad policy
paradigms we know and love — Keynesianism, monetarism, human capital theory,
and so on.
Within the confines of the academic field, the relationship between these three kinds
of knowledge claims is seemingly transparent. Narrow observation statements accumulate
and are interpreted and processed into cleaner stylized facts. These stylized facts then serve
as the explananda for causal theories. This process is depicted in Figure 6.6. In mainstream
American economics, at least since the 1930s, causal theories usually take the form of
explicit mathematical models (Weintraub 2002). Much as climate modelers seek to repro-
duce key features of the observed temperature record in their simulations (Edwards 2010),
economic modelers try to reproduce stylized facts by varying their assumptions about, e.g.,
frictions in various markets, information asymmetries, and so on. Progress happens through
the identification of new stylized facts, the construction of better explanatory models, and
eventually, through the accumulation of new narrow observations which seem to deviate
from our expectations (“anomalies” in Kuhnian terms) and which eventually may lead to
whole new families of theories. In this sense, the rediscovery of the 1% fits nicely: labor
economists observed irregularities in executive pay and other top earners, new data were
analyzed to reveal a previously unspotted trend in top incomes, and this trend motivated
new theories emphasizing political institutions in place of human capital.
These three kinds of knowledge claims do not remain confined to the academic field,
however. All three may independently enter into the policy process or public discourse
in influential ways (as depicted in Figure 6.7). Narrow observations may inform policy
responses, as when early estimates of the decline in GDP in 2008 caused by the financial
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Narrow Observations Stylized Facts Causal Theories Policy
Figure 6.6: Stylized facts mediate the link between observations and theories.
Narrow Observations Stylized Facts Causal Theories Policy
Figure 6.7: A more complex model highlighting the direct influence of observations and
stylized facts on policy.
Narrow Observations Stylized Facts Causal Theories Policy
Regimes of Perceptibility
Figure 6.8: This model highlights how causal theories and policies together produce
regimes of perceptibility, including institutionalized policy devices for seeing, that influ-
ence which observations are made and how those observations are combined into stylized
facts.
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crisis underestimated the extent of the recession, and (according to some commentators)
led to the Obama administration pursuing a smaller fiscal stimulus than was needed to prop
up the economy (Grunwald 2012, see chapter 4 for details). As we saw, stylized facts
can have a powerful influence on public understandings of economic problems, as when
the identification of the rise of the 1% reshaped contemporary American understandings
of inequality. Finally, broad economic theories may guide the actions of economists in
positions of institutional authority (like heads of central banks).
Beyond their direct influence on particular policy debates, and, crucially for understand-
ing the history of inequality knowledge, prior theories may also condition the production of
new methods of observation (i.e. policy devices for seeing) and thus limit the kinds of new
narrow observations and stylized facts which accumulate. Put another way: if economists
theorize that X is irrelevant to their current theoretical understanding of some process, they
will not advocate for (or produce on their own) systems of observation capable of tracking
X. Thus, our current regimes of perceptibility are shaped by past understandings of what
was worth observing (as depicted in Figure 6.8). Human capital theory shaped the produc-
tion of data about inequality, leading economists to advocate for better microdata produced
by increasingly detailed surveys and, simultaneously, led economists to abandon the study
of tax records (and the production of easy to use secondary data sets based on tax records).
Thus, in addition to incorporating our existing understandings of the role of economics
in policy, this model suggests two novel paths of influence: the direct role of stylized facts
in shaping policy debates, and the indirect role of economic theories on policy through
their shaping of our regimes of perceptibility. The history of inequality knowledge in the
post-WWII United States nicely demonstrates both of these paths.
6.6.2 Ignorance and Sustained Attention
Beyond this conceptual model of the economic knowledge and policy, the rediscovery of
the 1% also contributes to ongoing discussions around the production of ignorance by high-
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lighting the importance of sustained attention. Most of the existing research on agnotology
follows one of two paths. The first studies the intentional, strategic production of igno-
rance, often connected to the profit motive of large corporations who benefit from political
inaction and thus from the appearance of scientific controversy (Proctor 1995, Oreskes
and Conway 2010). The second examines the unintentional or normative production of
ignorance (“undone science”), often connected to social movement pressure to change dis-
ciplinary norms and thus alter the way science is done or expand the objects of scientific
inquiry (Epstein 2007, Fickel et al. 2010, Kleinman and Suryanarayanan 2013). The redis-
covery of the 1% has much in common with the “undone science” tradition, as the failure to
observe trends in top incomes resulted from the particular ways that economists’ regimes of
perceptibility excluded top incomes from view rather than a strategic attempt to obfuscate
wealth at the very top.
Unlike the majority of undone science cases, the rediscovery of the 1% did not require
the acceptance of new methods or new data, but rather a return to older, simpler methods
that had been put aside because newer tools became available (and those tools were better
suited to economists’ theoretical interests). If economists had simply updated the estimates
from NBER (1921), Kuznets (1953), and Radner and Hinrichs (1974), the growth of top
incomes would have been observed in the mid-1980s without resorting to new methods or
new kinds of data. Similarly, if the growth of top incomes had occurred 20 years earlier, it
would have been picked up in the Department of Commerce’s estimates.33
Finally, that the 1992 “Krugman calculation” debate did not result in sustained attention
to top incomes highlights the importance of linking narrow observations to routine methods
33An analysis of comparable figures from Radner and Hinrichs (1974) and Piketty and Saez (2003) shows
how closely matched the two datasets are. For example, Radner and Hinrichs (1974) find that in 1964, the
top .1% received 1.9% of all income; Piketty and Saez (2003) find that in 1964, the top .1% received 1.97%
of all income. For 1971, Radner and Hinrichs (1974) find that the top 1% of consumer units received 7.2%
of all incomes; Piketty and Saez find that the top 1% receive 7.79% of all incomes. This closeness is, of
course, unsurprising, as Piketty and Saez and Radner and Hinrichs (1974) both rely on the same underlying
tax data. Differences are in part accounted for by slight variations in the income concept, and the definition of
the relevant units of analysis — the SCB figures, for example, incorporate some microdata to estimate family
incomes rather than tax units.
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of observation and broader theoretical frameworks. As an isolated calculation, Krugman’s
calculation was a political claim used to criticize the economic legacy of Ronald Reagan.
Piketty and Saez instead framed their calculation in the long sweep of the past century,
and published their findings in academic journals rather than feeding them into op-eds and
stump speeches. They also continued calculating the top 1% share, as part of a comparative
research program that has now produced data about trends in top incomes for more than 25
countries.34 In short, Piketty and Saez built a new regime of perceptibility for top incomes
that both analyzed data and interpreted it (at least enough to produce stylized facts and
comparative evaluations of different countries), and thus provided sustained attention that
made it impossible for top incomes to simply recede into the background as they did after
the 1992 presidential election.
6.7 Conclusion
The facts of income inequality do not speak for themselves in the accumulated
statistical frequency distributions. The facts must be recognized in the statis-
tical constructs, and interpreted from them. (Mincer 1957 quoted in Teixeira
2007: 33)
In short, top income inequality has become one of the defining social problems of the
21st century. That top inequality was not one of the defining social problems of the 1980s
and 1990s tells us something about the importance of economic experts in channeling pub-
lic attention towards certain kinds of inequalities, and away from others. As Mincer (1957)
noted, the facts of inequality — like all facts — do not speak for themselves, they must
be recognized and interpreted. What Mincer did not highlight was precisely who gets to
do that interpretation, who chooses which aspects of the statistics to highlight or ignore.
Economists and government statistical bureaus jointly construct systems of observation
that carefully track certain aspects of the economic system, while disattending to others.
34http://topincomes.g-mond.parisschoolofeconomics.eu/, accessed September 8,
2014.
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To understand why we care so much about top inequalities now, and why we seemed to care
so little as recently as 20 years ago, we must understand both changes in the distribution
itself and changes in the production of inequality knowledge.
What other facts about inequality are out there, waiting to be (re)discovered?
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CHAPTER 7
Conclusion
7.1 “You Can’t Feed a Family with GDP”
We’ve all heard the aphorism that “a rising tide lifts all boats.” If we think of national
income — or GDP — as the economy’s tide, then this particular aphorism more or less
held true in practice for decades.1 For most of the post-WWII era, years of strong economic
growth (when the economy’s size increased, the tide was up) were good across the board.
Poor people did better, rich people did better. GDP was not quite a “sufficient statistic”
for understanding economic performance, but it was a pretty reasonable approximation.2
Since the mid-1990s (or perhaps a bit earlier), this story has changed dramatically. The
link between measured economic growth and rising standards of living seems to have been
severed. Take, for example, a recent New York Times (2014) story, “You Can’t Feed a
Family with GDP.” The story documents the continued rise of the GDP per capita alongside
the stagnation and decline of median household incomes in the late 1990s to present 2000s
(as illustrated in Figure 7.1). As the NYT summarizes, “Around 1999, growth in the United
States economy stopped translating to growth in middle-class incomes.”
The data here show another version of the “stylized facts” of income inequality laid out
in the previous chapter. We know that the top 1% have received an increasing share of all
1The use of this aphorism in connection with national prosperity is associated with President Kennedy,
who often employed it in both his election campaign and presidency to describe how prosperity in one state
would help lift the entire nation’s economy. See, for example, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/
ws/index.php?pid=60414&st=rising+tide&st1=.
2In statistics, a “sufficient statistic” is a function of the data that contains all information necessary for
inference about an unknown parameter.
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Figure 7.1: From New York Times (2014).
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income, and we know that wages for typical workers have been flat or decreasing. What
this framing highlights is how the takeoff of the 1% implies a rupture in the meaning of
GDP. The American economy recovered well from the 2008-2009 financial crisis, but the
American people did not. The rising tide now only lifts a few boats.
This narrative has become ubiquitous. As I was writing this conclusion, a colleague
alerted me to yet another news story on the disconnect between the apparent performance
of the economy and the lived economic experience of individuals: “My Economy: Hard
work, risk and opportunity in Alabama.” (Marketplace 2015)3 The story opens:
The American economy looks pretty good on paper right now. We’re adding
jobs — not as many as we’d like — but we’re adding them. The country’s
gross domestic product is expanding — again, not as fast as we’d like, but
it’s growing. Wall Street is doing pretty well. Corporate profits are up. The
recession ended five and a half years ago.
But it sure doesn’t feel that way to a lot of the country.
This tension surrounding the inability of the GDP to capture even narrowly-conceived
economic performance for the majority of people is somewhat different from older criti-
cisms of the GDP’s exclusion or mistreatment of important areas of social life (for a review
of criticisms of GDP, see Stiglitz et al 2010). As discussed in chapter 5, national income
statistics have never adequately accounted for unpaid labor, mostly performed by women.
The output of government is treated in an ad hoc fashion that may downplay the importance
of public works and infrastructure by treating them as final consumption (Kuznets 1948).
The environment is left out, leading to well-known paradoxes such as spending on pollution
reduction leading to increases in measured economic growth (Nordhaus and Tobin 1972).
These criticisms generally take the form of accusing GDP of leaving something out, and in
turn, of “the economy” being incomplete.4
3See https://twitter.com/StephenMolldrem/status/662364161439956992 for the
notifying tweet, November 5, 2015.
4Feminist geographers Cameron and Gibson-Graham (2003) argue that these criticisms call for “complet-
ing” the economy by including more and more within its boundaries, but in so doing fundamentally reinforce
a narrow vision of economic production located in the for-profit enterprises and markets.
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Rather than engaging in this variety of critique, this dissertation has been an exercise
in historical ontology (Hacking 2002) in the service of understanding the present space
of economic debate. How did we come to have an object called “the economy”? Why
do certain statistics play such a central role in defining it? How might things have been
otherwise?
The five substantive chapters of this dissertation begin to answer these questions. Along
the way, they offer insights relevant to several contemporary debates in sociology, political
science and science studies, as well as the history of economics. In chapter 2, I drew on
a large sample of economic discourse to adjudicate between two competing positions in
the historiography of macroeconomics. I showed how both camps had captured part of the
story. By the end of the 19th century, political economy had emerged as a well-developed
field of thought, and “the economic” had formed as a sphere of life complementary to
politics and nature. In the mid-20th century, “the economy” as technical object forms
on top of this economic sphere. The economy is distinct from economic life (and from
politics or nature) in that it has a well-defined, routinely measured size, meaning that its
growth (or decline) can be (seemingly) objectively measured and controlled. Chapter 2
thus established the timing of the emergence of the economy and of economic life, and
helped to make sense of the competing narratives of historians of economic thought who
have variously emphasized either the late 18th or mid-20th century as the moment of the
economy’s emergence.
In chapter 3, I engaged in the messy work of tracing the assemblage that formed the
economy as a technical object. I traced some of the conditions that made possible the
emergence of timely aggregate economic statistics. This historical exercise helped make
sense of why, for example, the Depression of 1893 or early 19th century financial panics
did not lead to the same outburst of novel statistical practices, fields of economic thoughts,
and modes of economic governance. I then trace the history of how national income statis-
tics in particular emerged as the key aggregate for defining and bounding the economy
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in the 1930s and 1940s. The Great Depression amplified existing interest in measuring
economic outcomes, and led to the institutionalization of official national income account-
ing. National income proved its worth in World War II, as By the end of World War II,
the modern macroeconomic regime of perceptibility was largely complete, with quarterly
measurements of GNP, along with monthly measurements of unemployment and inflation.
This regime made visible (and thus potentially governable) small changes in what came to
be understood as the size of the economy, changes that would simply have been invisible
in earlier eras.
Chapter 4 examines how the availability of timely aggregate economic statistics re-
shaped the capacities and obligations of the state. Government had long been understood
as playing a central, constitutive role in economic life. Populists and progressives debated
a wide range of economic interventions in the late 19th and early 20th century, and belittled
the old dogmas of laissez-faire. These interventions focused on the structures of economic
life — the institutions that enabled markets and firms to function, including property and
contract law, and anti-trust enforcement. Economic debates in this period did not yet envi-
sion a “data dependent” role for the state, where the state’s proper course of action would
be dictated by the current conditions of “the economy” or something similar. In the 1920s
and 1930s, planners of various political affiliations began to propose and enact more timely
forms of economic governance, with proposals like countercyclical public works to com-
bat unemployment, and open-market operations by the Federal Reserve to control financial
markets. In the 1940s and 1950s, fueled by the newly visible economy, politicians began
to embrace a macroeconomic vision of economic governance. “Managing the economy”
supplemented older visions of the state’s role, and politicians began to promise reforms
couched in terms of precise targets for unemployment, and especially economic growth.
Politicians were simultaneously increasingly responsible for delivering on these promises,
independent of the capacity of their proposed interventions to actually achieve their precise
macroeconomic objectives. By the 1970s, politicians increasingly sought ways to offload
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their newfound responsibilities back onto the market, thus setting up some of the dynamics
explored in recent work on neoliberalism and the turn of finance.
The following two chapters turned away from what was made possible by the formation
of the economy to what was left out, or made more difficult. Chapter 5 showed why unpaid
housework continually floats on the edge of inclusion in national income (and thus in the
economy), never quite yielding to the national income accountants’ demands for unequivo-
cal, objective, market-based valuations. Chapter 6 looks at the treatment of the distribution
of income in both the macroeconomic regime of perceptibility, and in the parallel regime
associated with labor economics. Macroeconomists largely ignored the distribution of in-
come, and efforts to include measures of distribution in the national accounts were ignored
and defunded. Labor economists, in contrast, examined the distribution of earnings, but
did not care about wider measures of incomes, and were content to leave unexamined the
extreme tails of the distribution in exchange for richer information about the sources of
variation in the middle. Together, these two regimes of perceptibility produced compelling
and influential stylized facts summarizing our understanding of the dynamics of aggregate
income and sources of variation in earnings, but failed to observe changes in top incomes.
Only when public finance economists began to construct a new regime of perceptibility
using tax data to specifically examine top incomes did the stylized fact of the rise of the top
1% receive sustained attention, and thus become a matter of both academic and political
concern.
7.2 Multiplying Economies
Having shown how we got here, I now briefly turn to where else we might have gone. Mol
(2002) sensitized us to the importance of practices in enacting our technical objects. Na-
tional income statistics enacted the economy. It follows, then, that understanding how else
we might have measured national income — or what we might have measured instead of
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national income — should give us some insight into alternative shapes the economy could
have taken. These alternatives veer from “plausible worlds” (Hawthorn 1993) — events
that almost happened, debates that could have gone otherwise — towards increasingly dis-
tant possibilities. I start by asking, what if we measured GDP a bit differently? What if the
economy had a slightly different size? I then proceed to ask, what if the economy had no
size? What if we measured economic life in some entirely different way? Next, I ask, what
if “the economy” never came into being as a sociotechnical object, but rather remained a
fuzzy conceptual space more akin to politics or nature? And last, I ask what if the eco-
nomic had never become conceptually separated from the political or the natural? These
accounts — especially the final two — are highly speculative. At a minimum, they should
dramatize the transformations in economic discourse that have taken place over the past
hundred years, and how difficult it is to imagine a world without well-defined, bounded,
measured economies.
7.2.1 A Different GDP
The first set of counterfactuals are the most plausible, and the most informed by the his-
torical record. Although GDP has settled into a relatively stable form over the past cen-
tury, there have been many moments of contention about the particular choices made in
its construction, and especially in the 1920s-1940s, there were many alternatives seriously
considered. For example, it is relatively easy to imagine a world in which the advocates
for the inclusion of unpaid housework were a bit more compelling in their arguments, and
a bit less tentative in their worries about the underlying data. Similarly we can imagine
a world in which the politics of inequality in the 1950s-1960s were slightly different, en-
abling the Department of Commerce to successfully acquire funding to better incorporate
income distribution into the National Income and Product Accounts framework. How im-
portant would these changes — or similar alterations — have been? What would have
changed (and what might change in the near future) if we measured GDP a bit differently?
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My contention is that these changes would have had important effects on particular
economic debates, but would not have changed the overall shape of economic governance
or our broadest understandings of “the economy” and its importance. Take the example
of housework. Suppose unpaid housework had been added to the official national income
statistics in the 1930s and the official UN standards of the 1950s. How would that change
have affected later New Deal planning efforts, the mobilization for World War II, or the
post-war politics of growth? The increased attention to housework might have led to a
sharper consideration of the tradeoffs made by women on the home front and a quicker
understanding of the idea that one of the reasons the US economy was so productive during
World War II is that women increased their paid work more than expected, in part due to the
dramatic decrease in the birth rate. The need to measure unpaid household labor to produce
accurate estimates of its value might have spurred earlier measurement of time use and per-
haps an earlier, stronger debate around the problem of the “second shift” (Hochschild 1989)
and issues of the productivity of unpaid labor (Folbre and Wagman 1993). These are im-
portant changes, and show the influence of economic experts and regimes of perceptibility
on how we understand and act on the economic world.
And yet the basic structure of the national income statistics, and the economy it defined,
would have remained the same. The basis for valuation would still be market prices, the
boundaries of the statistics would still be nation states, and so on. The politics of growth
could have proceeded apace, with a few more footnotes about the difficulty of measuring
variations in unpaid work. The economy would still have had a size, knowable and govern-
able in close to real time. “Completing the economy” would not fundamentally disrupt it
(Cameron and Gibson-Graham 2003). We would likely still think and talk much as we do
now.
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7.2.2 The Economy, But Not As We Know It
Another way to dramatize the importance of the rise of the macroeconomic regime of per-
ceptibility centered around national income statistics to suppose instead that an alternate
measurement system came to dominate our understanding of aggregate economic affairs.
We can see the possibility for such alternatives in several places: in the Soviet Union’s Ma-
terial Product System (a variant of national accounting derived from a particularly restric-
tive reading of Marx’s labor theory of value, see Herrera 2010), in Germany’s abandonment
of national income statistics during World War II in favor of more disaggregated measures
(Tooze 2001), and the long tradition of research on input/output economics most promi-
nently associated with Wassily Leontief (Dorfman 1973). In 1941, Leontief published an
influential book on input/output economics titled The Structure of the American Economy
— the same title as the 1939 NRC report, but with a vision linked to a very different statisti-
cal system than the national income-based discussions that eventually won out. All of these
systems still relied on large scale quantification efforts, and produced detailed systems of
accounts capable of organizing data about many aspects of the economic system.
These different statistical frameworks connect to different understandings of economic
planning. For example, Leontief’s version of the economy focused not on the total size
of the system, but on the pattern of flows between sectors. Input/output economics are
much more compatible with detailed, industry-level planning of the sort attempted in the
mid-1930s, but abandoned in favor of Keynesian-inflected macroeconomic management
after facing increasing resistance from business interests and the courts. Stapleford (2011)
documents how National Resources Committee moved away from Gardiner Means’ vision
of “multi-industry planning” (Lee 1990) in 1937-1939 in part due to data limitations —
Means could not generate the detailed statistics needed for more fine-grained control of
industries. If Means had been a bit more successful at producing the data needed for his
analysis, or if Leontief’s empirical work had been completed a bit earlier, we could imag-
ine “the economy” defined not in terms of its size but in terms of its Patterns of Resource
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Use (as Means’ 1938 book was titled). Such an economy might have foregrounded dis-
cussions of “balance” over discussions of “growth.” Indeed, it’s hard to imagine talking
about growth without some singular measure of size. Without a single aggregate measure
of economic performance, economies would be much more difficult to compare, and the
political debates around economic performance would have had to change as well.
Such a system would have had to win over many skeptical converts — all of the forces
that arrayed to fight industry-level planning — but if it had, the resulting economy would
have looked substantially different. Perhaps the disconnect between industry-level flows
and quality of life would have been large enough that another quality of life measure would
have surfaced and become dominant, more cleanly separating economic performance and
overall well-being. It’s much harder to imagine what our economic debates would look like
without recourse to a single measure of an economy’s size.
7.2.3 Long Live Economic Life!
Even more alien is a counterfactual in which economic life never becomes so quantified.
Or, put differently, where the various efforts to quantify bits of economic life are never
amalgamated into a unified statistical framework. Nature and politics offer instructive par-
allels. The efforts to quantify nature in its various forms — from biodiversity to global
climate — have been truly vast (Edwards 2010). Similarly, although perhaps not quite so
strikingly, political scientists have quantified everything from partisan position to the corre-
lates of war. And yet neither of these efforts has quite so transformed “nature” or “politics”
into a technical object on its own.
Put this way, it’s not so difficult to imagine a persistent discourse of economic life that
made little or no recourse to unifying statistics. Macroeconomics would be very different
or absent entirely. Economic life would still be quantified, measured, and manipulated,
much as nature and politics are, but its boundaries would remain fuzzy.
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7.2.4 Embeddedness Forever
Finally, we imagine a counterfactual in which the economic never discursively separates
from the political or the natural. This counterfactual requires traveling back long before
the 19th century (where my analysis begins), but again, I think it is worth spending a mo-
ment to ponder. As Polanyi (1944) long ago noted, the idea that the economy is separated
(“disembedded”) from politics and nature has had very destructive consequences. It pro-
duced the fiction that land, labor, and money could be treated as commodities independent
of their realities as nature itself, human beings, and a political convention. I do not know
what a world without a separate economic sphere would look like, one in which the basic
“stuff” of social life consisted of some ontology other than our own. In many ways, this
possibility is much more foreign than any of those discussed above. We can imagine, with
some difficulty, a world where the economy remains indistinct and conceptual, less like an
object and more like a domain of life. But what would a truly embedded society look like,
one that never convinced itself that economic things were different from political things? I
leave descriptions of such a counterfactual as an exercise for the reader.
7.3 Limitations
Every research project has its blind spots and an unwieldy historical project whose shape
twisted and turned over time has more than most. Here I briefly discuss three clear areas of
concerns and opportunities for future research.
First, the dissertation has focused primarily on the United States, and to a lesser extent
the United Kingdom. Developments in the rest of the world enter rarely. Two partial
justifications for this focus are the dominance of Anglo-American economics in the global
field (Fourcade 2006) and the influence of Anglo-American statistical conventions on the
United Nations System of National Accounts, and thus the national accounts of the rest
of the world. Despite these justifications, my analysis is clearly limited by an insufficient
216
exploration of alternative conceptions of economic life present in the 1900s-1930s in non-
English speaking countries, and by the similar absence of discussion of the spread and
implementation of the US-UK vision. Some of that work has already been completed by
others, to whom I am indebted (e.g. Tooze 2001 on Germany 1900-1945, O’Bryan 2009
on Japan post-WWII). Much more remains to be done.
Second, much of my research examined the history of economics per se. Alternative
discourses produced outside of the discipline received less attention. Again, this narrow-
ness limits the space of possibilities investigated. For example, future research might ex-
plore the Technocracy movement of the 1930s, which envisioned a statistical system built
entirely on energy rather than money as the unit of analysis. This and other movements
proposed radically different objects of management than the market-based economy. Un-
derstanding their proposals, and how they failed, would enhance the story told here.
Finally, my analysis has been somewhat circumstantial in some of its causal claims. The
overall argument is a formation story (Hirschman and Reed 2014), a narrative account of
the coming into being of a new kind of thing and the consequences resulting from its emer-
gence. The chapters of this dissertation vary in their approach, focusing on establishing
the phenomena (especially chapter 2), unpacking the sequence of its events leading to the
particular version of the economy that came to dominate (chapter 3), looking at the conse-
quences of that emergence for political accountability (chapter 4), and examining two paths
not taken (chapter 5 and 6). At times I offer only suggestive evidence for important claims,
other times I make arguments about conditions for possibility rather than tight causal link-
ages. Grafting together such a miscellany produced an account that would likely not be
described as “clean.” I hope that despite this messiness, the reader comes away convinced
of the broad outlines of the story, or brimming with ideas for how to disprove it and in so
doing tighten the analysis.
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7.4 Learning to Love the GDP
In my time studying the history of national income statistics and the economy, I admit to
have grown rather fond of the GDP (and the broader system of accounts institutionalized
in mid-20th century). I empathize with the emotional tenor of Diane Coyle’s (2014) recent
book, GDP: A Brief but Affectionate History. The vast bulk of work written on GDP in
recent years has been critical. We are keenly aware of what “the economy” leaves out.
My initial forays into its history were motivated by these critical concerns. It was only in
studying the history of what GDP accomplished, what “the economy” made visible and
possible, that I began to appreciate it on its own terms. A bit less abstractly, I have come
to appreciate the political power of (seemingly) unequivocal numbers. Politicians really
are forced to account for economic performance, as imperfectly measured as it is. Try to
imagine a world without the economy, as I did above, and it becomes easier to see how
much we’ve learned within the current framework.
The economy is not a perfect invention and GDP is not a perfect measure. They reflect
the time and circumstances of their creation, and the systematic biases of their inventors.
Nonetheless, we can and should respect their accomplishments while simultaneously work-
ing towards something better.
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